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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1451432 |
Time | |
Date | 201705 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | LAS.Airport |
State Reference | NV |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A321 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 119 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Route In Use | SID BOACH |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Small Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Total 6500 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Approach Departure |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict |
Narrative:
Climbing out of las on the BOACH7 departure off runway 01R; after checking in with departure we were cleared to climb unrestricted to FL190. Somewhere in the vicinity of witla we were cleared direct boach. Climbing through approximately 17;000 feet at 300 knots the TCAS issued a TA; we both reduced range on the navigation display (nd); the target showed ahead and slightly to our right and less than 1000 feet above. The TA changed to an RA very quickly. The RA was initially monitor vertical speed I believe; and then changed to descend. The captain was flying and had disconnected the autopilot immediately upon the RA issuance. He did reduce the pitch attitude but the actual vertical speed never reached the green band on the vsi which was a strong descend command. I turned off the flight directors a few seconds after the RA started; and said something like 'get the nose down' as we were not in the green vsi band but there was so much going on I don't know if he heard me.I had then tentatively started to make a nose down input on my own side stick but discontinued as I had the thought 'don't make simultaneous inputs'. The captain reminded me to tell ATC in the middle of all this; which I had not thought of; so I did notify las vegas we were in a TCAS directed descent. We both saw the other aircraft pass off the right side and slightly above. We then got the 'clear of conflict' and resumed our climb to FL190. Time from the initial TA to clear of conflict was very short; I would say 15-30 seconds total event duration.the captain called las approach after we blocked in [at destination] and they said a sky dive aircraft was where they should not have been; apologized and stated we were not at fault.I can't comment on avoiding GA aircraft we don't know are there; however I was less than happy with my own performance in the situation. The pilot flying (PF) was responding to the RA command in the correct direction but not to an adequate degree; and I didn't act assertively enough to address this. I believe I felt inhibited partly because it's a big step to directly intervene as a first officer; and also because we have been taught that after two challenges then you intervene; however there was absolutely no time available for this routine to play out. I would very much like to see TCAS RA scenarios in training that are not easily anticipated; happen quickly; and I highly recommend we specifically practice pilot monitoring (pm) intervention when the PF actions are not adequate; appropriate or correct; each and all of which could conceivably occur with very little time available for the pm to recognize and address or correct.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier flight crew and a Controller reported an unsafe situation where an air carrier and a sky diving aircraft became to close; resulting in a Resolution Alert for the carrier.
Narrative: Climbing out of LAS on the BOACH7 departure off RWY 01R; after checking in with departure we were cleared to climb unrestricted to FL190. Somewhere in the vicinity of WITLA we were cleared direct BOACH. Climbing through approximately 17;000 feet at 300 knots the TCAS issued a TA; we both reduced range on the Navigation Display (ND); the target showed ahead and slightly to our right and less than 1000 feet above. The TA changed to an RA very quickly. The RA was initially monitor vertical speed I believe; and then changed to descend. The Captain was flying and had disconnected the autopilot immediately upon the RA issuance. He did reduce the pitch attitude but the actual vertical speed never reached the green band on the VSI which was a strong descend command. I turned off the flight directors a few seconds after the RA started; and said something like 'get the nose down' as we were not in the green VSI band but there was so much going on I don't know if he heard me.I had then tentatively started to make a nose down input on my own side stick but discontinued as I had the thought 'don't make simultaneous inputs'. The captain reminded me to tell ATC in the middle of all this; which I had not thought of; so I did notify Las Vegas we were in a TCAS directed descent. We both saw the other aircraft pass off the right side and slightly above. We then got the 'Clear of Conflict' and resumed our climb to FL190. Time from the initial TA to clear of conflict was very short; I would say 15-30 seconds total event duration.The Captain called LAS Approach after we blocked in [at destination] and they said a sky dive aircraft was where they should not have been; apologized and stated we were not at fault.I can't comment on avoiding GA aircraft we don't know are there; however I was less than happy with my own performance in the situation. The Pilot Flying (PF) was responding to the RA command in the correct direction but not to an adequate degree; and I didn't act assertively enough to address this. I believe I felt inhibited partly because it's a big step to directly intervene as a First Officer; and also because we have been taught that after two challenges then you intervene; however there was absolutely no time available for this routine to play out. I would very much like to see TCAS RA scenarios in training that are not easily anticipated; happen quickly; and I highly recommend we specifically practice Pilot Monitoring (PM) intervention when the PF actions are not adequate; appropriate or correct; each and all of which could conceivably occur with very little time available for the PM to recognize and address or correct.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.