Narrative:

Top of climb FL380 left bleed trip light illuminated. Followed QRH with resulting bleed reset. Roughly ten minutes later left bleed trip light illuminated again. Followed QRH with another successful bleed reset. Observed split in duct pressure with right indicating 37 psi and left indicating 13 psi. Cabin pressure normal. Sent text to dispatch of events and duct pressure split. Also took picture with cell phone. Remainder of cruise portion of flight normal.receiving descent clearance from ATC to FL240 and transition to 250 knots (at FL380 you're just shy of 250 KIAS). Soon after starting descent right bleed trip light illuminated. Unable to control cabin altitude (cabin altitude rising greater than 2000 fps with cabin at 8000 ft) donned O2 mask; [advised ATC] and requested 10;000 MSL. All was granted. Contacted cabin crew in high teens and made a PA to passengers at 10;000 feet. Requested emergency personnel to meet aircraft upon gate arrival. Informed ZZZ operations. Cockpit crew worked as a team each performing their respective duties as flying pilot and pilot monitoring.flight attendants (three with less than a year with [company]) performed duties very well. First officer and I attended the flight attendant's critical incident stress debrief. Information learned of cabin activities was #4 flight attendant did lose consciousness and the #1 flight attendant nearly did same but was assisted by # 3 flight attendant. These flight attendants did don O2 mask but apparently did not pull on the O2 mask cord hard enough to release the O2. Passengers said to have been bewildered by the goings on and most did not don O2 mask until observing fas don their O2 mask. Also fas did chime cockpit 4 chimes but we never recognized the chime due to noise and focus on duties at hand. They stated they were concerned of our welfare. Possibly caused by a history of bleeds problems that were not in the aml due to prior removal of those pages. The only reference in the aml was a maintenance entry of a replacement of engine bleed valve [4 days earlier]. However; all information and history could be found.reference cabin chimes - I suggest a unique emergency cabin to cockpit or cockpit to cabin chime or signal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported a complete loss of cabin pressure due to several pressurization component malfunctions. A successful landing was accomplished; however one Flight Attendant became incapacitated.

Narrative: Top of climb FL380 left bleed trip light illuminated. Followed QRH with resulting bleed reset. Roughly ten minutes later left bleed trip light illuminated again. Followed QRH with another successful bleed reset. Observed split in duct pressure with right indicating 37 PSI and left indicating 13 PSI. Cabin pressure normal. Sent text to dispatch of events and duct pressure split. Also took picture with cell phone. Remainder of cruise portion of flight normal.Receiving descent clearance from ATC to FL240 and transition to 250 knots (at FL380 you're just shy of 250 KIAS). Soon after starting descent right bleed trip light illuminated. Unable to control cabin altitude (cabin altitude rising greater than 2000 fps with cabin at 8000 ft) donned O2 mask; [advised ATC] and requested 10;000 MSL. All was granted. Contacted cabin crew in high teens and made a PA to passengers at 10;000 feet. Requested emergency personnel to meet aircraft upon gate arrival. Informed ZZZ operations. Cockpit crew worked as a team each performing their respective duties as flying pilot and pilot monitoring.Flight attendants (three with less than a year with [Company]) performed duties very well. First officer and I attended the FA's critical incident stress debrief. Information learned of cabin activities was #4 FA did lose consciousness and the #1 FA nearly did same but was assisted by # 3 FA. These flight attendants did don O2 mask but apparently did not pull on the O2 mask cord hard enough to release the O2. Passengers said to have been bewildered by the goings on and most did not don O2 mask until observing FAs don their O2 mask. Also FAs did chime cockpit 4 chimes but we never recognized the chime due to noise and focus on duties at hand. They stated they were concerned of our welfare. Possibly caused by a history of bleeds problems that were not in the AML due to prior removal of those pages. The only reference in the AML was a maintenance entry of a replacement of engine bleed valve [4 days earlier]. However; all information and history could be found.Reference cabin chimes - I suggest a unique emergency cabin to cockpit or cockpit to cabin chime or signal.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.