Narrative:

After pushing back from the gate and beginning our taxi to the runway; we received an ACARS notification along with final weights that said we were tail heavy and would need to move everyone out of the last row in coach. This seemed like an odd message for a 737-800; and since we were already taxiing; we decided to move the passengers in the hold area near the end of runway xxr. This delayed our departure by several minutes; which put us past our edct (expected departure clearance time). Thankfully; ATC was able to coordinate a new time in short order; but the potential for us to have missed our window was significant. After takeoff; I decided to ask the load planner for the breakdown of cargo weights that necessitated the last minute passenger movements. After no response from the load planner; I sent a message asking the dispatcher if he could provide this data. He forwarded our request to load planning; who then sent a generic message of why the weight change was needed. I again asked for specific weight information for my records. Eventually; the load planner sent the ACARS message. The rear bin had been loaded to a far greater extent than the front; which was almost empty. I'm wondering if this was done by saber to move the aircraft's cg aft in order to save gas due to improved aerodynamics. But if that's the case; I'm wondering if this type of loading sets up the crews or the airline for increased likelihood of tail tips; missed edcts; or other non-standard issues that arise from coordination of passenger movement after pushback. Additionally; these types of events serve as a distraction on the flight deck; which could impact the flow of the before takeoff to the line checklist; which I believe is already overly complicated and a hazard to flight. Thankfully; our crew worked through these challenges with the utmost professionalism. We managed these threats well; moved the passengers in an expeditious manner; and accomplished our checklists as intended. But after seeing the cargo load report; I felt compelled to write this report to bring this issue to the attention of the flight safety committees.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 Captain reported being informed after gate departure that the aircraft was tail heavy and passengers seated in the last row needed to move forward.

Narrative: After pushing back from the gate and beginning our taxi to the runway; we received an ACARS notification along with final weights that said we were tail heavy and would need to move everyone out of the last row in coach. This seemed like an odd message for a 737-800; and since we were already taxiing; we decided to move the passengers in the hold area near the end of Runway XXR. This delayed our departure by several minutes; which put us past our EDCT (Expected Departure Clearance Time). Thankfully; ATC was able to coordinate a new time in short order; but the potential for us to have missed our window was significant. After takeoff; I decided to ask the load planner for the breakdown of cargo weights that necessitated the last minute passenger movements. After no response from the load planner; I sent a message asking the dispatcher if he could provide this data. He forwarded our request to load planning; who then sent a generic message of why the weight change was needed. I again asked for specific weight information for my records. Eventually; the load planner sent the ACARS message. The rear bin had been loaded to a far greater extent than the front; which was almost empty. I'm wondering if this was done by SABER to move the aircraft's CG aft in order to save gas due to improved aerodynamics. But if that's the case; I'm wondering if this type of loading sets up the crews or the airline for increased likelihood of tail tips; missed EDCTs; or other non-standard issues that arise from coordination of passenger movement after pushback. Additionally; these types of events serve as a distraction on the flight deck; which could impact the flow of the before takeoff to the line checklist; which I believe is already overly complicated and a hazard to flight. Thankfully; our crew worked through these challenges with the utmost professionalism. We managed these threats well; moved the passengers in an expeditious manner; and accomplished our checklists as intended. But after seeing the cargo load report; I felt compelled to write this report to bring this issue to the attention of the flight safety committees.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.