Narrative:

I came in for the beginning of a midshift and there was weather everywhere. On top of the weather and deviations due to special events there was additional traffic. I plugged in at sector 20 which had 3 sectors combined to it. Sector 22 had macon hi and south departure combined on it. There was a line of weather over atlanta and another line of weather over the coast of georgia. All aircraft were transitioning through the corridor between those 2 lines. The volume of traffic was crazy. Too much for the sectors to be combined the way they were; but there were not many options because of the staffing. There was way too much traffic for the amount of people we had.when I arrived for the mid shift at xa:00 there were 3 people that had been on position for over 2 hours. The 2 ultra hi sectors were getting hammered as well as sector 22. Sector 20; with the 3 sectors combined on it; started out manageable; but quickly got very busy. The added traffic departing the area only added to the complexity and volume. I called for an assist and received one in a fairly timely manner. The actual safety event came when I had an aircraft deviating at 34000 feet. I handed the aircraft off to sector 22 and switched him in a timely manner. A few minutes later; the conflict alert went off with another aircraft at 34000 feet in sector 22. The second aircraft was also deviating and was head-on with the aircraft I handed off to 22. I immediately checked to see if the original aircraft was on my frequency. He was not. Sector 22 tried frantically to call the 2 aircraft with no luck. The supervisor was standing directly behind him; just watching. I hollered across the room and told the supervisor to try the aircraft on guard frequency. Communication was established and separation was achieved. Where do I begin? The capacity far exceeded our staffing. Sectors should never have been combined or should have been split when traffic began to build. That's hard to do when you don't have the bodies. Flow control has been awful so far this year. In the 3 big weather days I've seen so far this year; every one of them has gotten completely out of control. I don't know exactly what or who needs to be addressed; but something needs to be done. At this rate; summer traffic will be unmanageable. In our area the guard frequency is on a sector that is hardly ever manned. That's unacceptable. It should actually be available at every single sector. All day long. We should all have instant access to those frequencies. When we need to call someone on guard; we have to tell the supervisor who then has to get up and walk over to the sector where it's located and then has to ask us the call sign again. If it's a supervisor they also want to know the frequency because they are not certified and don't know them. Those are precious seconds that are lost in an emergency situation. Most importantly; the supervisor working that night and watching the whole thing unfold before his eyes should have taken it upon himself to get on guard and call those pilots. I shouldn't have had to tell him to do it. This same supervisor asked us if we were ready to combine up on a midshift 2 or 3 times; before we were really in any shape to do it. It was still way too busy to do it when he was asking us. He should have realized that on his own.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZTL Center Controller working combined sectors with weather deviations reported their area's airspace became overloaded with traffic and he observed two aircraft head on at the same altitude.

Narrative: I came in for the beginning of a midshift and there was weather everywhere. On top of the weather and deviations due to special events there was additional traffic. I plugged in at Sector 20 which had 3 sectors combined to it. Sector 22 had Macon Hi and South Departure combined on it. There was a line of weather over Atlanta and another line of weather over the coast of Georgia. All aircraft were transitioning through the corridor between those 2 lines. The volume of traffic was crazy. Too much for the sectors to be combined the way they were; but there were not many options because of the staffing. There was way too much traffic for the amount of people we had.When I arrived for the mid shift at XA:00 there were 3 people that had been on position for over 2 hours. The 2 Ultra Hi sectors were getting hammered as well as sector 22. Sector 20; with the 3 sectors combined on it; started out manageable; but quickly got very busy. The added traffic departing the area only added to the complexity and volume. I called for an Assist and received one in a fairly timely manner. The actual safety event came when I had an aircraft deviating at 34000 feet. I handed the aircraft off to sector 22 and switched him in a timely manner. A few minutes later; the conflict alert went off with another aircraft at 34000 feet in sector 22. The second aircraft was also deviating and was head-on with the aircraft I handed off to 22. I immediately checked to see if the original aircraft was on my frequency. He was not. Sector 22 tried frantically to call the 2 aircraft with no luck. The supervisor was standing directly behind him; just watching. I hollered across the room and told the supervisor to try the aircraft on guard frequency. Communication was established and separation was achieved. Where do I begin? The capacity far exceeded our staffing. Sectors should never have been combined or should have been split when traffic began to build. That's hard to do when you don't have the bodies. Flow control has been awful so far this year. In the 3 big weather days I've seen so far this year; every one of them has gotten completely out of control. I don't know exactly what or who needs to be addressed; but something needs to be done. At this rate; summer traffic will be unmanageable. In our area the guard frequency is on a sector that is hardly ever manned. That's unacceptable. It should actually be available at every single sector. All day long. We should all have INSTANT access to those frequencies. When we need to call someone on guard; we have to tell the supervisor who then has to get up and walk over to the sector where it's located and then has to ask us the call sign again. If it's a supervisor they also want to know the frequency because they are not certified and don't know them. Those are PRECIOUS seconds that are lost in an emergency situation. Most importantly; the supervisor working that night and watching the whole thing unfold before his eyes should have taken it upon himself to get on guard and call those pilots. I shouldn't have had to tell him to do it. This same supervisor asked us if we were ready to combine up on a midshift 2 or 3 times; before we were really in any shape to do it. It was still way too busy to do it when he was asking us. He should have realized that on his own.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.