Narrative:

Upon entering the control room I noticed that all of the 8 sectors that we work were combined down to two scopes. At this time of night there are usually 4 scopes open. There is a traffic push that runs [for 30 minutes] that requires at least 3 scopes open and especially with the amount of weather. One scope was all sectors north of rdu and the other was three sectors south of rdu. The north scope had a lot of weather to the south end resulting in very little traffic due to the predominantly northern traffic flow. The south sector; comprised of two high altitudes and one low sector; had about 15 aircraft all going north and all heading for the moderate; heavy and extreme precipitation at the north end of the sector. The area flm was plugged into the D side of the south sector and told me to sit there and help the right side controller. As I sat down the right side told the flm that the aircraft that were running right at the weather decided that the gap had closed and that they did not want to go any farther north. The northern half of the sectors was covered in heavy precipitation with a line of extreme precipitation across three quarters of the top from west to east. The right side began turning all of the aircraft south while I began to put in new routes on all. The plan was to take them south; away from the weather and then east into the adjacent sector in bay 3. From there it would be a straight shot north along the coast while staying east of the weather.the right side had aircraft on three frequencies and congestion was a major issue. He had to repeat himself; aircraft were stepping on each other and there was a lot to get done. I was taking calls from three sectors at atlanta center and two from jacksonville center while trying to update routes in the uret (user request evaluation tool). I was still catching up with the right sides plan when I received a call from the bay 3; D side; asking me to take radar on a flight going north to bwi. I told the D side unable and explained our situation. None of our aircraft would go through that weather and neither would [this aircraft]. We were turning 15 aircraft south and then east into their sector and that we were too busy to take any more. He said 'ok' and hung up. There was no way that we had time to take another aircraft who would just deviate and add to our workload. The frequency was so congested that adding another would have been detrimental. Seconds later the right side from bay 3 called me. 'So you are not going to take my [aircraft]? He requested this route for weather'. I told him that we couldn't because no one was going through that weather and that all of our traffic was being vectored south then east and into his sector. 'Yeah; all of your traffic is coming into my sector but you won't take my traffic?' I said 'no; we can't.' he replied; 'then if you're not going to take my traffic then I'm not taking yours. 'Come on;' I said but he interrupted me. 'Don't give me that; you're going to give me all of that traffic but you won't work with me?' he replied. I told him that we were just picking up the pieces here referencing the chaos that was going on in our sector. At that point; I had to make a decision. There were 15 aircraft heading east that still needed routes and adding one more who would just deviate and add to the mess did not make sense. As our traffic approached the boundary with bay 3 we were wasting time talking about this. A decision was needed before all of our traffic piled into bay 3 without permission and the window to stop and hold all of them in our airspace was rapidly closing. The traffic in our sector was known to us but we knew nothing of what was happening in bay 3. If I missed this window while arguing with this person; bad things were going to happen when our traffic merged with the traffic in the other sector. If you don't take my traffic I won't take yours he said. I told him that 'we're in the hold then.' he hung up. I could not argue any longer. I feltthat there was no time left and that no matter what; the next controller would not take our traffic. Bay 3 forced us into a no notice hold because the controller over there was unhappy that we wouldn't run his one airplane into known heavy and extreme precipitation that no one else would fly through. What happened next was not as bad as running into bay 3's traffic but it was not good. The right side began putting all traffic into present position holds; about 15 aircraft total. They were spread out enough and at different altitudes that only two came close but separation was never lost. I immediately called atlanta and jacksonville centers and shut them off for all traffic. After about 10 minutes; we got word that we might try a small opening in the weather. The right side asked for a pathfinder and got several volunteers. The small gap worked and we began the process of rerouting our traffic a second time; through a gap to the north east. At this point I had to call bay 3 for a point out and the controller informed me that he would take our traffic now. It was a full 10 minutes later and we were now running a new route. Altogether; traffic was shut down for about 20 minutes while we cleaned up the sector. After reviewing the falcon