37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1433720 |
Time | |
Date | 201703 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | No Aircraft |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
This is my response to crew info bulletin XXX concerning dual cue flight director. The bulletin asked for feedback; but provided no contact information. No one really listens to the line pilots; anyway. Dear director of training and standards; glad everything is on track. Sure glad you undertook a safety and operations analysis to consider possibilities for our pilot group. I flew dual cue thirty years ago and taught it as an instructor to pilots. It's a great system; if properly trained before a person flies solo. Just last week during the snow storm; I had to do two missed approaches before landing safely; as the ceiling was yo-yoing up and down. On the first missed approach; which was a surprised to everyone; the dual cue directed me back to the localizer and programmed missed approach path while tower was directing us to climb turn right and then immediately level off. I heard half of the instructions from the startled tower controller and my first officer heard the other half. In the weather; I'm hand flying; my ADI is turning one way and my dual cue bars are going in the opposite; while my first officer and I are barking instructions/questions at each other. The second missed approach 20 minutes later went smoother. We landed safely about 45 minutes later; but needed a follow-me truck to taxi the gate; because of snowy white-out conditions at the field. Just one question; during vast and in-depth training; safety and standards analysis: have you ever thought of training the company pilots properly in a timely manner before we face new flying environment with passengers onboard? From the line; it seems your esteemed analysis has institutionalized the following training process: step one: tell the pilots a new change is coming via a gazillion bulletins from multiple sources and perhaps a video.step two: let the pilots fly the new procedure; new equipment; or vastly new flying environment with passengers onboard and ask for feedback.step three: analyzing all the feedback from the line and tell the pilots what a wonderful job everyone one has done during the new rollout.step four: if the feedback from the line suggests there are dangerous situations emerging from the on-the-job training program; then perhaps add a training bloc into the simulator two to three years after initiating the new procedure; equipment or flying environment. It feels like over the last five years flying the line; this institutionalized process of dangerous; untimely and bizarre way of training has been repeated at least two to three dozen times. This path certainly violates any training; safety or standards philosophy I was taught and this includes combat missions.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier Captain reported of possible shortcomings in company policy to train line pilots in new procedures.
Narrative: This is my response to Crew Info Bulletin XXX concerning Dual Cue flight director. The bulletin asked for feedback; but provided no contact information. No one really listens to the line Pilots; anyway. Dear Director of Training and Standards; Glad everything is on track. Sure glad you undertook a Safety and Operations Analysis to consider possibilities for our Pilot group. I flew Dual Cue thirty years ago and taught it as an instructor to Pilots. It's a great system; if properly trained BEFORE a person flies solo. Just last week during the snow storm; I had to do two missed approaches before landing safely; as the ceiling was yo-yoing up and down. On the first missed approach; which was a surprised to everyone; the dual cue directed me back to the Localizer and programmed missed approach path while Tower was directing us to climb turn right and then immediately level off. I heard half of the instructions from the startled Tower Controller and my First Officer heard the other half. In the weather; I'm hand flying; my ADI is turning one way and my dual cue bars are going in the opposite; while my First Officer and I are barking instructions/questions at each other. The second missed approach 20 minutes later went smoother. We landed safely about 45 minutes later; but needed a follow-me truck to taxi the gate; because of snowy white-out conditions at the field. Just one question; during vast and in-depth Training; Safety and Standards analysis: HAVE YOU EVER THOUGHT OF TRAINING THE COMPANY PILOTS PROPERLY IN A TIMELY MANNER BEFORE WE FACE NEW FLYING ENVIRONMENT WITH PASSENGERS ONBOARD? From the line; it seems your esteemed analysis has institutionalized the following training process: Step one: Tell the Pilots a new change is coming via a gazillion bulletins from multiple sources and perhaps a video.Step two: Let the Pilots fly the new procedure; new equipment; or vastly new flying environment with Passengers onboard and ask for feedback.Step three: Analyzing all the feedback from the line and tell the Pilots what a wonderful job everyone one has done during the new rollout.Step four: If the feedback from the line suggests there are dangerous situations emerging from the on-the-job training program; then perhaps add a training bloc into the simulator two to three years after initiating the new procedure; equipment or flying environment. It feels like over the last five years flying the line; this institutionalized process of dangerous; untimely and bizarre way of training has been repeated at least two to three dozen times. This path certainly violates any Training; Safety or Standards philosophy I was taught and this includes combat missions.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.