Narrative:

On the flight into iad early in the morning we had initially been cleared for the ILS 1R. Approach control then cancelled the approach clearance because he had been informed that 1R was now closed due to unacceptable runway condition. 1C was declared active runway and we received vectors for ILS 1C with runway condition of 3/3/3. When we landed on 1C it was extremely rough. Snow had melted and refrozen; creating big ice berms several inches high in places. Snow plows and sweepers were out but had yet to clean the majority of taxiways and any runway. I asked for taxi assistance to get to our ramp and airport operations vehicle came out to marshal us across the airport. Throughout the taxi we had to cross vast areas completely covered in ice and snow and snow drifts up to a foot tall. I kept engine de-ice on throughout all air and ground operations.after we parked at our ramp I decided to put plugs and engine covers on the aircraft. It was windy and blowing snow and I did not want snow to get into the engine cores and melt and refreeze in case we had a substantial ground delay. The engine fans were still turning rapidly in the wind and I did not notice any damage at that time. I turned my attention to the landing gear which was completely covered in ice and snow. I cleaned off the landing gear and inspected for damage to tires; struts; actuators and brake lines because my main concern was landing gear damage due to the rough ground condition we had encountered.about an hour later with passengers on board we received clearance to our filed destination with runway 1C still the active runway; runway condition 3/3/3 and no departure delays. We then proceeded to the de-ice pad and got de-iced with type 1 and type 4. We kept engines running during the de-icing. We then received taxi instructions across the airport to runway 1C. Again I kept the engine heat on throughout all taxiing. While some taxiways had been cleared of snow in the meantime; most were still in really bad condition. In the hour we had been on parked on the ramp there had been a lot of snow plow activity on the airport. I made the wrong assumption that since iad is a major international airport the active runway had received priority and been swept before they would clear anybody to depart from it. We were cleared for takeoff on 1C. The runway was just as rough and contaminated as when we had landed. The aircraft was jostled and shaken violently and combined with the poor friction it was literally skipping sideways across the runway. At around 80-90 knots it became clear I would not be able to maintain directional control and I aborted the takeoff. I never touched the wheel brakes as the snow and roughness of the runway was enough to slow the aircraft down and we coasted to a stop before exiting. I informed ATC that 1C was unacceptable for takeoff due to the rough ice contamination. They offered us runway 30 for takeoff instead. Last runway condition for 30 was 2/2/2 and last aircraft had departed 2.5 hours ago. I refused runway 30. Runway 1R was offered. It was in the process of being cleared and would be ready shortly with an updated runway condition report. At this point the temperature had increased to zero celsius; the sun was up and our type 4 de-ice fluid had not sheared off on the takeoff attempt. There was no visual wing contamination and I decided that further de-icing would be unnecessary. Rather than taxi back; I accepted runway 1R and would wait for an updated condition report. We received taxi instructions across the airport to runway 1R. Again we encountered significant taxiway contamination that required significant thrust to taxi across. Halfway across the airport; the airport ground operations supervisor broke in on the radio and said 'runway 1R is closed. I don't know why they're sending you there'. A discussion ensued on the radio between ATC and airport operations as which runway was open and active. Everything seemed rather disorganized.airport operations told us directly it would be 30-40 minutes before they would have 1R cleared. We then told ATC we would taxi back and wait it out instead.the passengers deplaned and we added some more fuel. I also spent considerable time cleaning snow and ice accumulation off the landing gear and injured my hands in the process. It was still windy and the fans were spinning and I did not notice any external damage to the engines. The air temperature was now just above freezing and I decided against a second de-icing. It was nearly an hour before we got word that runway 1R had now been cleared and opened for takeoff. The engine de-ice bleed air switches were selected on throughout all ground operations from right after engine start. Again it took considerable power to taxi across the ice contaminated portions of the taxiways. I briefed my copilot that we would cycle the gear an extra time after takeoff to fling off snow and ice. We [were] the third aircraft to take off from 1R. I was flying pilot and I did notice that the aircraft was pulling slightly