Narrative:

We received several EICAS messages. We were cruising at FL310 when the aircraft EICAS indicated the following messages: door passenger aft open; door serv aft open; door crg aft open; lg wow (weight on wheels) system fail; brk lh fault; and brk rh fault. Since lg wow system fail was the root of the other EICAS messages; we immediately divided flying duties and referred to QRH lg wow system fail. I was the pilot flying and operated the radios while my first officer did the QRH procedure. We reviewed the procedure and began to coordinate a diversion as directed by the QRH to land as soon as possible. Dispatch was very helpful and immediately selected ZZZ as our diversion airport. This was the most suitable airport given our current position. We advised ATC; flight attendants (using test items as a guide); and passenger of our intentions. During our descent into ZZZ the EICAS messages cleared. We advised dispatch and company maintenance of the cleared messages. In the interest of safety we all agreed that continuing through with the diversion was the best course of action. The approach and landing planning was made with [the] QRH in mind. My first officer and I felt that even though the EICAS messages were not present we should configure the aircraft as directed by QRH. We configured with slat/flap full. ATC mobilized crash fire and rescue because we mentioned the possibility of having steering and decelerating difficulties. The approach; backed up by the ILS; was smooth and the landing was uneventful. Steering; thrust reversers; and ground spoilers were in operation during the landing roll-out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 Captain reported they received several EICAS messages related to the squat (Weight On Wheels) switch and diverted for an uneventful landing.

Narrative: We received several EICAS messages. We were cruising at FL310 when the aircraft EICAS indicated the following messages: DOOR PAX AFT OPEN; DOOR SERV AFT OPEN; DOOR CRG AFT OPEN; LG WOW (Weight On Wheels) SYS FAIL; BRK LH FAULT; and BRK RH FAULT. Since LG WOW SYS FAIL was the root of the other EICAS messages; we immediately divided flying duties and referred to QRH LG WOW SYS FAIL. I was the pilot flying and operated the radios while my first officer did the QRH procedure. We reviewed the procedure and began to coordinate a diversion as directed by the QRH to land as soon as possible. Dispatch was very helpful and immediately selected ZZZ as our diversion airport. This was the most suitable airport given our current position. We advised ATC; flight attendants (using TEST items as a guide); and passenger of our intentions. During our descent into ZZZ the EICAS messages cleared. We advised dispatch and company maintenance of the cleared messages. In the interest of safety we all agreed that continuing through with the diversion was the best course of action. The approach and landing planning was made with [the] QRH in mind. My First Officer and I felt that even though the EICAS messages were not present we should configure the aircraft as directed by QRH. We configured with Slat/Flap FULL. ATC mobilized Crash Fire and Rescue because we mentioned the possibility of having steering and decelerating difficulties. The approach; backed up by the ILS; was smooth and the landing was uneventful. Steering; thrust reversers; and ground spoilers were in operation during the landing roll-out.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.