Narrative:

Sfo was west plan landing runway 28R and departing runway 1R. The tower scanned aircraft X indicating a runway 28 departure. Though the flight strip still indicated the pilot was assigned the trukn departure; the TRACON has agreed that when a trukn SID flight strip is scanned showing a runway 28 departure; the TRACON can expect the aircraft to fly the sntna SID. The pilot departed with an immediate right turn. As I was wondering what was going on and in the process of calling the tower; the tower controller called me and said the pilot was assigned the 28 trukn departure; he forgot to call it over. My supervisor noticed the event; asked me what was going on and subsequently called over to the tower. The supervisor at the tower seemed to think it was a non-issue since the controller called me right away to let me know what happened. A few minutes later; the tower called to say that the 'right turn' button was not functioning and that they would call over if they had any more 28 trukn departures. Based on the information contained on the flight strip scanned by the tower; the pilot was expected to depart into sutro sector airspace; but instead departed into richmond sector airspace thus entering another controller's airspace without prior coordination. The tower failed to forward the amended flight plan information to the departure controller. The tower did not comply with the appropriate strip marking as dictated in the letter of agreement (LOA) between nct and sfo. Since the tower controller knew immediately what was going on and told me he forgot to let me know; I am not convinced that the problem was the equipment. All separation on the departure sectors depends on knowing exactly what departure procedure the pilot will be departing on. When sfo tower scans a departure strip to the departure controllers showing runway 28 in this configuration; the departure coordinator has coordination responsibilities to the richmond and sutro controllers. This consists of verbal notification; data block modification and ensuring correct strip marking. When sfo tower scans a flight plan with incorrect information; the ci-1 cannot do his/her required actions to ensure proper notification to the departure controllers. Without knowing exactly what the pilot will do on departure; the departure controllers will unknowingly issue control instructions which have a high probability of conflicting with another aircraft causing a loss of separation. The other issue causing confusion is the tower not amending the flight plans to reflect what the pilot has actually been assigned. The LOA states several options that the tower may assign. We have no way of knowing what has been assigned unless the tower either makes an amendment or verbally coordinates. The above situation even demonstrates that the flight strip showing the trukn SID with a '28' indicator doesn't mean the pilot was assigned the sntna SID. There are some sfo tower controllers who do make an flight data input/output (fdio) amendment when a SID is different from what was originally assigned by computer. We have absolutely no problems with the strips or pilots taking off on an unexpected route of flight. I would like to thank those individuals who do this. They reduce coordination; eliminate confusion and ensure safety. Since the whole purpose of this program stated goal is safety; I can't help but wonder why this problem continues. This is a problem that originates at the tower. The tower is the responsible entity for their flight plans; the tower is responsible for forwarding flight plan information they amend; the tower is expected to comply with the LOA. On this configuration; whenever an aircraft departs runway 28 unexpectedly; the tower usually advises the coordinator that the equipment is not working. In the past I have put the tower on call for release until the equipment is fixed only to be advised 5 minutes later or less that it is working again. I have worked with [multiple airports] when they genuinely have scanning equipment problems. These problems are not fixed in 5 minutes. Though I cannot say exactly what transpires at the tower when an event like this happens; the usual answer is to blame equipment. I recommend that sfo tower perform their required duty to forward amended flight plan information to the coordinator. The LOA does not constitute control coordination regarding the responsibility to forward amended flight plan information to the receiving controller. It should be obvious that leaving the departure controller to wonder what was issued to the pilot is unsafe and reckless. If this is an internal procedure problem within the tower; for example; not following procedure in order to ensure correct communication; I recommend call for release on the runway 28 departures as described above until training can be provided to ensure proper and safe coordination to the receiving facility. If the scanning equipment cannot be reliably depended upon to correctly send over departure information; I recommend sfo call for release on all departures. The scanning equipment should be decommissioned from service until maintenance can trouble shoot the problem with the 'buttons' etc. If the equipment cannot be reliably depended upon; the tower will have to continue to call for release.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A TRACON Departure Controller reports SFO Tower routinely allows departures to depart with the wrong route indicated on the flight plan and not coordinating the correct departure runway.

