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Attributes | |
ACN | 1440957 |
Time | |
Date | 201703 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-800 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
Just prior to the tug disconnecting from the aircraft I notice a ramp supervisor running towards the driver. The tug driver informed me of a late bag and wanted to know if they could load it in the forward cargo bin. Before I could tell him to wait until I shut down the number 2 engine; the master caution and fwd cargo lights illuminated. I immediately shut down the number 2 engine and before I could tell the tug driver to wait until the engine spooled down; the master caution and fwd cargo lights went out just as quickly as they had come on. I tried to explain to the tug driver the requirement to shut down the number 2 engine before loading bags; but he acted like he didn't know what I was talking about. The aircraft operating manual and ground operations manual clearly states the requirement to shut down the number 2 engine before loading late commodities. What concerns me about this incident is that we had a supervisor and three push crew personnel; and none of them waited for the engine to be shut down; nor stop an individual from approaching the aircraft with the engine running. I don't know if this is an isolated incident; ramp personnel are unaware of the danger; or individuals ignoring company policy and procedures in an effort to save time. If continued; this practice may result in personal injury or loss of life.the following recommendations are provided. First; review/training for all ramp personnel on loading late commodities procedures. Secondly; the warning in the ground operations manual needs to be updated to mirror the warning in the aircraft operating manual regarding the dangers of extreme ingestion hazard.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-800 Captain reported a ramp employee approached the aircraft and loaded a late bag without waiting for the Number 2 engine to be shut down.
Narrative: Just prior to the tug disconnecting from the aircraft I notice a Ramp Supervisor running towards the driver. The Tug Driver informed me of a late bag and wanted to know if they could load it in the forward cargo bin. Before I could tell him to wait until I shut down the number 2 engine; the MASTER CAUTION and FWD CARGO lights illuminated. I immediately shut down the number 2 engine and before I could tell the Tug Driver to wait until the engine spooled down; the MASTER CAUTION and FWD CARGO lights went out just as quickly as they had come on. I tried to explain to the Tug Driver the requirement to shut down the number 2 engine before loading bags; but he acted like he didn't know what I was talking about. The Aircraft Operating Manual and Ground Operations Manual clearly states the requirement to shut down the number 2 engine before loading late commodities. What concerns me about this incident is that we had a Supervisor and three Push Crew Personnel; and none of them waited for the engine to be shut down; nor stop an individual from approaching the aircraft with the engine running. I don't know if this is an isolated incident; Ramp Personnel are unaware of the danger; or individuals ignoring Company policy and procedures in an effort to save time. If continued; this practice may result in personal injury or loss of life.The following recommendations are provided. First; review/training for all Ramp Personnel on loading late commodities procedures. Secondly; the warning in the Ground Operations Manual needs to be updated to mirror the warning in the Aircraft Operating Manual regarding the dangers of extreme ingestion hazard.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.