Narrative:

On 1/fri/90, I, mr. M and mr. H went to avionics to pick up our aircraft (after having an ADF and DME installed). While I was taking care of the paperwork for the avionics, mr. H called FSS and obtained a WX briefing and filed an IFR flight plan. At no time did mr. H disclose the contents of the WX briefing. During the preflight I pointed out to mr. H that there was some water and other possible contamination of the left main tank, and that the egt/cht gauge was inoperative. During taxi mr. H failed to make a proper x-chk of the flight INS. After runup I pointed out to mr. H that the wet compass was not indicating properly. We were on runway 19 and the compass was indicating west. Mr. H decided to proceed into hard IFR conditions with no wet compass, a violation of far 91.00. Mr. H adjusted the trim setting to neutral and I informed him that I usually set it aft of neutral. He insisted neutral was ok, and proceeded to scrape the tires on the runway 3 times before using sufficient back pressure to pull the aircraft off the runway. During the takeoff, mr. H held flaps in until passing 800', when I told him I was taking out the flaps. He also held in full power (past red line) until we passed 1000', when I told him I usually use 24-24 for climb. I repeated this 3 times before he reduced power. It was not until we were well into the flight that I became aware of the severity of the WX. Mr. H was unable to maintain altitude within 100' and on 3 occasions descended more than 800' below the assigned altitude of 3000'. When we hit the first downdrafts mr. H failed to reduce power until the aircraft was well into the yellow arc. When he finally reduced power, he did so in a very abrupt manner by reducing manifold pressure by more than 15' all at once. I cringe at the thought of what the cht gauge would have reflected at this point. When we encountered the updrafts mr. H did not notice the reversal of the vsi and we had gained nearly 300' before he added power all at once. This happened 3 times before mr. He responded to the query of ATC and advised them he could not maintain altitude. ATC then cleared us for 500' either way. At this point we began to encounter several lightning flashes. It was at this point the #1 navigation began to flag and became inoperative. Mr. H did not report this to ATC. Mr. H also appeared to be having a problem holding his heading any closer than 10-15 degrees. We broke out of the clouds at 1200', 3.5 mi east and 4 mi north of the airport. Mr. H was at 1000' when he turned base and 900' on final. Mr. H then pulled power back to 15' and put the propeller full forward while indicating an airspeed of 140 mph. This put the propeller past redline. Mr. H made no adjustment. We were still very high on final and mr. H pulled full flaps at over 135 mph. The flap operating range stops at 120 mph. Mr. H then executed an excellent slip to landing, but had to get on the brakes fairly hard to make the last turn off. (We landed at about 120 mph.) upon landing I checked with FSS to ascertain what the WX conditions had been at the time of our departure from conroe airport. I was told that there had been a squall line moving through the area consisting of level 3 and 4 thunderstorms. We had encountered a 46-50 KT headwind, which explained why it took nearly 1 hour to get back. It is my opinion that mr. H exercised a complete lack of regard for the safety of his passenger and the aircraft that had been entrusted to him. Flying into level 3-4 thunderstorms is an unnecessary risk, even under ideal conditions, but west/O a magnetic compass, an inoperative egt/cht, and an intermittent navigation, combined with taking off on a tank that was the opp from where the 2 passenger were sitting and known to have contamination, was extremely poor judgement and sounds a little bit like some of the accident reports I have read. If mr. M and I had been aware of the severity of the WX, we would not have gotten in the aircraft. Mr. M (also a licensed pilot) was appalled at the entire situation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter stated that the individual flying, mr. H, is the chief pilot for the aeronautical club and is well knownin the area as he gives safety lectures for the club and the FAA. A short time after this reported incident he gave the members of the aeronautical club a lecture on how not to let time constraints color your judgement in pressing on into conditions that would affect flight safety. An interesting point on this is that the reason given to the 2 passenger for the flight that day was that he had to get back home for lunch! His position as chief pilot is an appointed one and the reporter has seen him doing strange things with aircraft on training flts, such as nearly landing with gear up. The reporter was expelled from the flying club about 3 weeks after turning the report (as attached) into the president of the club. Trumped up charges were made as reasons for dismissal and the reporter is now involved in a law suit over aircraft modifications made on his aircraft related to club rules. Reporter would like to report mr. H to the FAA but feels that he is too well known and it wouldn't do any good. He feels also that some pilots turned out in the club's training program do not show the best of judgement because of the actions of mr. H.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FERRY FLT WITH AERO CLUB SMA HAS INFLT ENCOUNTER WITH WX AND THE 2 PASSENGERS HAVE EXCITING STORIES TO TELL.