and voice tapes I learned that the bay 3 controller did not have more than 6 aircraft in his sector. He had minutes before rerouted a bwi arrival to the north and could have easily done the same with the second one. The bay 3 controller also entered our airspace with the aircraft without our permission before eventually turning him out. Staffing - there is no way that those sectors should have been combined that early. We should have more controllers per shift but management will not pay for the overtime to staff. Take away the manager bonus for saving overtime money and we can get back to safely running traffictmu - what were they doing running all of this traffic into extreme precipitation? Why do the airlines have such a say in this safety issue? We are going to do serious harm to an aircraft by running them at extreme weather. We saw it a few weeks ago where traffic was run through a corridor with reports of severe turbulence because the airlines did not want to spend the money to put on extra fuel for the reroute. Same thing here. We are running at extreme precipitation and when we have nowhere else to go; the sector goes to hell. Attitudes - controllers cannot just shut off traffic because they are unhappy. This has become almost common place at ZDC. Just a few weeks ago a bay 1 controller essentially shut off the east coast by refusing to take all traffic because he didn't like getting two ewr arrivals with less than the requested miles in trail. The sector that was feeding him was inundated with weather and was working with less than a third of the airspace due to deviations. In our case the controller did not like being told no. He also did not want to work our traffic. He had seen it coming and seemed angry that he would have to take it. Too many controllers spend their time complaining about others who work less traffic then them. Why should I have to work all of this traffic when the other area gets more breaks and doesn't have much traffic? This is crap. We all need to look out for each other. The bay 3 controller was dodging traffic instead of helping us out. Professionalism - you need permission to enter another controller's airspace. If permission is not granted you do something else. That's what we had to do. It is not a negotiation. That bay 3 controller tried to intimidate us and threaten us into doing something that we could not do. That's just wrong. I explained our situation and expected help from a fellow controller. What we got was nothing of the sort.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDC controllers reported being flooded with traffic and weather then having a disagreement with another Controller which led to unplanned holding and an airspace violation.

Narrative: Upon entering the control room I noticed that all of the 8 sectors that we work were combined down to two scopes. At this time of night there are usually 4 scopes open. There is a traffic push that runs [for 30 minutes] that requires at least 3 scopes open and especially with the amount of weather. One scope was all sectors north of RDU and the other was three sectors south of RDU. The north scope had a lot of weather to the south end resulting in very little traffic due to the predominantly northern traffic flow. The south sector; comprised of two high altitudes and one low sector; had about 15 aircraft all going north and all heading for the moderate; heavy and extreme precipitation at the north end of the sector. The area FLM was plugged into the D side of the south sector and told me to sit there and help the R side controller. As I sat down the R side told the FLM that the aircraft that were running right at the weather decided that the gap had closed and that they did not want to go any farther north. The northern half of the sectors was covered in heavy precipitation with a line of extreme precipitation across three quarters of the top from west to east. The R side began turning all of the aircraft south while I began to put in new routes on all. The plan was to take them south; away from the weather and then east into the adjacent sector in Bay 3. From there it would be a straight shot north along the coast while staying east of the weather.The R side had aircraft on three frequencies and congestion was a major issue. He had to repeat himself; aircraft were stepping on each other and there was a lot to get done. I was taking calls from three sectors at Atlanta Center and two from Jacksonville Center while trying to update routes in the URET (User Request Evaluation Tool). I was still catching up with the R sides plan when I received a call from the Bay 3; D Side; asking me to take radar on a flight going north to BWI. I told the D side unable and explained our situation. None of our aircraft would go through that weather and neither would [this aircraft]. We were turning 15 aircraft south and then east into their sector and that we were too busy to take any more. He said 'OK' and hung up. There was no way that we had time to take another aircraft who would just deviate and add to our workload. The frequency was so congested that adding another would have been detrimental. Seconds later the R side from Bay 3 called me. 