left. That was consistent with the wind direction but I also assumed it was more pronounced because of possible snow and ice in the brakes. After takeoff there was some vibration which I ascribed to ice on the underside of the wing from the takeoff roll or possibly an inboard landing gear door not being able to close completely. The engines performed normally at that time. As I accelerated above 10000 feet the vibration subsided. As we reached 30000 feet it became clear that the left engine was operating subpar and we would not be able to climb to the planned 40000 feet cruise altitude. I switched engine sync to N2 instead of N1 but there would be an N1 split between the engines with left engine maxing out first. Fuel flow; oil temp; oil pressure; generator performance etc. Seemed consistent with an otherwise healthy engine so I elected to complete the flight at 36000 feet. I was extremely tired and exhausted at this time.after landing and deplaning passengers the FBO line service man mentioned that we appear to have lost some fan blades. A post flight inspection revealed ice damage to several fan blades on #1 engine and a chip out of a stator on number 2 engine. I do not know at what point throughout the morning's events the damage might have occurred.I should have called fatigue and scrubbed the flight that morning. My judgement was impaired by job fatigue; stress and lack of sleep. We had been flying a lot; had a full schedule every single day of this rotation. We've had to deal with weather; missed approaches; destination changes due to weather and multiple maintenance issues. For the last couple of days I had been dropping hints to our company that I was getting really tired and close to calling fatigue. The company response was to keep loading up our schedule. The night prior I had been locked out of my hotel room after returning from dinner due to a technical issue with the electronic lock. It took considerable time and hotel security to come and fix the lock and let me into my room. I was around midnight before I got to sleep. My alarm woke me up at well before sunrise. On the final leg I was unable to stay awake and had to take controlled nap. I was not thinking clearly that morning and my judgement as a captain could have been much better.one of our rtu's (radio tuning unit) had failed days earlier. Company maintenance decided to defer it by MEL as long as possible rather than fix or replace it as soon as practical. There had been opportunities to replace the rtu in either north or south maintenance stations; but instead we kept flying with a single rtu. On every flight we had to operate two radios using a single rtu. It takes a lot of mental focus to keep from messing up frequencies when using a single unit. During all of our taxiing across the airport in iad we had to communicate on 3 frequencies simultaneously: ATC ground control; ramp control and FBO. It was extremely mentally exhausting to only have a single rtu for that.dulles airport seemed caught by surprise by the late season snow storm and didn't seem to have a coherent plan. I was appalled by the lousy condition of the active runway 1C. While we managed to land on it alright; along with some heavier jets; the small wheels on our jets were unable to cope as well as the larger jet's wheels. The same goes for the poor condition of the taxiways. I have been at many airports over the years; big and small; and this is by far the worst snow cleaning I have ever experienced. The poor planning was evidenced by the confusion and discussion on open radio between ATC and airport operations. Ironically; if this had been a small uncontrolled airport I would have personally made the call and deemed all surface conditions unacceptable for operating until completely cleaned. But because this was a major international airport with snow cleaning equipment and airport operations vehicles inspecting taxiways and runways I deferred to their judgment instead. I did not think that a major airport would clear aircraft to operate on unsafe surfaces. I should have listened to my personal intuition and experience; but I was tired and stressed.I never heard any chunks of ice being ingested into the engines even though considerable power had to be used during taxi at iad. The roughness; drag and noise from the wheels plowing through the taxiway snow might have masked any engine events. I should probably have given more thought to a more thorough inspection of the engines. But every time we were parked I did not see any external damage to the engine cowlings or intakes and the fans were spinning rapidly in the breeze. Inspecting the fans would have entailed climbing up on the slippery wing and stopping the fan disc with my hands first. My main focus had been on inspecting and cleaning the landing gear which had seen significant abuse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air taxi Captain reported departing IAD during an unexpectedly late snow and ice event which resulted in damage to both engines discovered at their destination.

