Narrative:

Captain's leg. He wanted 35 in phl. He briefed approach as usual. I told him I had never landed 35. He said it was quick and easy; 'should save 5 minutes.' about 20 miles out; 7000 ft; he started to mention tall ships and how we could not fly over them; and we would not; 'and there is a 99.9% [chance] it won't be a factor.' as we were cleared for the visual; tower told us about a ship that would be passing the approach end. We called it in sight. Captain had me ask them 'what size ship is it?' tower did not know. As we approached; 8 miles out; it was clear the ship would be below us. One mile out; he kind of laughed and said; 'I will just level off a bit.' as we passed directly over this huge ship (at 200 ft) he leveled off; and then pushed nose over to 1200 fpm. At the 100 ft call I also saw pull up in red on pfd. It did not give us the aural alert though; as it was already saying 100 ft; and he was pulling up. I had never landed on 35 and was unaware of the safety alert issued by company. He was not; as he mentioned it. However; since we were so close to the airport; I was unable to review it. I felt remiss in not being familiar with the safety alert. Had I known about it; I would have known we could not fly over any ship; of most any size! Very poor job by the captain in briefing and executing this approach (mentioning the safety alert 45 minutes prior during his approach brief would have been appropriate). After reading the safety alert; it was obvious we should have gone around due to having to fly over the ship. We have the most professional captains around; always following the rules (not!). [I should have] better familiarity with all safety alerts. I should have made him go around! After all; he said he would not fly over any tall ships. He should have made the call eight miles out; when it was apparent we would be overflying this ship. Having a culture that fosters professionalism; and following the rules rather than getting the job done no matter what it takes (which includes breaking the rules). Not that we foster breaking the rules; but since it is always no harm no foul around here; it is really the same thing. The [safety] team should be calling people nonstop when they trigger a reading! Then people might actually start to get it. They might actually get that someone is actually watching. Not just doing a bunch of data collection. I know we say safety first; but enforcing procedures; standardization; and SOP is the root of all of all that; and the value of those has truly not been instilled in so many captains I fly with. There are so many subpar captains out there when it comes to following SOP or common sense; it is mind numbing. But gosh darn-it; you know for sure they will set zeros in the course window before they leave the cockpit! Who cares about that unstabilized approach that just happened though! There needs to be a change in culture for flight operations that instills what is truly most important for our work group. One that values standardization; and safety; over whatever it is now or they are used to in the past. I suggest that you start with calling people and discussing what happened when they triggered [a safety report]. Then the word will get out that all that stuff in the book really matters!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported they failed to comply with SOPs on approach to PHL. He stated that he was unhappy with the level of SOP adherence and professionalism of some of the Captains he flies with.

Narrative: Captain's leg. He wanted 35 in PHL. He briefed approach as usual. I told him I had never landed 35. He said it was quick and easy; 'should save 5 minutes.' About 20 miles out; 7000 ft; he started to mention tall ships and how we could not fly over them; and we would not; 'and there is a 99.9% [chance] it won't be a factor.' As we were cleared for the visual; Tower told us about a ship that would be passing the approach end. We called it in sight. Captain had me ask them 'what size ship is it?' Tower did not know. As we approached; 8 miles out; it was clear the ship would be below us. One mile out; He kind of laughed and said; 'I will just level off a bit.' As we passed directly over this huge ship (at 200 ft) he leveled off; and then pushed nose over to 1200 fpm. At the 100 ft call I also saw PULL UP in red on PFD. It did not give us the aural alert though; as it was already saying 100 ft; and he was pulling up. I had never landed on 35 and was unaware of the Safety Alert issued by Company. He was not; as he mentioned it. However; since we were so close to the airport; I was unable to review it. I felt remiss in not being familiar with the Safety Alert. Had I known about it; I would have known we could not fly over any ship; of most any size! Very poor job by the Captain in briefing and executing this approach (mentioning the Safety Alert 45 minutes prior during his Approach Brief would have been appropriate). After reading the Safety Alert; it was obvious we should have gone around due to having to fly over the ship. We have the most professional Captains around; always following the rules (NOT!). [I should have] better familiarity with all Safety Alerts. I should have made him go around! After all; he said he would not fly over any tall ships. He should have made the call eight miles out; when it was apparent we would be overflying this ship. Having a culture that fosters professionalism; and following the rules rather than getting the job done no matter what it takes (which includes breaking the rules). Not that we foster breaking the rules; but since it is always no harm no foul around here; it is really the same thing. The [safety] team should be calling people nonstop when they trigger a reading! Then people might actually start to get it. They might actually get that someone is actually watching. Not just doing a bunch of data collection. I know we say Safety First; but enforcing procedures; standardization; and SOP is the root of all of all that; and the value of those has truly not been instilled in so many Captains I fly with. There are so many subpar Captains out there when it comes to following SOP or common sense; it is mind numbing. But gosh darn-it; you know for sure they will set zeros in the course window before they leave the cockpit! Who cares about that unstabilized approach that just happened though! There needs to be a change in culture for Flight Operations that instills what is truly most important for our work group. One that values standardization; and safety; over whatever it is now or they are used to in the past. I suggest that you start with calling people and discussing what happened when they triggered [a safety report]. Then the word will get out that all that stuff in the book really matters!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.