Narrative:

We were slowing to be at 230 at kilde (SILCN4 arrival/if RNAV Y 30L sjc) norcal approach asked us to cross klide at 5000 and keep 250 knots until klide/ then slow to 210. Then cleared for the approach at klide. I increased the speed to oblige. I overshot final approach course and so gp was not captured. (I had selected 'vector to final' and failed to eliminate the discontinuity between klide and hivak.) this was promptly corrected but it compounded the issue because it delayed pulling the speed back to 210 and delayed the descent when we could not afford both. At 245 knots I called for gear down in an initial attempt to slow down/ get down but after a few seconds; I realized this wasn't going to work as we were not even flaps 1 and 1500' high (at ~4200') 3-4 miles from FAF hivak (2700') we had a slight tailwind also. I told the first officer of my intention to go-around and asked him to bring the gear up he then asked 'did you hit toga?' I knew I had not (and didn't intend to at that point in time; but I doubted my plan given that we don't do soft go-arounds at this airline.) the decision to go-around was absolutely correct; but if ever there was a time to do a soft go-around; this would have been it. I immediately second-guessed what I was doing and selected GA (after having a moment and accidentally deselecting/reselecting the auto throttle). We were ~4000' and given runway heading and 3000; so we now also had a descent. Between the descent and selecting GA we were up to 260 knots beneath the edge of the sfo bravo shelf. We should have been at 200. ATC gave us a right turn to the northeast and a climb to 6000 to re-sequence us for another RNAV Y to 30L. This helped get the speed under control and gave us time to complete all announcements/ checklists and we subsequently made an uneventful landing. This debacle was unfortunate because although ATC put us in an undesirable position at klide (high and fast) 1). I should never have made that error loading the approach and 2) I failed to fly the plane despite knowing that GA would put us in a bad position. There was no rush; I should have continued to slow and taken a moment to brief the best way to manage this particular situation. Both fatigue and emotional state were absolutely contributing factors in my errors as I received this assignment at the very end of 5 days of sitting reserve under the new regime and having an argument with scheduling over this assignment. It seems contradictory to say; but at the same time I also feel that a lack of flight hours in recent months has also degraded my performance as I have been only averaged 35 hrs/month over the past year.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported ATC requested 250 KTS approaching KILDE; but after overshooting final; failed to slow and descend sufficiently so executed a go-around.

Narrative: We were slowing to be at 230 at KILDE (SILCN4 arrival/IF RNAV Y 30L SJC) Norcal approach asked us to cross KLIDE at 5000 and keep 250 knots until KLIDE/ then slow to 210. Then cleared for the approach at KLIDE. I increased the speed to oblige. I overshot final approach course and so GP was not captured. (I had selected 'vector to final' and failed to eliminate the discontinuity between KLIDE and HIVAK.) This was promptly corrected but it compounded the issue because it delayed pulling the speed back to 210 and delayed the descent when we could not afford both. At 245 knots I called for gear down in an initial attempt to slow down/ get down but after a few seconds; I realized this wasn't going to work as we were not even flaps 1 and 1500' high (at ~4200') 3-4 miles from FAF HIVAK (2700') we had a slight tailwind also. I told the FO of my intention to go-around and asked him to bring the gear up he then asked 'did you hit TOGA?' I knew I had not (and didn't intend to at that point in time; but I doubted my plan given that we don't do soft go-arounds at this airline.) The decision to go-around was absolutely correct; but if ever there was a time to do a soft go-around; this would have been it. I immediately second-guessed what I was doing and selected GA (after having a moment and accidentally deselecting/reselecting the auto throttle). We were ~4000' and given runway heading and 3000; so we now also had a descent. Between the descent and selecting GA we were up to 260 knots beneath the edge of the SFO Bravo shelf. We should have been at 200. ATC gave us a right turn to the northeast and a climb to 6000 to re-sequence us for another RNAV Y to 30L. This helped get the speed under control and gave us time to complete all announcements/ checklists and we subsequently made an uneventful landing. This debacle was unfortunate because although ATC put us in an undesirable position at KLIDE (high and fast) 1). I should never have made that error loading the approach and 2) I failed to fly the plane despite knowing that GA would put us in a bad position. There was no rush; I should have continued to slow and taken a moment to brief the best way to manage this particular situation. Both fatigue and emotional state were absolutely contributing factors in my errors as I received this assignment at the very end of 5 days of sitting reserve under the new regime and having an argument with scheduling over this assignment. It seems contradictory to say; but at the same time I also feel that a lack of flight hours in recent months has also degraded my performance as I have been only averaged 35 hrs/month over the past year.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.