Narrative:

I was working 4 sectors combined. We had had a massive amount of deviations earlier in the night due to weather; so aircraft were coming in late. Aircraft X had diverted earlier and when ready to depart for slc; advised the controller that they needed to hold for fuel burn as low and slow as possible. Traffic management unit (tmu) notified me that they would be holding.when I received aircraft X; I asked if they had the depiction of the holding pattern. They said no; but if I gave it to them they would have it programmed and ready. I read them the radial; right turns; one minute legs. The aircraft then keyed up and asked if that hold was north or south of the VOR. I didn't take that as I should have (I hadn't realized I skipped saying west of the VOR) and was thinking they were again asking turn direction off the radial; so I replied right turns. They didn't query again.I then asked if they wanted a vector to help join or if they could do it easy from there. They said their present position was fine. When I cleared the aircraft to the fix; since I was sure we were both on the same page; I said 'cleared to the ... VOR; hold as previously discussed...' etc. The aircraft turned right towards higher terrain; and I made a comment to a more seasoned controller watching; that it seemed weird; but we were both convinced all was okay and that was the aircraft's procedure turn to join. The aircraft entered the 9500 foot MVA east of the VOR and I queried that they were turning to the VOR. They said affirmative; and I did not issue a low altitude alert because they seemed to possibly be entering the hold still from a procedure turn.as they returned to the VOR; I noticed another right turn with the aircraft. I keyed up and asked them to verify they were holding on the 281R to which they said affirmative. A short time later; the aircraft keyed back up and said they had programmed incorrectly and were holding the inbound course instead of the radial. There was not a second loss with the mvas as the aircraft immediately started a right turn towards the VOR.my first recommendation is to never miss giving the direction of hold off the VOR. I now see exactly why that is included phraseology; to alleviate this situation. I didn't realized I had missed it in the initial discussion. My second recommendation is when they asked north or south of the VOR. I didn't understand exactly what they were asking; and my answer probably left questions for them; but neither of us asked for clarification. We can't leave holes open for interpretation; and both of us did in this situation. My third recommendation is to never shortcut phraseology. Had I not shortcut the clearance; I likely would have said hold west. Instead my phraseology 'hold as previously discussed' left another hole for this issue to develop.my fourth recommendation is to never be afraid to issue a safety alert. It made me uncomfortable; I expressed that to another controller who assured me the pilot was doing correct. Then I keyed up to ensure the aircraft was turning away from the terrain; but I never expressed why I was asking or the urgency of their position in reference to the terrain. If I had this situation happen again; I would issue the low altitude alert because I now have been able to find the visual depiction of the hold in national information display system (nids) (the set up is terrible and you look forever for the information you need when you actually want it) and know they were doing wrong; and also because I learned more about how they set up holding from this situation.I likely would have realized this mistake quicker had I been able to find the map showing direction of hold. I know they were supposed to be west on the 281R; but with no visual reference; I was assuming the aircraft was doing correctly. It turns out it was the next button down in nids; but I wasn't aware of that. Both of us that observed the situation assumed that first hold was them commencing a procedure turn to join up. When they began making the second turn and I queried them. We were all convinced something wasn't adding up; and the pilot keyed up saying they had programmed incorrectly before I made the call to turn them away myself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Controller issued incomplete holding instructions causing an aircraft to turn in the wrong direction below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

Narrative: I was working 4 Sectors combined. We had had a massive amount of deviations earlier in the night due to weather; so aircraft were coming in late. Aircraft X had diverted earlier and when ready to depart for SLC; advised the controller that they needed to hold for fuel burn as low and slow as possible. Traffic Management Unit (TMU) notified me that they would be holding.When I received Aircraft X; I asked if they had the depiction of the holding pattern. They said no; but if I gave it to them they would have it programmed and ready. I read them the radial; right turns; one minute legs. The aircraft then keyed up and asked if that hold was North or South of the VOR. I didn't take that as I should have (I hadn't realized I skipped saying West of the VOR) and was thinking they were again asking turn direction off the radial; so I replied right turns. They didn't query again.I then asked if they wanted a vector to help join or if they could do it easy from there. They said their present position was fine. When I cleared the aircraft to the fix; since I was sure we were both on the same page; I said 'Cleared to the ... VOR; hold as previously discussed...' etc. The aircraft turned right towards higher terrain; and I made a comment to a more seasoned controller watching; that it seemed weird; but we were both convinced all was okay and that was the aircraft's procedure turn to join. The aircraft entered the 9500 foot MVA east of the VOR and I queried that they were turning to the VOR. They said affirmative; and I did not issue a low altitude alert because they seemed to possibly be entering the hold still from a procedure turn.As they returned to the VOR; I noticed another right turn with the aircraft. I keyed up and asked them to verify they were holding on the 281R to which they said affirmative. A short time later; the aircraft keyed back up and said they had programmed incorrectly and were holding the inbound course instead of the radial. There was not a second loss with the MVAs as the aircraft immediately started a right turn towards the VOR.My first recommendation is to never miss giving the direction of hold off the VOR. I now see exactly why that is included phraseology; to alleviate this situation. I didn't realized I had missed it in the initial discussion. My second recommendation is when they asked north or south of the VOR. I didn't understand exactly what they were asking; and my answer probably left questions for them; but neither of us asked for clarification. We can't leave holes open for interpretation; and both of us did in this situation. My third recommendation is to never shortcut phraseology. Had I not shortcut the clearance; I likely would have said Hold West. Instead my phraseology 'hold as previously discussed' left another hole for this issue to develop.My fourth recommendation is to never be afraid to issue a safety alert. It made me uncomfortable; I expressed that to another controller who assured me the pilot was doing correct. Then I keyed up to ensure the aircraft was turning away from the terrain; but I never expressed why I was asking or the urgency of their position in reference to the terrain. If I had this situation happen again; I would issue the low altitude alert because I now have been able to find the visual depiction of the hold in National Information Display System (NIDS) (the set up is terrible and you look forever for the information you need when you actually want it) and know they were doing wrong; and also because I learned more about how they set up holding from this situation.I likely would have realized this mistake quicker had I been able to find the Map showing direction of hold. I know they were supposed to be West on the 281R; but with no visual reference; I was assuming the aircraft was doing correctly. It turns out it was the next button down in NIDS; but I wasn't aware of that. Both of us that observed the situation assumed that first hold was them commencing a procedure turn to join up. When they began making the second turn and I queried them. We were all convinced something wasn't adding up; and the pilot keyed up saying they had programmed incorrectly before I made the call to turn them away myself.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.