Narrative:

After monitoring ATIS (runway 26 was in use) yuma ground control was requested to allow use of runway 17, 'if possible'. Ground control appeared to have granted the request when taxi instructions were provided to the midfield intersection of runway 35. After run-up and taxi call to tower was made. Yuma tower responded (by best recollection) cleared for takeoff. During climb out the tower controller advised the pilot of small aircraft X that he had departed on runway 17 when he was cleared for departure on runway 35. He requested, and received, pilot's name, social security number, where aircraft is based, with home telephone number. He stated he was filing an incident report to FAA. He further reported that a taxiing fighter jet Y was endangered by our departure. It was the perception of the pilot that his request for takeoff on runway 17 had been approved. The pilot was predisposed to listen only for indications that his request had been approved, a natural human tendency. The pilot could have avoided the possibility of a wrong runway departure by questioning either the ground controller or the tower operator, an example of inaction. Finally, the pilot did not repeat the takeoff instructions to the tower operator. Had he done so, prior to departing, the incorrect assumption of runway heading could have been corrected. An example of inaction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG RWY TKOF FOR SMA AT YUM.

Narrative: AFTER MONITORING ATIS (RWY 26 WAS IN USE) YUMA GND CTL WAS REQUESTED TO ALLOW USE OF RWY 17, 'IF POSSIBLE'. GND CTL APPEARED TO HAVE GRANTED THE REQUEST WHEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROVIDED TO THE MIDFIELD INTXN OF RWY 35. AFTER RUN-UP AND TAXI CALL TO TWR WAS MADE. YUMA TWR RESPONDED (BY BEST RECOLLECTION) CLRED FOR TKOF. DURING CLBOUT THE TWR CTLR ADVISED THE PLT OF SMA X THAT HE HAD DEPARTED ON RWY 17 WHEN HE WAS CLRED FOR DEP ON RWY 35. HE REQUESTED, AND RECEIVED, PLT'S NAME, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, WHERE ACFT IS BASED, WITH HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER. HE STATED HE WAS FILING AN INCIDENT RPT TO FAA. HE FURTHER RPTED THAT A TAXIING FIGHTER JET Y WAS ENDANGERED BY OUR DEP. IT WAS THE PERCEPTION OF THE PLT THAT HIS REQUEST FOR TKOF ON RWY 17 HAD BEEN APPROVED. THE PLT WAS PREDISPOSED TO LISTEN ONLY FOR INDICATIONS THAT HIS REQUEST HAD BEEN APPROVED, A NATURAL HUMAN TENDENCY. THE PLT COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE POSSIBILITY OF A WRONG RWY DEP BY QUESTIONING EITHER THE GND CTLR OR THE TWR OPERATOR, AN EXAMPLE OF INACTION. FINALLY, THE PLT DID NOT REPEAT THE TKOF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TWR OPERATOR. HAD HE DONE SO, PRIOR TO DEPARTING, THE INCORRECT ASSUMPTION OF RWY HDG COULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED. AN EXAMPLE OF INACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.