Narrative: On the flight into IAD early in the morning we had initially been cleared for the ILS 1R. Approach control then cancelled the approach clearance because he had been informed that 1R was now closed due to unacceptable runway condition. 1C was declared active runway and we received vectors for ILS 1C with runway condition of 3/3/3. When we landed on 1C it was extremely rough. Snow had melted and refrozen; creating big ice berms several inches high in places. Snow plows and sweepers were out but had yet to clean the majority of taxiways and any runway. I asked for taxi assistance to get to our ramp and airport operations vehicle came out to marshal us across the airport. Throughout the taxi we had to cross vast areas completely covered in ice and snow and snow drifts up to a foot tall. I kept engine de-ice on throughout all air and ground operations.After we parked at our ramp I decided to put plugs and engine covers on the aircraft. It was windy and blowing snow and I did not want snow to get into the engine cores and melt and refreeze in case we had a substantial ground delay. The engine fans were still turning rapidly in the wind and I did not notice any damage at that time. I turned my attention to the landing gear which was completely covered in ice and snow. I cleaned off the landing gear and inspected for damage to tires; struts; actuators and brake lines because my main concern was landing gear damage due to the rough ground condition we had encountered.About an hour later with passengers on board we received clearance to our filed destination with runway 1C still the active runway; runway condition 3/3/3 and no departure delays. We then proceeded to the de-ice pad and got de-iced with type 1 and type 4. We kept engines running during the de-icing. We then received taxi instructions across the airport to runway 1C. Again I kept the engine heat on throughout all taxiing. While some taxiways had been cleared of snow in the meantime; most were still in really bad condition. In the hour we had been on parked on the ramp there had been a lot of snow plow activity on the airport. I made the wrong assumption that since IAD is a major international airport the active runway had received priority and been swept before they would clear anybody to depart from it. We were cleared for takeoff on 1C. The runway was just as rough and contaminated as when we had landed. The aircraft was jostled and shaken violently and combined with the poor friction it was literally skipping sideways across the runway. At around 80-90 knots it became clear I would not be able to maintain directional control and I aborted the takeoff. I never touched the wheel brakes as the snow and roughness of the runway was enough to slow the aircraft down and we coasted to a stop before exiting. I informed ATC that 1C was unacceptable for takeoff due to the rough ice contamination. They offered us runway 30 for takeoff instead. Last runway condition for 30 was 2/2/2 and last aircraft had departed 2.5 hours ago. I refused runway 30. Runway 1R was offered. It was in the process of being cleared and would be ready shortly with an updated runway condition report. At this point the temperature had increased to zero Celsius; the sun was up and our type 4 de-ice fluid had not sheared off on the takeoff attempt. There was no visual wing contamination and I decided that further de-icing would be unnecessary. Rather than taxi back; I accepted runway 1R and would wait for an updated condition report. We received taxi instructions across the airport to runway 1R. Again we encountered significant taxiway contamination that required significant thrust to taxi across. Halfway across the airport; the airport ground operations supervisor broke in on the radio and said 'runway 1R is closed. I don't know why they're sending you there'. A discussion ensued on the radio between ATC and airport operations as which runway was open and active. Everything seemed rather disorganized.Airport operations told us directly it would be 30-40 minutes before they would have 1R cleared. We then told ATC we would taxi back and wait it out instead.The passengers deplaned and we added some more fuel. I also spent considerable time cleaning snow and ice accumulation off the landing gear and injured my hands in the process. It was still windy and the fans were spinning and I did not notice any external damage to the engines. The air temperature was now just above freezing and I decided against a second de-icing. It was nearly an hour before we got word that runway 1R had now been cleared and opened for takeoff. The engine de-ice bleed air switches were selected ON throughout all ground operations from right after engine start. Again it took considerable power to taxi across the ice contaminated portions of the taxiways. I briefed my copilot that we would cycle the gear an extra time after takeoff to fling off snow and ice. We [were] the third aircraft to take off from 