37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1453496 |
Time | |
Date | 201706 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Exterior Pax/Crew Door |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural FAR |
Narrative:
While assigned to operate a md-80. I met the inbound crew. Off going #1 flight attendant indicated that she had difficulty operating the forward entry door. Off going captain also indicated a potential difficulty with the door but that he had gotten it to work. When asked if it had been placed in the aircraft maintenance log (aml) he said no because he didn't want to incur a delay or have the aircraft taken out of service. I entered the item in the aircraft aml and called for maintenance. The first mechanic immediately said that there was a problem with the door. A maintenance supervisor came out and overrode the mechanic. My #1 flight attendant tried the door and also experienced difficulty. The discrepancy appeared to be one of an intermittent nature and therefore also the serviceability of the door. Since a captain; two fas; a mechanic and myself all had experienced difficulty with the door I desired some sort of maintenance action be performed. The supervisor informed me in no uncertain terms that no maintenance at all would be performed and if I didn't like it my only choice would be to refuse the aircraft. So I elected to refuse the aircraft. The door could have been placed on nef (non-essential furnishings) which would have at least involved maintenance on an ongoing basis while the aircraft was kept in service until a more thorough check of the door could have been accomplished; but that wasn't done. Instead the supervisor elevated it to level 5 management and a chief pilot was sent out to speak to me; the captain. This could be viewed as an attempt at intimidating the captain into accepting the aircraft and so-called pilot-pushing. The chief pilot; to his credit; supported my decision. The supervisor also informed the chief pilot that no maintenance action would be performed. Then; instead of realizing a potential intermittent problem with the door went further; blaming the flight attendant; instead of the door; which is disingenuous at best; and told the chief pilot that my #1 flight attendant didn't know how to operate the door properly. The maintenance supervisor is not in the flight services training department; is not qualified to evaluate flight attendant compliance; nor is it in his job description; duties and responsibilities to make such a judgment. What does that say about the off going captain; the first mechanic; the off going #1 flight attendant and myself? All unqualified? I told him that she was qualified and current and mentioned to the chief pilot that if that was not the case then the chief should have her removed from the flight sequence; which of course he did not do. Later; after the chief had returned to the flight office I called him and he said that after further reflection had called operations and told them that his concern was that after the aircraft aml had been cleared another captain would not be familiar with the aircraft history. He was told by operations that the aircraft would be taken out of service. But; it wasn't. I noticed this and called and spoke to another chief; because the first had left for the day; and he said that he would check into it. The aircraft continued to operate. I spoke with two [maintenance controllers] and they told me that an instruction would be issued on the aircraft; but upon further inquiry discovered that it wasn't issued. The aircraft continues to operate. I gave the first on-coming captain to operate the aircraft a turnover brief. I think the issuance of a technician instruction and nef would still be a prudent course of action and also a renewed emphasis on eliminating pilot-pushing and potential pilot intimidation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MD-80 Captain reported a main cabin door problem was not documented by the off going crew and entered the discrepancy in the aircraft maintenance log. A mechanic verified the problem; but the Supervisor overrode the decision resulting in the crew refusing the aircraft after enduring pilot pushing and threats from maintenance.
Narrative: While assigned to operate a MD-80. I met the inbound crew. Off going #1 FA indicated that she had difficulty operating the forward entry door. Off going Captain also indicated a potential difficulty with the door but that he had gotten it to work. When asked if it had been placed in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) he said no because he didn't want to incur a delay or have the aircraft taken out of service. I entered the item in the aircraft AML and called for Maintenance. The first Mechanic immediately said that there was a problem with the door. A Maintenance Supervisor came out and overrode the Mechanic. My #1 FA tried the door and also experienced difficulty. The discrepancy appeared to be one of an intermittent nature and therefore also the serviceability of the door. Since a Captain; two FAs; a mechanic and myself all had experienced difficulty with the door I desired some sort of maintenance action be performed. The Supervisor informed me in no uncertain terms that no maintenance at all would be performed and if I didn't like it my only choice would be to refuse the aircraft. So I elected to refuse the aircraft. The door could have been placed on NEF (Non-Essential Furnishings) which would have at least involved maintenance on an ongoing basis while the aircraft was kept in service until a more thorough check of the door could have been accomplished; but that wasn't done. Instead the Supervisor elevated it to level 5 management and a Chief Pilot was sent out to speak to me; the Captain. This could be viewed as an attempt at intimidating the Captain into accepting the aircraft and so-called Pilot-Pushing. The Chief Pilot; to his credit; supported my decision. The Supervisor also informed the Chief Pilot that no maintenance action would be performed. Then; instead of realizing a potential intermittent problem with the door went further; blaming the FA; instead of the door; which is disingenuous at best; and told the Chief Pilot that my #1 FA didn't know how to operate the door properly. The Maintenance Supervisor is not in the Flight Services Training Department; is not qualified to evaluate FA compliance; nor is it in his job description; duties and responsibilities to make such a judgment. What does that say about the off going Captain; the first mechanic; the off going #1 FA and myself? All unqualified? I told him that she was qualified and current and mentioned to the Chief Pilot that if that was not the case then the Chief should have her removed from the flight sequence; which of course he did not do. Later; after the Chief had returned to the flight office I called him and he said that after further reflection had called Operations and told them that his concern was that after the aircraft AML had been cleared another Captain would not be familiar with the aircraft history. He was told by Operations that the aircraft would be taken out of service. But; it wasn't. I noticed this and called and spoke to another Chief; because the first had left for the day; and he said that he would check into it. The aircraft continued to operate. I spoke with two [maintenance controllers] and they told me that an instruction would be issued on the aircraft; but upon further inquiry discovered that it wasn't issued. The aircraft continues to operate. I gave the first on-coming Captain to operate the aircraft a turnover brief. I think the issuance of a Technician Instruction and NEF would still be a prudent course of action and also a renewed emphasis on eliminating pilot-pushing and potential pilot intimidation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.