Narrative:

During the descent briefing; the captain noted the risk of a high; unstabilized approach. Our mitigation strategy was to slow and descend early if given the visual approach. Approximately 20 NM from the airport we were cleared for the visual approach to runway 11. The captain set the published FAF altitude for the ILS 11 into the altitude alerter for guidance; and we began a 1200 fpm descent. We began to cross a ridge on a 10 NM left base for runway 11 at 8;800 ft. I began to notice the radio altimeter counting down from 2;500 ft but didn't alert the captain for fear of being nit-picky and out of the belief we would still be well clear of the ridge line. About that time; we received an egpws terrain warning. The captain disconnected the autopilot and momentarily leveled the aircraft. I observed the radio altimeter displayed 1300 ft. A second later; we were clear of the ridge and continued the descent to final. We maintained visual contact with the terrain at all times. The primary cause was our misjudgment of the closure rate with the ridge. Visually; we were certain we would be well clear; but it was apparently enough to trigger an egpws look ahead warning. Contributing factors were our fixation on not being high and fast due to the 'high unstabilized approach' warnings. Another factor was my lack of confidence to question the captain's descent rate when I saw the radio altimeter counting down. In the future; I will be less hesitant to point out issues that I see to the captain. I will also be sure to balance the threat of being high and fast with the threat of descending too early.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported a momentary EGPWS terrain warning on approach to GJT Runway 11 in VMC.

Narrative: During the descent briefing; the Captain noted the risk of a high; unstabilized approach. Our mitigation strategy was to slow and descend early if given the visual approach. Approximately 20 NM from the airport we were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 11. The captain set the published FAF altitude for the ILS 11 into the altitude alerter for guidance; and we began a 1200 fpm descent. We began to cross a ridge on a 10 NM left base for Runway 11 at 8;800 ft. I began to notice the radio altimeter counting down from 2;500 ft but didn't alert the captain for fear of being nit-picky and out of the belief we would still be well clear of the ridge line. About that time; we received an EGPWS terrain warning. The Captain disconnected the autopilot and momentarily leveled the aircraft. I observed the radio altimeter displayed 1300 ft. A second later; we were clear of the ridge and continued the descent to final. We maintained visual contact with the terrain at all times. The primary cause was our misjudgment of the closure rate with the ridge. Visually; we were certain we would be well clear; but it was apparently enough to trigger an EGPWS look ahead warning. Contributing factors were our fixation on not being high and fast due to the 'High Unstabilized Approach' warnings. Another factor was my lack of confidence to question the captain's descent rate when I saw the radio altimeter counting down. In the future; I will be less hesitant to point out issues that I see to the captain. I will also be sure to balance the threat of being high and fast with the threat of descending too early.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.