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Mri tower controller reported the approach control was not complying with an automated point out procedure causing unnecessary delay and flight time over water for aircraft.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1453052 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201705 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | MRI.Airport |
| State Reference | AK |
| Environment | |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | E-3 Sentry (AWACS) |
| Flight Phase | Final Approach |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Supervisor / CIC |
| Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
| Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I had just been relieved of controller in charge (controller in charge) by the front line manager (flm) when the LC1 stated turned to the flm to advise him that anchorage approach (A11) called with a 'red light' as an E3 flew over point mckenzie (the northwest boundary of mri airspace). The LC1 told A11 that we had been 'red light' for the past 2 hours. It is like an afterthought on A11's part. I just do not know if it is a lack of training; a lack of controller proficiency; complacency or disregard for safety. It may be a combination of all those factors.this same situation happened the day before. However; I will be submitting safety problem report on that once I review the recordings.this has become a dangerous trend where A11 controllers leave us with a 'red light' for hours on end. A11 does not understand that our single engine aircraft rely on a deviation across the water (knik arm / far part 93). Sometimes a couple extra hundred feet can mean the difference between life or death. Alaska's cold waters are not forgiving even if rescue and recovery are immediate. A11 and mri need to revisit the LOA which addresses 'red / green light.' both parties need to check their pride at the door. The complaint needs to be viewed from our single engine user's point of view. Their safety depends on it.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MRI Tower Controller reported the Approach Control was not complying with an automated point out procedure causing unnecessary delay and flight time over water for aircraft.
Narrative: I had just been relieved of Controller in Charge (CIC) by the Front Line Manager (FLM) when the LC1 stated turned to the FLM to advise him that Anchorage Approach (A11) called with a 'red light' as an E3 flew over Point McKenzie (the northwest boundary of MRI airspace). The LC1 told A11 that we had been 'red light' for the past 2 hours. It is like an afterthought on A11's part. I just do not know if it is a lack of training; a lack of controller proficiency; complacency or disregard for safety. It may be a combination of all those factors.This same situation happened the day before. However; I will be submitting safety problem report on that once I review the recordings.This has become a dangerous trend where A11 controllers leave us with a 'red light' for hours on end. A11 does not understand that our single engine aircraft rely on a deviation across the water (Knik Arm / FAR Part 93). Sometimes a couple extra hundred feet can mean the difference between life or death. Alaska's cold waters are not forgiving even if rescue and recovery are immediate. A11 and MRI need to revisit the LOA which addresses 'red / green light.' Both parties need to check their pride at the door. The complaint needs to be viewed from our single engine user's point of view. Their safety depends on it.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.