Narrative: ON 1/FRI/90, I, MR. M AND MR. H WENT TO AVIONICS TO PICK UP OUR ACFT (AFTER HAVING AN ADF AND DME INSTALLED). WHILE I WAS TAKING CARE OF THE PAPERWORK FOR THE AVIONICS, MR. H CALLED FSS AND OBTAINED A WX BRIEFING AND FILED AN IFR FLT PLAN. AT NO TIME DID MR. H DISCLOSE THE CONTENTS OF THE WX BRIEFING. DURING THE PREFLT I POINTED OUT TO MR. H THAT THERE WAS SOME WATER AND OTHER POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION OF THE LEFT MAIN TANK, AND THAT THE EGT/CHT GAUGE WAS INOP. DURING TAXI MR. H FAILED TO MAKE A PROPER X-CHK OF THE FLT INS. AFTER RUNUP I POINTED OUT TO MR. H THAT THE WET COMPASS WAS NOT INDICATING PROPERLY. WE WERE ON RWY 19 AND THE COMPASS WAS INDICATING W. MR. H DECIDED TO PROCEED INTO HARD IFR CONDITIONS WITH NO WET COMPASS, A VIOLATION OF FAR 91.00. MR. H ADJUSTED THE TRIM SETTING TO NEUTRAL AND I INFORMED HIM THAT I USUALLY SET IT AFT OF NEUTRAL. HE INSISTED NEUTRAL WAS OK, AND PROCEEDED TO SCRAPE THE TIRES ON THE RWY 3 TIMES BEFORE USING SUFFICIENT BACK PRESSURE TO PULL THE ACFT OFF THE RWY. DURING THE TKOF, MR. H HELD FLAPS IN UNTIL PASSING 800', WHEN I TOLD HIM I WAS TAKING OUT THE FLAPS. HE ALSO HELD IN FULL PWR (PAST RED LINE) UNTIL WE PASSED 1000', WHEN I TOLD HIM I USUALLY USE 24-24 FOR CLB. I REPEATED THIS 3 TIMES BEFORE HE REDUCED PWR. IT WAS NOT UNTIL WE WERE WELL INTO THE FLT THAT I BECAME AWARE OF THE SEVERITY OF THE WX. MR. H WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ALT WITHIN 100' AND ON 3 OCCASIONS DSNDED MORE THAN 800' BELOW THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 3000'. WHEN WE HIT THE FIRST DOWNDRAFTS MR. H FAILED TO REDUCE PWR UNTIL THE ACFT WAS WELL INTO THE YELLOW ARC. WHEN HE FINALLY REDUCED PWR, HE DID SO IN A VERY ABRUPT MANNER BY REDUCING MANIFOLD PRESSURE BY MORE THAN 15' ALL AT ONCE. I CRINGE AT THE THOUGHT OF WHAT THE CHT GAUGE WOULD HAVE REFLECTED AT THIS POINT. WHEN WE ENCOUNTERED THE UPDRAFTS MR. H DID NOT NOTICE THE REVERSAL OF THE VSI AND WE HAD GAINED NEARLY 300' BEFORE HE ADDED PWR ALL AT ONCE. THIS HAPPENED 3 TIMES BEFORE MR. HE RESPONDED TO THE QUERY OF ATC AND ADVISED THEM HE COULD NOT MAINTAIN ALT. ATC THEN CLRED US FOR 500' EITHER WAY. AT THIS POINT WE BEGAN TO ENCOUNTER SEVERAL LIGHTNING FLASHES. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THE #1 NAV BEGAN TO FLAG AND BECAME INOP. MR. H DID NOT RPT THIS TO ATC. MR. H ALSO APPEARED TO BE HAVING A PROB HOLDING HIS HDG ANY CLOSER THAN 10-15 DEGS. WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT 1200', 3.5 MI E AND 4 MI N OF THE ARPT. MR. H WAS AT 1000' WHEN HE TURNED BASE AND 900' ON FINAL. MR. H THEN PULLED PWR BACK TO 15' AND PUT THE PROP FULL FORWARD WHILE INDICATING AN AIRSPD OF 140 