'So you are not going to take my [aircraft]? He requested this route for weather'. I told him that we couldn't because no one was going through that weather and that all of our traffic was being vectored south then east and into his sector. 'Yeah; all of your traffic is coming into my sector but you won't take my traffic?' I said 'no; we can't.' He replied; 'Then if you're not going to take my traffic then I'm not taking yours. 'Come on;' I said but he interrupted me. 'Don't give me that; you're going to give me all of that traffic but you won't work with me?' he replied. I told him that we were just picking up the pieces here referencing the chaos that was going on in our sector. At that point; I had to make a decision. There were 15 aircraft heading east that still needed routes and adding one more who would just deviate and add to the mess did not make sense. As our traffic approached the boundary with bay 3 we were wasting time talking about this. A decision was needed before all of our traffic piled into bay 3 without permission and the window to stop and hold all of them in our airspace was rapidly closing. The traffic in our sector was known to us but we knew nothing of what was happening in Bay 3. If I missed this window while arguing with this person; bad things were going to happen when our traffic merged with the traffic in the other sector. If you don't take my traffic I won't take yours he said. I told him that 'We're in the hold then.' He hung up. I could not argue any longer. I feltthat there was no time left and that no matter what; the next controller would not take our traffic. Bay 3 forced us into a no notice hold because the controller over there was unhappy that we wouldn't run his one airplane into known heavy and extreme precipitation that no one else would fly through. What happened next was not as bad as running into Bay 3's traffic but it was not good. The R side began putting all traffic into present position holds; about 15 aircraft total. They were spread out enough and at different altitudes that only two came close but separation was never lost. I immediately called Atlanta and Jacksonville Centers and shut them off for all traffic. After about 10 minutes; we got word that we might try a small opening in the weather. The R side asked for a pathfinder and got several volunteers. The small gap worked and we began the process of rerouting our traffic a second time; through a gap to the north east. At this point I had to call bay 3 for a point out and the controller informed me that he would take our traffic now. It was a full 10 minutes later and we were now running a new route. Altogether; traffic was shut down for about 20 minutes while we cleaned up the sector. After reviewing the Falcon and voice tapes I learned that the Bay 3 controller did not have more than 6 aircraft in his sector. He had minutes before rerouted a BWI arrival to the north and could have easily done the same with the second one. The bay 3 controller also entered our airspace with the aircraft without our permission before eventually turning him out. Staffing - There is no way that those sectors should have been combined that early. We should have more controllers per shift but management will not pay for the overtime to staff. Take away the manager bonus for saving overtime money and we can get back to safely running trafficTMU - What were they doing running all of this traffic into extreme precipitation? Why do the airlines have such a say in this safety issue? We are going to do serious harm to an aircraft by running them at extreme weather. We saw it a few weeks ago where traffic was run through a corridor with reports of severe turbulence because the airlines did not want to spend the money to put on extra fuel for the reroute. Same thing here. We are running at extreme precipitation and when we have nowhere else to go; the sector goes to hell. Attitudes - Controllers cannot just shut off traffic because they are unhappy. This has become almost common place at ZDC. Just a few weeks ago a Bay 1 controller essentially shut off the east coast by refusing to take all traffic because he didn't like getting two EWR arrivals with less than the requested miles in trail. The sector that was feeding him was inundated with weather and was working with less than a third of the airspace due to deviations. In our case the controller did not like being told no. He also did not want to work our traffic. He had seen it coming and seemed angry that he would have to take it. Too many controllers spend their time complaining about others who work less traffic then them. Why should I have to work all of this traffic when the other area gets more breaks and doesn't have much traffic? This is crap. We all need to look out for each other. The bay 3 controller was dodging traffic instead of helping us out. Professionalism - You need permission to enter another controller's airspace. If permission is not granted you do something else. That's what we had to do. It is not a negotiation. That bay 3 controller tried to intimidate us and threaten us into doing something that we could not do. That's just wrong. I explained our situation and expected help from a fellow controller. What we got was nothing of the sort.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.