Narrative:

Approximately 20-40 seconds after takeoff noted smoke entering cabin near over wing exits. Smoke continued to become thicker and blanketed entire cabin; starting from ceiling to floor. Color of smoke was white/gray and light to moderate thickness. Some passengers were coughing; others were fanning themselves due to smell. Received interphone call from #4 flight attendant seated at direct-view near 2R and I confirmed my awareness of smoke. Advised that I would contact flight deck; and to standby. Called flight deck using emergency call; they answered immediately and reported smoke in cabin; location; color; and intensity. Advised smoke had a petroleum smell and sweet taste. Flight deck advised it was most likely the rh pneumatic air conditioning kit (pack). They theorized it may have overheated while on the ground.advised that I would go into cabin and report findings. Requested flight deck to make announcement to cabin once duties permitted. Completed call with flight deck; then made announcement reassuring passengers that flight deck was aware of situation; to remain calm; stay seated with seatbelts fastened; and crew would thoroughly trained to handle this type of situation. Flight deck would update us as soon as their duties permitted. While making this PA; I noticed condensation (mist) also coming from the sidewall panel ducts. I reassure passengers the 'mist' coming from the sidewalls was due to high humidity and was condensation; this was normal. I wanted the passengers to be aware of the difference to avoid additional alarm or panic. Proceeded into the cabin to check for the source of smoke.proceeding slowly forward-aft; reassuring passengers while also noting that smoke was beginning to dissipating. As I reached row 25; only light haze/smoke. I returned to forward jump seat interphone and advised flight deck (routine call) that smoke was clearing. Flight continued to [destination] without further incident. Duration of smoke was approximately 2-3 minutes. No passenger illnesses or injuries were reported to the crew. Questioned other crewmembers discreetly on their status; appeared/stated 'okay'.during the process of making my emergency call to flight deck; the number #4 made a PA advising passengers the crew was aware of the cabin smoke and to remain calm. Further; he stated we would most likely return to [departure airport]. Understandably; the tone of his voice during his PA included a higher degree of stress/nervousness. After my conversation with the flight deck; I followed his PA to reiterate some of the same points; but made a conscious effort to keep my tone steady; reassuring; and calming. I also made no mention of a possible return to [departure airport]. On a different flight; we shared feedback with each other; including the pas. I stated that I would have done the same thing; but with one exception. I would not have included the reference about returning to [our departure airport] since this could have caused greater distress once the captain announced we would continue onward to [our destination]. I suggested that during any crisis; pas should be limited to the bare minimum details; reporting only known/confirmed facts. Avoid speculating since this could reduce your creditability if those speculations don't occur. He agreed.during the emergency (after checking the cabin); I referenced the emergency procedures section to review cabin fire/smoke procedures. To my surprise (and frustration) all references to cabin smoke procedures have been deleted. The prior fire/smoke procedures included detailed instructions about how to correctly respond to either emergency since smoke/fire are usually (but not always) associated in the same emergency. The procedures included switching off the power port and in flight entertainment (ife) masters. While this event didn't include an actual fire; the volume of smoke required the crew to respond with a methodical and coordinated approach. The lack of written guidance caused hesitation and uncertainty. Subsequently; I did not switch off the ife or power port power masters since I had no specific checklist to follow.the former fire/smoke procedures were developed from research learned due to the swiss air 111 accident; and previous cabin smoke emergencies. While this event was unrelated to an ife or power port malfunction; not accomplishing these tasks could have escalated the risk if it was indeed related to either component. Further; until the smoke cleared; the crew could only speculated about the true root cause; thus following the fire/smoke procedures would have been relevant to my emergency. I highly impress upon our procedures group to restore the original verbiage/check-list.airbus training item: during taxi (6-10 minutes prior to smoke event); I noticed the aft cabin temperature rising on the forward attendant panel (fap) temperature gauge. At one point; the cabin registered 86 degrees. I thought it odd (since the aft cabin was nowhere near this hot); but considered a malfunction with the fap. After the emergency; I shared my observation with the flight deck which helped to confirm a rh pack malfunction. I suggest this observation should be sent to airbus/engineering. If validated; then communicate to flight attendants to better help the flight deck troubleshoot a pack overheat event.flight department: I've noticed on several occasions that flight deck crews routinely set the airbus cabin temperature controls in the flight deck to full cold. This action causes extreme fog/condensation to be emitted from the cabin a/C vents while on the ground; taxi; take-off; and cruise. I've also observed that most pilots are unaware it's not necessary to 'peg' the controls to full cold in order to quickly cool the cabin. Placing the controls at full cold only increased the level of the dramatic display of mist/fog in the cabin; causing concern by passengers. The flight attendants reported a dense 'fog' immediately after landing.captain's performance: upon arrival [at our destination]; the captain quickly deplaned and did not debrief the crew; nor did he request the status of the crew's wellbeing. Additionally; checking the write-ups; there does not appear to be any mention of this event in the aircraft logbook. Is this protocol? There are several write-ups about trim air system faults. Are they related to a pack overheat? While it's understandable the captain may have considered the event a simple mechanical matter; thus him appearing to treat the matter lightly. However; in retrospect; it was quite an upsetting concern to all who endured this smoke event from the cabin side. To his credit; he was extremely quick to respond to all interphone calls and made a PA to the cabin very soon after the smoke was reported; very much appreciated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Flight Attendant reported smoke in the cabin near the overwing exits during climb.