MPH. THIS PUT THE PROP PAST REDLINE. MR. H MADE NO ADJUSTMENT. WE WERE STILL VERY HIGH ON FINAL AND MR. H PULLED FULL FLAPS AT OVER 135 MPH. THE FLAP OPERATING RANGE STOPS AT 120 MPH. MR. H THEN EXECUTED AN EXCELLENT SLIP TO LNDG, BUT HAD TO GET ON THE BRAKES FAIRLY HARD TO MAKE THE LAST TURN OFF. (WE LANDED AT ABOUT 120 MPH.) UPON LNDG I CHKED WITH FSS TO ASCERTAIN WHAT THE WX CONDITIONS HAD BEEN AT THE TIME OF OUR DEP FROM CONROE ARPT. I WAS TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SQUALL LINE MOVING THROUGH THE AREA CONSISTING OF LEVEL 3 AND 4 TSTMS. WE HAD ENCOUNTERED A 46-50 KT HEADWIND, WHICH EXPLAINED WHY IT TOOK NEARLY 1 HR TO GET BACK. IT IS MY OPINION THAT MR. H EXERCISED A COMPLETE LACK OF REGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF HIS PAX AND THE ACFT THAT HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED TO HIM. FLYING INTO LEVEL 3-4 TSTMS IS AN UNNECESSARY RISK, EVEN UNDER IDEAL CONDITIONS, BUT W/O A MAGNETIC COMPASS, AN INOP EGT/CHT, AND AN INTERMITTENT NAV, COMBINED WITH TAKING OFF ON A TANK THAT WAS THE OPP FROM WHERE THE 2 PAX WERE SITTING AND KNOWN TO HAVE CONTAMINATION, WAS EXTREMELY POOR JUDGEMENT AND SOUNDS A LITTLE BIT LIKE SOME OF THE ACCIDENT RPTS I HAVE READ. IF MR. M AND I HAD BEEN AWARE OF THE SEVERITY OF THE WX, WE WOULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN IN THE ACFT. MR. M (ALSO A LICENSED PLT) WAS APPALLED AT THE ENTIRE SITUATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL FLYING, MR. H, IS THE CHIEF PLT FOR THE AERO CLUB AND IS WELL KNOWNIN THE AREA AS HE GIVES SAFETY LECTURES FOR THE CLUB AND THE FAA. A SHORT TIME AFTER THIS RPTED INCIDENT HE GAVE THE MEMBERS OF THE AERO CLUB A LECTURE ON HOW NOT TO LET TIME CONSTRAINTS COLOR YOUR JUDGEMENT IN PRESSING ON INTO CONDITIONS THAT WOULD AFFECT FLT SAFETY. AN INTERESTING POINT ON THIS IS THAT THE REASON GIVEN TO THE 2 PAX FOR THE FLT THAT DAY WAS THAT HE HAD TO GET BACK HOME FOR LUNCH! HIS POS AS CHIEF PLT IS AN APPOINTED ONE AND THE RPTR HAS SEEN HIM DOING STRANGE THINGS WITH ACFT ON TRNING FLTS, SUCH AS NEARLY LNDG WITH GEAR UP. THE RPTR WAS EXPELLED FROM THE FLYING CLUB ABOUT 3 WKS AFTER TURNING THE RPT (AS ATTACHED) INTO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CLUB. TRUMPED UP CHARGES WERE MADE AS REASONS FOR DISMISSAL AND THE RPTR IS NOW INVOLVED IN A LAW SUIT OVER ACFT MODIFICATIONS MADE ON HIS ACFT RELATED TO CLUB RULES. RPTR WOULD LIKE TO RPT MR. H TO THE FAA BUT FEELS THAT HE IS TOO WELL KNOWN AND IT WOULDN'T DO ANY GOOD. HE FEELS ALSO THAT SOME PLTS TURNED OUT IN THE CLUB'S TRNING PROGRAM DO NOT SHOW THE BEST OF JUDGEMENT BECAUSE OF THE ACTIONS OF MR. H.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.