1R. I was flying pilot and I did notice that the aircraft was pulling slightly left. That was consistent with the wind direction but I also assumed it was more pronounced because of possible snow and ice in the brakes. After takeoff there was some vibration which I ascribed to ice on the underside of the wing from the takeoff roll or possibly an inboard landing gear door not being able to close completely. The engines performed normally at that time. As I accelerated above 10000 feet the vibration subsided. As we reached 30000 feet it became clear that the left engine was operating subpar and we would not be able to climb to the planned 40000 feet cruise altitude. I switched engine sync to N2 instead of N1 but there would be an N1 split between the engines with left engine maxing out first. Fuel flow; oil temp; oil pressure; generator performance etc. seemed consistent with an otherwise healthy engine so I elected to complete the flight at 36000 feet. I was extremely tired and exhausted at this time.After landing and deplaning passengers the FBO line service man mentioned that we appear to have lost some fan blades. A post flight inspection revealed ice damage to several fan blades on #1 engine and a chip out of a stator on Number 2 engine. I do not know at what point throughout the morning's events the damage might have occurred.I should have called fatigue and scrubbed the flight that morning. My judgement was impaired by job fatigue; stress and lack of sleep. We had been flying a lot; had a full schedule every single day of this rotation. We've had to deal with weather; missed approaches; destination changes due to weather and multiple maintenance issues. For the last couple of days I had been dropping hints to our company that I was getting really tired and close to calling fatigue. The company response was to keep loading up our schedule. The night prior I had been locked out of my hotel room after returning from dinner due to a technical issue with the electronic lock. It took considerable time and hotel security to come and fix the lock and let me into my room. I was around midnight before I got to sleep. My alarm woke me up at well before sunrise. On the final leg I was unable to stay awake and had to take controlled nap. I was not thinking clearly that morning and my judgement as a captain could have been much better.One of our RTU's (Radio Tuning Unit) had failed days earlier. Company maintenance decided to defer it by MEL as long as possible rather than fix or replace it as soon as practical. There had been opportunities to replace the RTU in either north or south maintenance stations; but instead we kept flying with a single RTU. On every flight we had to operate two radios using a single RTU. It takes a lot of mental focus to keep from messing up frequencies when using a single unit. During all of our taxiing across the airport in IAD we had to communicate on 3 frequencies simultaneously: ATC ground control; ramp control and FBO. It was extremely mentally exhausting to only have a single RTU for that.Dulles Airport seemed caught by surprise by the late season snow storm and didn't seem to have a coherent plan. I was appalled by the lousy condition of the active runway 1C. While we managed to land on it alright; along with some heavier jets; the small wheels on our jets were unable to cope as well as the larger jet's wheels. The same goes for the poor condition of the taxiways. I have been at many airports over the years; big and small; and this is by far the worst snow cleaning I have ever experienced. The poor planning was evidenced by the confusion and discussion on open radio between ATC and airport operations. Ironically; if this had been a small uncontrolled airport I would have personally made the call and deemed all surface conditions unacceptable for operating until completely cleaned. But because this was a major international airport with snow cleaning equipment and airport operations vehicles inspecting taxiways and runways I deferred to their judgment instead. I did not think that a major airport would clear aircraft to operate on unsafe surfaces. I should have listened to my personal intuition and experience; but I was tired and stressed.I never heard any chunks of ice being ingested into the engines even though considerable power had to be used during taxi at IAD. The roughness; drag and noise from the wheels plowing through the taxiway snow might have masked any engine events. I should probably have given more thought to a more thorough inspection of the engines. But every time we were parked I did not see any external damage to the engine cowlings or intakes and the fans were spinning rapidly in the breeze. Inspecting the fans would have entailed climbing up on the slippery wing and stopping the fan disc with my hands first. My main focus had been on inspecting and cleaning the landing gear which had seen significant abuse.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.