Narrative:

I was working radar. Traffic was steadily increasing; which always creates more coordination between facilities. I cleared aircraft Y direct and had them contact center as that sector had accepted the automated handoff. Shortly thereafter; I received the handoff on aircraft X descending via the RNAV arrival. The aircraft was at 16700 feet. I thought center was going to climb aircraft Y per the LOA (letter of agreement) but apparently that had not taken place yet.I went to aircraft X and realized they were descending into aircraft Y that was still level at 12000 feet northeast bound. I issued a left turn to heading 130 degrees and did not issue an altitude. Aircraft X was slow in reply but appeared to be turning but separation appeared to have been lost already. Aircraft X then replied they were responding to a TCAS and climbing. At that time they no longer appeared to be in a left turn but more like 170 degrees. Aircraft X advised me they would file a report and wanted me to provide them with the tail number of the other aircraft. I supplied them with a phone number to the watch supervisor desk. As far as I know; they never called the facility. I am told the closest proximity between the two aircraft was 1.42 miles and 900 feet vertical.recommend better staffing on each shift. There was no one available to work the assist position; so arrival data realizing the situation and the amount of traffic; left the data position and sat next to me to help with coordination and the extra set of eyes. But he did not catch the impending situation nor did I. There are many days that we have to work combined positions due to the poor staffing here.we have two other positions available to reduce workload; yet we do not have a body to put in the position. May not sound like much but there are several days each month where we have a total count of 1500-1800 operations and we do it with just 3 sectors. A place like the center works 2500-3000 operations daily but do it with 8-10 sectors. Do the math; staffing is deplorable and services have to be denied or the controllers become stretched so thin that things like this happen constantly. It is only getting worse and morale is getting worse as well. I do not know where the supervisor was during this; but I believe he was in the radar room. After it happened I reported the event to them. It is my fault; no one else's. I had other options and will exercise them in the future; like keeping both aircraft on my frequency and not depending on the receiving controller to climb the departure out of the arrivals way. We have pretty much gone stripless so I did not know where the aircraft was going until questioning the aircraft Y. Probably not a great idea. Maybe create a departure procedure for aircraft departing the secondary airports that will ensure separation from the busy arrival procedures. We do not have RNAV departures; because apparently; the airlines do not want them? We also need to stop the excessive coordination with center and other facilitates and follow the loas. Some days; center coordinates every airplane. Tell them to realize; if you clear aircraft to the same fix; they will get there and then they ask approach to bail them out with stacks over fixes; or headings other than the letter of agreement; etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZHU Center Controller and AUS TRACON Controller reported two aircraft conflicted with each other due to a different interpretation of their responsibilities according to the LOA between the facilities.

Narrative: I was working Radar. Traffic was steadily increasing; which always creates more coordination between facilities. I cleared Aircraft Y direct and had them contact Center as that sector had accepted the automated handoff. Shortly thereafter; I received the handoff on Aircraft X descending via the RNAV Arrival. The aircraft was at 16700 feet. I thought Center was going to climb Aircraft Y per the LOA (Letter of Agreement) but apparently that had not taken place yet.I went to Aircraft X and realized they were descending into Aircraft Y that was still level at 12000 feet northeast bound. I issued a left turn to heading 130 degrees and did not issue an altitude. Aircraft X was slow in reply but appeared to be turning but separation appeared to have been lost already. Aircraft X then replied they were responding to a TCAS and climbing. At that time they no longer appeared to be in a left turn but more like 170 degrees. Aircraft X advised me they would file a report and wanted me to provide them with the tail number of the other aircraft. I supplied them with a phone number to the watch supervisor desk. As far as I know; they never called the facility. I am told the closest proximity between the two aircraft was 1.42 miles and 900 feet vertical.Recommend better Staffing on each shift. There was no one available to work the assist position; so Arrival Data realizing the situation and the amount of traffic; left the data position and sat next to me to help with coordination and the extra set of eyes. But he did not catch the impending situation nor did I. There are many days that we have to work combined positions due to the poor staffing here.We have two other positions available to reduce workload; yet we do not have a body to put in the position. May not sound like much but there are several days each month where we have a total count of 1500-1800 operations and we do it with just 3 sectors. A place like the Center works 2500-3000 operations daily but do it with 8-10 sectors. Do the math; staffing is deplorable and services have to be denied or the controllers become stretched so thin that things like this happen constantly. It is only getting worse and morale is getting worse as well. I do not know where the Supervisor was during this; but I believe he was in the radar room. After it happened I reported the event to them. It is my fault; no one else's. I had other options and will exercise them in the future; like keeping both aircraft on my frequency and not depending on the receiving controller to climb the departure out of the arrivals way. We have pretty much gone stripless so I did not know where the aircraft was going until questioning the Aircraft Y. Probably not a great idea. Maybe create a departure procedure for aircraft departing the secondary airports that will ensure separation from the busy arrival procedures. We do not have RNAV departures; because apparently; the airlines do not want them? We also need to stop the excessive coordination with Center and other facilitates and follow the LOAs. Some days; Center coordinates every airplane. Tell them to realize; if you clear aircraft to the same fix; they will get there and then they ask Approach to bail them out with stacks over fixes; or headings other than the Letter of Agreement; etc.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.