Narrative:

While on final for a visual approach to runway 35; once beyond the ATC assigned speed fix we began to decel and selected flaps 5; the next call was gear down flaps 15; at this point we both realized that the flaps had not deployed and we executed a missed approach.we had 5000 pounds of fuel so at this point a reasonably tight pattern was a primary concern to both of us. While getting vectors for an approach to the longest runway available; I ran the flaps up landing checklist out loud; I also ran numbers for our approach on an onboard performance computer and verified these via VHF with our dispatch.the captain did [advise ATC] to have crash fire rescue equipment standing by as a precaution. The landing was with leading edge devices only and was a non-event as we had plenty of runway for a light -700.looking at the situation after we arrived at the gate and the mechanics had retracted the leds (leading edge devices) the flap indicator now looked more like an asymmetry than a pure flaps up scenario; this may be because the split was more pronounced after the maintenance action. The needles were still close but they had both moved some off of up and one needle now appeared slightly out of the white hat bar.I did fumble through the beginning of 3 flap checklists before deciding to run the flaps up; the captain did concur with my decision; but as he was flying and communicating with tower at the same time I should have more slowly articulated the options to make sure we were in agreement. I also had to adjust the performance numbers as I first ran flaps 1 thinking 'less than flaps one' until I took a second closer look.if I had started with the actual asymmetry checklist it would have had us bring the flap handle back up to offer more protection against asymmetrical trailing edge deployment if the alternate extension switch was held. The checklist calls for moving the switch momentarily; which was done correctly; although I did action it 3 times momentarily as the leds were very slow to the extending and full extend lights; much slower than our simulator experience with the system.everything was completed and verified in a safe and timely manner given the situation. If I had a do-over I feel this experience would give me better results in any of our checklists. I believe a change in company culture to one that feels of severe discipline and reviews of events; that often lead to re-training on your record; added to our stress level and slightly negatively affected our performance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported the flaps did not deploy when commanded.

Narrative: While on final for a visual approach to runway 35; once beyond the ATC assigned speed fix we began to decel and selected flaps 5; the next call was gear down flaps 15; at this point we both realized that the flaps had not deployed and we executed a missed approach.We had 5000 pounds of fuel so at this point a reasonably tight pattern was a primary concern to both of us. While getting vectors for an approach to the longest runway available; I ran the flaps up landing checklist out loud; I also ran numbers for our approach on an onboard performance computer and verified these via VHF with our dispatch.The Captain did [advise ATC] to have CFR standing by as a precaution. The landing was with leading edge devices only and was a non-event as we had plenty of runway for a light -700.Looking at the situation after we arrived at the gate and the mechanics had retracted the LEDs (leading edge devices) the flap indicator now looked more like an asymmetry than a pure flaps up scenario; this may be because the split was more pronounced after the maintenance action. The needles were still close but they had both moved some off of up and one needle now appeared slightly out of the white hat bar.I did fumble through the beginning of 3 flap checklists before deciding to run the flaps up; the Captain did concur with my decision; but as he was flying and communicating with tower at the same time I should have more slowly articulated the options to make sure we were in agreement. I also had to adjust the performance numbers as I first ran flaps 1 thinking 'less than flaps one' until I took a second closer look.If I had started with the actual asymmetry checklist it would have had us bring the flap handle back up to offer more protection against asymmetrical trailing edge deployment if the alternate extension switch was held. The checklist calls for moving the switch momentarily; which was done correctly; although I did action it 3 times momentarily as the leds were very slow to the extending and full extend lights; much slower than our simulator experience with the system.Everything was completed and verified in a safe and timely manner given the situation. If I had a do-over I feel this experience would give me better results in any of our checklists. I believe a change in company culture to one that feels of severe discipline and reviews of events; that often lead to re-training on your record; added to our stress level and slightly negatively affected our performance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.