Narrative: Approximately 20-40 seconds after takeoff noted smoke entering cabin near over wing exits. Smoke continued to become thicker and blanketed entire cabin; starting from ceiling to floor. Color of smoke was white/gray and light to moderate thickness. Some passengers were coughing; others were fanning themselves due to smell. Received interphone call from #4 Flight Attendant seated at direct-view near 2R and I confirmed my awareness of smoke. Advised that I would contact flight deck; and to standby. Called flight deck using emergency call; they answered immediately and reported smoke in cabin; location; color; and intensity. Advised smoke had a petroleum smell and sweet taste. Flight deck advised it was most likely the RH Pneumatic Air Conditioning Kit (PACK). They theorized it may have overheated while on the ground.Advised that I would go into cabin and report findings. Requested flight deck to make announcement to cabin once duties permitted. Completed call with flight deck; then made announcement reassuring passengers that flight deck was aware of situation; to remain calm; stay seated with seatbelts fastened; and crew would thoroughly trained to handle this type of situation. Flight deck would update us as soon as their duties permitted. While making this PA; I noticed condensation (mist) also coming from the sidewall panel ducts. I reassure passengers the 'mist' coming from the sidewalls was due to high humidity and was condensation; this was normal. I wanted the passengers to be aware of the difference to avoid additional alarm or panic. Proceeded into the cabin to check for the source of smoke.Proceeding slowly forward-aft; reassuring passengers while also noting that smoke was beginning to dissipating. As I reached row 25; only light haze/smoke. I returned to forward jump seat interphone and advised flight deck (routine call) that smoke was clearing. Flight continued to [destination] without further incident. Duration of smoke was approximately 2-3 minutes. No passenger illnesses or injuries were reported to the crew. Questioned other crewmembers discreetly on their status; appeared/stated 'okay'.During the process of making my emergency call to flight deck; the number #4 made a PA advising passengers the crew was aware of the cabin smoke and to remain calm. Further; he stated we would most likely return to [departure airport]. Understandably; the tone of his voice during his PA included a higher degree of stress/nervousness. After my conversation with the flight deck; I followed his PA to reiterate some of the same points; but made a conscious effort to keep my tone steady; reassuring; and calming. I also made no mention of a possible return to [departure airport]. On a different flight; we shared feedback with each other; including the PAs. I stated that I would have done the same thing; but with one exception. I would not have included the reference about returning to [our departure airport] since this could have caused greater distress once the Captain announced we would continue onward to [our destination]. I suggested that during any crisis; PAs should be limited to the bare minimum details; reporting only known/confirmed facts. Avoid speculating since this could reduce your creditability if those speculations don't occur. He agreed.During the emergency (after checking the cabin); I referenced the emergency procedures section to review cabin fire/smoke procedures. To my surprise (and frustration) all references to cabin smoke procedures have been deleted. The prior fire/smoke procedures included detailed instructions about how to correctly respond to either emergency since smoke/fire are usually (but not always) associated in the same emergency. The procedures included switching off the power port and In Flight Entertainment (IFE) masters. While this event didn't include an actual fire; the volume of smoke required the crew to respond with a methodical and coordinated approach. The lack of written guidance caused hesitation and uncertainty. Subsequently; I did not switch off the IFE or power port power masters since I had no specific checklist to follow.The former fire/smoke procedures were developed from research learned due to the Swiss Air 111 accident; and previous cabin smoke emergencies. While this event was unrelated to an IFE or power port malfunction; not accomplishing these tasks could have escalated the risk if it was indeed related to either component. Further; until the smoke cleared; the crew could only speculated about the true root cause; thus following the fire/smoke procedures would have been relevant to my emergency. I highly impress upon our procedures group to restore the original verbiage/check-list.Airbus Training Item: during taxi (6-10 minutes prior to smoke event); I noticed the aft cabin temperature rising on the Forward Attendant Panel (FAP) temperature gauge. At one point; the cabin registered 86 degrees. I thought it odd (since the aft cabin was nowhere near this hot); but considered a malfunction with the FAP. After the emergency; I shared my observation with the flight deck which helped to confirm a RH PACK malfunction. I suggest this observation should be sent to Airbus/Engineering. If validated; then communicate to flight attendants to better help the flight deck troubleshoot a PACK overheat event.Flight Department: I've noticed on several occasions that flight deck crews routinely set the Airbus cabin temperature controls in the flight deck to full cold. This action causes extreme fog/condensation to be emitted from the cabin A/C vents while on the ground; taxi; take-off; and cruise. I've also observed that most pilots are unaware it's not necessary to 'peg' the controls to full cold in order to quickly cool the cabin. Placing the controls at full cold only increased the level of the dramatic display of mist/fog in the cabin; causing concern by passengers. The flight attendants reported a dense 'fog' immediately after landing.Captain's Performance: upon arrival [at our destination]; the Captain quickly deplaned and did not debrief the crew; nor did he request the status of the crew's wellbeing. Additionally; checking the write-ups; there does not appear to be any mention of this event in the aircraft logbook. Is this protocol? There are several write-ups about trim air system faults. Are they related to a PACK overheat? While it's understandable the Captain may have considered the event a simple mechanical matter; thus him appearing to treat the matter lightly. However; in retrospect; it was quite an upsetting concern to all who endured this smoke event from the cabin side. To his credit; he was extremely quick to respond to all interphone calls and made a PA to the cabin very soon after the smoke was reported; very much appreciated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.