Narrative:

We were flying the arrival into ZZZ. The weather was great at ZZZ and they were doing the ILS runway 31R or visual runway 31L. My first officer had just listened to the ATIS and had only written down that they were doing the ILS to runway 31R. The ATIS was very long and had a lot of information in it due to the construction going on at the field and he failed to get all of the information. I was listening to it as well and had heard that they were also doing the visual approach to runway 31L so I asked him why he didn't write that down. He said 'oh; I thought they were saying something else; but I couldn't understand it' and just shrugged it off. I told the first officer that we would do the visual approach to runway 31L and he acknowledged that.I was flying and had the autopilot on. Throughout our flight ATC had asked us a few times if we could fly faster and we were instructed to maintain 300 knots or greater for the arrival. We had previously crossed zzzzz at the published altitude (FL230) and were waiting for the controller to tell us to descend for ZZZZZ1. He was really busy on the radio and finally told us to cross ZZZZZ1 at FL190 and 250 knots 16 miles before ZZZZZ1. I started down and established my rate to meet the crossing restriction and speed. Shortly after doing so the first officer proceeded to set up the ILS runway 31R into the navigation's and GPS. While doing this the normal navigation page with the DME and other pertinent flight info was not being displayed. I didn't realize what he was doing; as he didn't ask if I wanted the ILS set up; until he was messing with the GPS and I asked what he was doing. He said he was putting the ILS points into the GPS for the approach and then I asked him why and he just sat there with an 'I don't know' look on his face. I reiterated that we were going to do the visual approach to runway 31L as the weather was good for it and the runway was better for where we were going on the field. After getting him back up to speed where I thought he already was the plane started turning (following the GPS) to go to ZZZZ1 and I looked at the altimeter and saw we were descending through FL200 at a slower rate of descent than I had originally set and we're still as 300 knots. I quickly turned off the autopilot and deployed the spoilers to descend faster and to slow the plane down. While I was doing this (still 700' high and 280 knots) ATC told us to go to the next frequency. By the time the first officer checked in with the next controller we were already at FL190 and 250 knots. Aside from the first officer trying to grasp all of what had just happened; the rest of the flight was uneventful.many factors come together to contribute to the error-1. ATC's request to fly faster and the late clearance down to the crossing/speed restriction.2. The first officer not getting all of the ATIS information and not realizing the importance of getting clarification if they don't understand something being said.3. Miscommunication between me and the first officer about what runway and approach we were using.4. The first officer's failure to inform me of what he was doing when configuring the navigation's and GPS for an approach we already discussed that we were not doing.5. Not noticing that the plane's rate of descent had slowed down after initially setting it.6. Letting the first officer's actions distract me from flying the airplane.ways in which I can prevent this type of error in the future-1. Tell ATC that we are unable to make the crossing/speed restriction so that we aren't rushed and have more time to get down. We could also request lower ourselves as sometimes ATC forgets about you and you should query them.2. Stress the importance of getting all of the information and that if they don't understand something to ask the other person for help and/or clarification.3. Not accepting an acknowledgement of something as understanding and to ask them to repeat it back to make sure that effective communication has taken place.4. Making sure that the first officer's keep the other person in the loop and that they should ask the person flying if they want an approach set up and if they may change anything before they just go ahead and do it.5. Remembering that the plane's rate of descent slows down after initially setting it and expecting that I'll have to adjust the nose down more to maintain the desired descent rate.6. Not allowing my attention to be diverted to actions that are not pertinent to the current task at hand and waiting for a reduced workload; more appropriate; time to address them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LR-35 Captain reported displeasure with the way his First Officer managed his duties during arrival. The result was a missed crossing restriction at a higher than cleared speed.

Narrative: We were flying the arrival into ZZZ. The weather was great at ZZZ and they were doing the ILS runway 31R or visual runway 31L. My FO had just listened to the ATIS and had only written down that they were doing the ILS to runway 31R. The ATIS was very long and had a lot of information in it due to the construction going on at the field and he failed to get all of the information. I was listening to it as well and had heard that they were also doing the visual approach to runway 31L so I asked him why he didn't write that down. He said 'Oh; I thought they were saying something else; but I couldn't understand it' and just shrugged it off. I told the FO that we would do the visual approach to runway 31L and he acknowledged that.I was flying and had the autopilot on. Throughout our flight ATC had asked us a few times if we could fly faster and we were instructed to maintain 300 knots or greater for the arrival. We had previously crossed ZZZZZ at the published altitude (FL230) and were waiting for the controller to tell us to descend for ZZZZZ1. He was really busy on the radio and finally told us to cross ZZZZZ1 at FL190 and 250 knots 16 miles before ZZZZZ1. I started down and established my rate to meet the crossing restriction and speed. Shortly after doing so the FO proceeded to set up the ILS runway 31R into the NAV's and GPS. While doing this the normal navigation page with the DME and other pertinent flight info was not being displayed. I didn't realize what he was doing; as he didn't ask if I wanted the ILS set up; until he was messing with the GPS and I asked what he was doing. He said he was putting the ILS points into the GPS for the approach and then I asked him why and he just sat there with an 'I don't know' look on his face. I reiterated that we were going to do the visual approach to runway 31L as the weather was good for it and the runway was better for where we were going on the field. After getting him back up to speed where I thought he already was the plane started turning (following the GPS) to go to ZZZZ1 and I looked at the altimeter and saw we were descending through FL200 at a slower rate of descent than I had originally set and we're still as 300 knots. I quickly turned off the autopilot and deployed the spoilers to descend faster and to slow the plane down. While I was doing this (still 700' high and 280 knots) ATC told us to go to the next frequency. By the time the FO checked in with the next controller we were already at FL190 and 250 knots. Aside from the FO trying to grasp all of what had just happened; the rest of the flight was uneventful.Many factors come together to contribute to the error-1. ATC's request to fly faster and the late clearance down to the crossing/speed restriction.2. The FO not getting all of the ATIS information and not realizing the importance of getting clarification if they don't understand something being said.3. Miscommunication between me and the FO about what runway and approach we were using.4. The FO's failure to inform me of what he was doing when configuring the NAV's and GPS for an approach we already discussed that we were not doing.5. Not noticing that the plane's rate of descent had slowed down after initially setting it.6. Letting the FO's actions distract me from flying the airplane.Ways in which I can prevent this type of error in the future-1. Tell ATC that we are unable to make the crossing/speed restriction so that we aren't rushed and have more time to get down. We could also request lower ourselves as sometimes ATC forgets about you and you should query them.2. Stress the importance of getting all of the information and that if they don't understand something to ask the other person for help and/or clarification.3. Not accepting an acknowledgement of something as understanding and to ask them to repeat it back to make sure that effective communication has taken place.4. Making sure that the FO's keep the other person in the loop and that they should ask the person flying if they want an approach set up and if they may change anything before they just go ahead and do it.5. Remembering that the plane's rate of descent slows down after initially setting it and expecting that I'll have to adjust the nose down more to maintain the desired descent rate.6. Not allowing my attention to be diverted to actions that are not pertinent to the current task at hand and waiting for a reduced workload; more appropriate; time to address them.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.