Narrative:

After takeoff from ZZZ; the flaps did not respond to being selected from flaps 2 to flaps 1. Shortly after realizing the flaps had not moved to the flaps 1 position; an ECAM alert showed a 'flaps locked' fault had occurred. Since we were actively coordinating with ATC to avoid numerous rain showers; I continued to act as the pilot flying and called for ECAM action. The ECAM and QRH merely provided for preparations for an abnormal landing. It was at night; with numerous heavy rain showers in the vicinity. The prospect of burning off fuel down to a reasonable landing weight; or an overweight emergency landing with a turbulent approach to a night landing at maximum or greater landing weight with partial flaps; which would also require even higher touchdown speeds on a wet runway was not an attractive course of action. Seeking to utilize outside resources I directed the relief pilot to contact dispatch to coordinate with maintenance control for more information or suggestions on how to proceed. Once in touch with maintenance control; they directed us to pull and reset the left and right flap control circuit breakers on the overhead panel. I advised the relief pilot to locate and pull and reset the circuit breakers as maintenance control directed. The procedure was successful with the flaps responding normally to the flap lever selection. The 'flaps locked' ECAM had also gone away. Maintenance control was told of the successful operation of the flaps and with apparent normal function returned and extinguishing of the ECAM warning. Maintenance control said we had apparently experienced a spurious anomaly of the flap control computer. He; maintenance control; said that we were good to continue our flight. By this time we had only used 1500 to 2000 pounds of fuel while resolving the flap problem. We conferred with the dispatcher about the resolved flap issue and our fuel on board. The dispatcher checked and agreed with us that we still had sufficient fuel and reserves and that continuing to ZZZZ was a good plan. So the first officer; the relief pilot and I; along with the dispatcher and maintenance control agreed that a continuation to ZZZZ was a satisfactory course of action. The flight continued on to ZZZZ with the flaps working normally throughout the remainder of the flight; taxi in and parking in ZZZZ. The takeoff flap anomaly and the cycling of the circuit breaker was recorded in the logbook. My [company] training instructs us to use all available resources to achieve the safest solution to abnormal situations. Although the QRH procedures would have us prepare for an accomplished landing as a result of the stuck flap situation; I elected to contact dispatch and maintenance control for help in arriving at a safe solution to our flap problem. To have returned for an immediate landing did not seem the safest course of action. The outside resources helped us resolve our immediate problem and return the airplane to its normal operating capability. Even if the flaps did not respond on landing at ZZZZ; we would have had a daylight landing on a 13;000 plus foot dry runway with a much lighter landing weight and better weather. Whereas; a return for landing to ZZZ or other nearby airports in dark; turbulent; rainy conditions to a shorter wet runway at much higher landing weights and speeds was a less safe options than continuing on to ZZZZ. Continuing training that emphases safety and using CRM and outside resources can help crews evaluate the abnormal situations that encountered.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A330 flight crew reported the trailing edge flaps did not respond when selected from flaps 2 to flaps 1 on departure.

Narrative: After takeoff from ZZZ; the flaps did not respond to being selected from Flaps 2 to Flaps 1. Shortly after realizing the flaps had not moved to the Flaps 1 position; an ECAM alert showed a 'Flaps Locked' fault had occurred. Since we were actively coordinating with ATC to avoid numerous rain showers; I continued to act as the Pilot Flying and called for ECAM action. The ECAM and QRH merely provided for preparations for an abnormal landing. It was at night; with numerous heavy rain showers in the vicinity. The prospect of burning off fuel down to a reasonable landing weight; or an overweight emergency landing with a turbulent approach to a night landing at maximum or greater landing weight with partial flaps; which would also require even higher touchdown speeds on a wet runway was not an attractive course of action. Seeking to utilize outside resources I directed the Relief Pilot to contact Dispatch to coordinate with Maintenance Control for more information or suggestions on how to proceed. Once in touch with Maintenance Control; they directed us to pull and reset the left and right flap control circuit breakers on the overhead panel. I advised the Relief Pilot to locate and pull and reset the circuit breakers as Maintenance Control directed. The procedure was successful with the flaps responding normally to the flap lever selection. The 'Flaps Locked' ECAM had also gone away. Maintenance Control was told of the successful operation of the flaps and with apparent normal function returned and extinguishing of the ECAM warning. Maintenance Control said we had apparently experienced a spurious anomaly of the flap control computer. He; Maintenance Control; said that we were good to continue our flight. By this time we had only used 1500 to 2000 pounds of fuel while resolving the flap problem. We conferred with the Dispatcher about the resolved flap issue and our fuel on board. The Dispatcher checked and agreed with us that we still had sufficient fuel and reserves and that continuing to ZZZZ was a good plan. So the First Officer; the Relief Pilot and I; along with the Dispatcher and Maintenance Control agreed that a continuation to ZZZZ was a satisfactory course of action. The flight continued on to ZZZZ with the flaps working normally throughout the remainder of the flight; taxi in and parking in ZZZZ. The takeoff flap anomaly and the cycling of the circuit breaker was recorded in the logbook. My [Company] training instructs us to use all available resources to achieve the safest solution to abnormal situations. Although the QRH procedures would have us prepare for an accomplished landing as a result of the stuck flap situation; I elected to contact Dispatch and Maintenance Control for help in arriving at a safe solution to our flap problem. To have returned for an immediate landing did not seem the safest course of action. The outside resources helped us resolve our immediate problem and return the airplane to its normal operating capability. Even if the flaps did not respond on landing at ZZZZ; we would have had a daylight landing on a 13;000 plus foot dry runway with a much lighter landing weight and better weather. Whereas; a return for landing to ZZZ or other nearby airports in dark; turbulent; rainy conditions to a shorter wet runway at much higher landing weights and speeds was a less safe options than continuing on to ZZZZ. Continuing training that emphases safety and using CRM and outside resources can help crews evaluate the abnormal situations that encountered.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.