Narrative: SFO was west plan landing Runway 28R and departing Runway 1R. The Tower scanned Aircraft X indicating a Runway 28 departure. Though the flight strip still indicated the pilot was assigned the TRUKN departure; the TRACON has agreed that when a TRUKN SID flight strip is scanned showing a Runway 28 departure; the TRACON can expect the aircraft to fly the SNTNA SID. The pilot departed with an immediate right turn. As I was wondering what was going on and in the process of calling the Tower; the Tower controller called me and said the pilot was assigned the 28 TRUKN Departure; he forgot to call it over. My Supervisor noticed the event; asked me what was going on and subsequently called over to the tower. The Supervisor at the Tower seemed to think it was a non-issue since the controller called me right away to let me know what happened. A few minutes later; the Tower called to say that the 'right turn' button was not functioning and that they would call over if they had any more 28 TRUKN departures. Based on the information contained on the flight strip scanned by the tower; the pilot was expected to depart into Sutro Sector airspace; but instead departed into Richmond Sector airspace thus entering another controller's airspace without prior coordination. The Tower failed to forward the amended flight plan information to the Departure Controller. The tower did not comply with the appropriate strip marking as dictated in the Letter of Agreement (LOA) between NCT and SFO. Since the Tower controller knew immediately what was going on and told me he forgot to let me know; I am not convinced that the problem was the equipment. All separation on the departure sectors depends on knowing exactly what departure procedure the pilot will be departing on. When SFO tower scans a departure strip to the Departure Controllers showing Runway 28 in this configuration; the Departure Coordinator has coordination responsibilities to the Richmond and Sutro controllers. This consists of verbal notification; Data Block modification and ensuring correct strip marking. When SFO tower scans a flight plan with incorrect information; the CI-1 cannot do his/her required actions to ensure proper notification to the departure controllers. Without knowing exactly what the pilot will do on departure; the departure controllers will unknowingly issue control instructions which have a high probability of conflicting with another aircraft causing a loss of separation. The other issue causing confusion is the Tower not amending the flight plans to reflect what the pilot has actually been assigned. The LOA states several options that the Tower may assign. We have no way of knowing what has been assigned unless the Tower either makes an amendment or verbally coordinates. The above situation even demonstrates that the flight strip showing the TRUKN SID with a '28' indicator doesn't mean the pilot was assigned the SNTNA SID. There are some SFO tower controllers who do make an Flight Data Input/Output (FDIO) amendment when a SID is different from what was originally assigned by computer. We have absolutely no problems with the strips or pilots taking off on an unexpected route of flight. I would like to thank those individuals who do this. They reduce coordination; eliminate confusion and ensure safety. Since the whole purpose of this program stated goal is safety; I can't help but wonder why this problem continues. This is a problem that originates at the Tower. The Tower is the responsible entity for their flight plans; the Tower is responsible for forwarding flight plan information they amend; the Tower is expected to comply with the LOA. On this configuration; whenever an aircraft departs Runway 28 unexpectedly; the tower usually advises the Coordinator that the equipment is not working. In the past I have put the Tower on call for release until the equipment is fixed only to be advised 5 minutes later or less that it is working again. I have worked with [multiple airports] when they genuinely have scanning equipment problems. These problems are not fixed in 5 minutes. Though I cannot say exactly what transpires at the tower when an event like this happens; the usual answer is to blame equipment. I recommend that SFO Tower perform their required duty to forward amended flight plan information to the Coordinator. The LOA does not constitute control coordination regarding the responsibility to forward amended flight plan information to the receiving controller. It should be obvious that leaving the departure controller to wonder what was issued to the pilot is unsafe and reckless. If this is an internal procedure problem within the Tower; for example; not following procedure in order to ensure correct communication; I recommend call for release on the Runway 28 departures as described above until training can be provided to ensure proper and safe coordination to the receiving facility. If the scanning equipment cannot be reliably depended upon to correctly send over departure information; I recommend SFO call for release on all departures. The scanning equipment should be decommissioned from service until maintenance can trouble shoot the problem with the 'buttons' etc. If the equipment cannot be reliably depended upon; the Tower will have to continue to call for release.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.