Narrative:

[After departure]; initially cleared up to 2;000 ft on course; then cleared up to 9000 ft. We were in heavy rain right off the bat and I had called dispatch on the ground to take a look at the radar; and we determined it was still safe to continue the flight. There was moderate turbulence and the airplane was having trouble climbing at 5 degrees pitch (the altimeter was stagnant and vsi read 0 fpm) so I instructed the first officer (first officer) to pitch up. He insisted that he was at 5 degrees pitch already; and so I said to pitch to 8 degrees. He was convinced our attitude indicators were not matching up; but they were; and that was not the issue at hand. We needed to be climbing. Once we got the climb going again we were cleared to FL220. At about 8;000 ft we got a #1 pitot heat caution light. I gave the first officer the radios and pulled out the checklist and followed it. For the time being; my instruments were still reading correctly; but we established that we needed to continue with the first officer flying since he had the most accurate indications. At 10;000 ft we got the cabin pressure warning light; instructed my first officer to descend back down to 10;000 ft and before pulling the checklist; I looked up at the pressurization panel really quick and noticed that I had missed the automatic/man/dump switch on the originator - it had been left in dump by mx; so I quickly put it back in automatic and the problem was solved; and we continued in our climb to FL220. We were still in heavy rain and IMC; but the turbulence had smoothed out. The strobes were on and reflecting off the clouds; and the first officer thought there was lightning. I turned the strobes off and put the beacon on to stop the effect and that seemed to stop the problem; but I took note of the possibility of lightning in the vicinity. It was +8C at this point as well; so no icing; but still heavy rain. Then the captain side airspeed indicator went to zero and the ca (captain) side altimeter read erroneously; we got air data computer messages on the identification-802 panel due to the loss of TAS data; the auto pilot; yaw damper kicked off and we lost the FD's (flight director). At this point we decided to [advise ATC] and did so; leveling off at 14;000 ft. Initially we planned to turn back to [the departure airport]; but the weather was below minimums due to the storm moving through. [Another airport] was right in front of us and they were using the ILS; but the weather was not much better; and my first officer voiced his concern about hand flying a raw data approach to minimums. I gave him the radios while I called dispatch; [who] gave me a quick weather update that [a third airport] was VFR; so we quickly changed plans and headed that way. In doing so; while I was still speaking on the satcom; my first officer said that he wasn't sure that they could hear him on the radio; so I switched us over quickly to #2 comm. My first officer said he had good communication with that; and we notified ATC that we may also have had a comm failure on the #1 side. There wasn't a lot of time to test it out since [the new destination] was so close. Since my instruments were dead; I couldn't take controls for the first officer to get out his charts for the ILS on his ipad; so I grabbed mine out of my jepp book; briefed him; set him up with his nav aids; etc. And gave him the chart while he flew. I then notified flight attendant (flight attendant); cabin and ran appropriate checklists (descent approach; landing) as we were vectored onto the approach. We landed safely (even though the first officer was clearly rusty and nervous about flying raw data and needed a little help due to his inexperience (descending at 3000 fpm at some points); he executed the approach just fine and did a nice job for his experience level in the aircraft.) and the trucks followed us to the gate. During the taxi in; I had the first officer make an announcement to the passengers to remain seated and had him do a radio test with the #1 comm with the tower; to which we came in loud and clear.after speaking with the crew; it was determinedthey were both tired from our min rest overnight and shaken up; so I backed them up and we called out fatigue. The event occurred due to a loss of the #1 pitot heat and #1 comm. My first officer said there may be lightning damage; and although there was no evidence (white light; loud bang; etc.) of an apparent lightning strike; I mentioned it to mx when we spoke on the ground. My first officer and the onsite mx did post flight walkarounds and inspections and found no evidence of a lightning strike. There was heavy rain so that may have played a part.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Dash-8 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after losing #1 pitot heat and #1 comm radio.

Narrative: [After departure]; initially cleared up to 2;000 ft on course; then cleared up to 9000 ft. We were in heavy rain right off the bat and I had called Dispatch on the ground to take a look at the radar; and we determined it was still safe to continue the flight. There was moderate turbulence and the airplane was having trouble climbing at 5 degrees pitch (the altimeter was stagnant and VSI read 0 fpm) so I instructed the FO (First Officer) to pitch up. He insisted that he was at 5 degrees pitch already; and so I said to pitch to 8 degrees. He was convinced our attitude indicators were not matching up; but they were; and that was not the issue at hand. We needed to be climbing. Once we got the climb going again we were cleared to FL220. At about 8;000 ft we got a #1 PITOT HEAT Caution Light. I gave the FO the radios and pulled out the checklist and followed it. For the time being; my instruments were still reading correctly; but we established that we needed to continue with the FO flying since he had the most accurate indications. At 10;000 ft we got the cabin pressure warning light; instructed my FO to descend back down to 10;000 ft and before pulling the checklist; I looked up at the pressurization panel really quick and noticed that I had missed the AUTO/MAN/DUMP switch on the originator - it had been left in dump by mx; so I quickly put it back in AUTO and the problem was solved; and we continued in our climb to FL220. We were still in heavy rain and IMC; but the turbulence had smoothed out. The strobes were on and reflecting off the clouds; and the FO thought there was lightning. I turned the strobes off and put the beacon on to stop the effect and that seemed to stop the problem; but I took note of the possibility of lightning in the vicinity. It was +8C at this point as well; so no icing; but still heavy rain. Then the Captain side airspeed indicator went to zero and the CA (Captain) side altimeter read erroneously; we got ADC messages on the ID-802 panel due to the loss of TAS data; the auto pilot; yaw damper kicked off and we lost the FD's (Flight Director). At this point we decided to [advise ATC] and did so; leveling off at 14;000 ft. Initially we planned to turn back to [the departure airport]; but the weather was below minimums due to the storm moving through. [Another airport] was right in front of us and they were using the ILS; but the weather was not much better; and my FO voiced his concern about hand flying a raw data approach to minimums. I gave him the radios while I called Dispatch; [who] gave me a quick weather update that [a third airport] was VFR; so we quickly changed plans and headed that way. In doing so; while I was still speaking on the Satcom; my FO said that he wasn't sure that they could hear him on the radio; so I switched us over quickly to #2 comm. My FO said he had good communication with that; and we notified ATC that we may also have had a comm failure on the #1 side. There wasn't a lot of time to test it out since [the new destination] was so close. Since my instruments were dead; I couldn't take controls for the FO to get out his charts for the ILS on his iPad; so I grabbed mine out of my Jepp book; briefed him; set him up with his nav aids; etc. and gave him the chart while he flew. I then notified FA (Flight Attendant); Cabin and ran appropriate checklists (descent approach; landing) as we were vectored onto the approach. We landed safely (even though the FO was clearly rusty and nervous about flying raw data and needed a little help due to his inexperience (descending at 3000 fpm at some points); he executed the approach just fine and did a nice job for his experience level in the aircraft.) and the trucks followed us to the gate. During the taxi in; I had the FO make an announcement to the passengers to remain seated and had him do a radio test with the #1 comm with the tower; to which we came in loud and clear.After speaking with the crew; it was determinedthey were both tired from our min rest overnight and shaken up; so I backed them up and we called out fatigue. The event occurred due to a loss of the #1 pitot heat and #1 comm. My FO said there may be lightning damage; and although there was no evidence (white light; loud bang; etc.) of an apparent lightning strike; I mentioned it to mx when we spoke on the ground. My FO and the onsite mx did post flight walkarounds and inspections and found no evidence of a lightning strike. There was heavy rain so that may have played a part.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.