Narrative:

Crew was departing on the second leg of the day after a 28 minute quick turn for fuel and one passenger. Anti-ice was selected on during the taxi for departure to post the vspeeds for an ai on takeoff. Ai cold messages posted during the taxi; so a static takeoff was elected to clear the cold messages prior to departure. During the power up; ai stab hot cas (crew alert system) messages posted; additionally the fuel filter bypass left cas message posted. The pilot not flying cycled the ai switches to clear the hot messages and the pilot flying released brakes to start the takeoff roll. We were aware of the fuel filter bypass cas but continued the takeoff. Rotation and climbout were normal; and once at a safe altitude we ran the fuel filter bypass left checklist. The procedure called to land as soon as possible; but given the weather and mountainous terrain we elected to continue on. We notified management of our situation; and we considered it could be a nuisance amber cas message.thirty minutes into the flight we were within range of several suitable airports; but since both engines were operating normally; and no secondary issues noted; we continued to land as soon as practical at the destination airport where maintenance could be facilitated. We maintained glide distance from suitable airports for the duration of the flight; kept the nearest-airport page up on and reviewed best glide speed for our gross weight. Total flight time was 1.8 hours.on engine shutdown the fuel filter left bypass message cleared. The passengers deplaned; and the crew began to discuss what they could have done better. In reviewing the fault logs; the crew noted that the fuel filter bypass message had posted at 0 KIAS; but being in a 'quick turn' state of mind had started the takeoff anyway. Per maintenance request; the crew started the lh engine for an idle power ground run to confirm the cas message valid. Shortly after engine start the amber fuel filter bypass left cas message posted.in the post-flight debrief of events the crew recognized how lucky they were to have no loss of engine power. If it was a fuel contamination issue; both engines could have failed in marginal VFR conditions in mountainous terrain.G5000 airplanes have a tendency to post numerous amber cas messages that the crew finds a little too easy to justify. This 'amber cas fatigue' is likely why the crew didn't consider the full gravity of one of the few 'land as soon as possible' amber cas messages until airborne and climbing away. The correct answer was to abort the takeoff at 0 KIAS; and call for maintenance support. Instead the pilot flying released brakes and began the takeoff with the previous stab hot messages in mind; in an effort to get some cooling airflow over the surface. There was no icing on descent and landing; and no icing on climbout.this was a failure by both crewmembers in communicating the need to abort; followed by a decision not to land as soon as possible. Our complacency is weighing heavy on us; and we regret we gave murphy's law a shot at us. Good thing murphy didn't take it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE-750 Captain reported regretting his decision to takeoff and complete the flight after receiving a fuel filter bypass light just before takeoff.

Narrative: Crew was departing on the second leg of the day after a 28 minute quick turn for fuel and one passenger. Anti-ice was selected ON during the taxi for departure to post the Vspeeds for an AI on takeoff. AI Cold messages posted during the taxi; so a static takeoff was elected to clear the cold messages prior to departure. During the power up; AI Stab hot CAS (Crew Alert System) messages posted; additionally the Fuel Filter Bypass L CAS message posted. The pilot not flying cycled the AI switches to clear the hot messages and the pilot flying released brakes to start the takeoff roll. We were aware of the Fuel Filter Bypass CAS but continued the takeoff. Rotation and climbout were normal; and once at a safe altitude we ran the Fuel Filter Bypass L checklist. The procedure called to land as soon as possible; but given the weather and mountainous terrain we elected to continue on. We notified management of our situation; and we considered it could be a nuisance amber CAS message.Thirty minutes into the flight we were within range of several suitable airports; but since both engines were operating normally; and no secondary issues noted; we continued to land as soon as practical at the destination airport where maintenance could be facilitated. We maintained glide distance from suitable airports for the duration of the flight; kept the nearest-airport page up on and reviewed best glide speed for our gross weight. Total flight time was 1.8 hours.On engine shutdown the Fuel Filter L bypass message cleared. The passengers deplaned; and the crew began to discuss what they could have done better. In reviewing the fault logs; the crew noted that the Fuel Filter Bypass message had posted at 0 KIAS; but being in a 'quick turn' state of mind had started the takeoff anyway. Per maintenance request; the crew started the LH engine for an idle power ground run to confirm the CAS message valid. Shortly after engine start the amber Fuel Filter Bypass L CAS message posted.In the post-flight debrief of events the crew recognized how lucky they were to have no loss of engine power. If it was a fuel contamination issue; both engines could have failed in marginal VFR conditions in mountainous terrain.G5000 airplanes have a tendency to post numerous amber CAS messages that the crew finds a little too easy to justify. This 'Amber CAS fatigue' is likely why the crew didn't consider the full gravity of one of the few 'land as soon as possible' amber CAS messages until airborne and climbing away. The correct answer was to abort the takeoff at 0 KIAS; and call for maintenance support. Instead the pilot flying released brakes and began the takeoff with the previous Stab Hot messages in mind; in an effort to get some cooling airflow over the surface. There was no icing on descent and landing; and no icing on climbout.This was a failure by both crewmembers in communicating the need to abort; followed by a decision not to land as soon as possible. Our complacency is weighing heavy on us; and we regret we gave Murphy's Law a shot at us. Good thing Murphy didn't take it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.