Narrative:

Air carrier X departed ontario int'l airport (oia) on runway 08R on a prdo 2 SID, with an atx Y on an ILS runway 26L approach. Oia is in a contra flow confign from xx pm to xg am for noise abatement. Air carrier X was on a SID which requires the pilot to turn south within 1 NM of the departure end of runway. Ont ATCT had (as per our LOA with ont TRACON), responsibility to ensure that the departing aircraft air carrier X was established on a heading 180 degree from the reciprocal of the final approach course before the arriving aircraft, atx Y passes the OM (5.5 mi). The SID heading complies with this. No radar separation or visual separation may be used. Usually, the tower controller will not change the departure to departure control until they observe the pilot in the turn. In this instance, however, tower told air carrier X pilot about the inbound traffic, told him to turn as soon as possible, and told him to change to departure. The air carrier X pilot did not comply with either the SID or the tower controller's instructions. As a result, the 2 aircraft passed, I estimate, within 500', and half a mi of each other. I was working the clearance delivery position and heard the supervisor tell local that air carrier X had not turned. I looked at the radar and saw the near miss. As far as I know no safety alert was given to either pilot, by the TRACON or tower. I don't think either pilot saw the other because of the WX. I also do not remember the conflict alert going off. No follow up action was taken by the TRACON or ATCT, other than the air carrier X pilot being asked to call the tower. Major contributors to this near midair were the air carrier X pilot and the local controller's inattention to duty. Also contributing to this unsafe situation is the opposite direction requirements at ont. Tower only has 14 mi of radar coverage to the east, and with atx Y coming in at 250 KTS (which is not unusual for them or other air carriers) there is little time to get a departure off within the separation requirements. Ontario approach is not required to call the incoming traffic, since ont ATCT is a limited radar tower which has ARTS III. These types of situations can be avoided by the los angeles department of airport (which runs oia), adopting a less stringent noise abatement policy. As oia has gotten busier over the years, the opposite direction situation has gotten worse, with more and more flts in and out during contra flow times. If the airport would allow west departures after xf am instead of xg am the situation would improve. Another possible remedy would be to have ont approach be required to call incoming traffic when there is contra flow. Speed restrictions should also be used for the arrs during this time. I've seen aircraft indicating 280 KTS on final, which with no forewarning by approach. With only 14 mi of coverage, this leaves precious little time to make the opposite direction separation work. I've had to cancel the takeoff clrncs of heavy jets because of this. With the new construction of the cargo ramp forthcoming the problem will only get worse. They will have 22 jets here compared with half that number now, and they do most of their flying during contra hours. Construction on a new terminal at oia is eminent. This will add another 36 gates. The controllers handbook needs to address the issues of opposite direction in the following areas: wake turbulence, radar separation and visual separation. Another safety problem is that there is only one controller on duty at ont ATCT between xk pm and xe am. The controller (who is working 4 positions combined), can be easily distracted from the opposite direction situation with other duties. As I have indicated, oia has a very serious safety problem. I would be happy to discuss this situation further with you. Thank you.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DEP ACR DOES NOT COMPLY WITH SID AND CONFLICTS WITH AN ARR ATX.

Narrative: ACR X DEPARTED ONTARIO INT'L ARPT (OIA) ON RWY 08R ON A PRDO 2 SID, WITH AN ATX Y ON AN ILS RWY 26L APCH. OIA IS IN A CONTRA FLOW CONFIGN FROM XX PM TO XG AM FOR NOISE ABATEMENT. ACR X WAS ON A SID WHICH REQUIRES THE PLT TO TURN S WITHIN 1 NM OF THE DEP END OF RWY. ONT ATCT HAD (AS PER OUR LOA WITH ONT TRACON), RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THE DEPARTING ACFT ACR X WAS ESTABLISHED ON A HDG 180 DEG FROM THE RECIPROCAL OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE BEFORE THE ARRIVING ACFT, ATX Y PASSES THE OM (5.5 MI). THE SID HDG COMPLIES WITH THIS. NO RADAR SEPARATION OR VISUAL SEPARATION MAY BE USED. USUALLY, THE TWR CTLR WILL NOT CHANGE THE DEP TO DEP CTL UNTIL THEY OBSERVE THE PLT IN THE TURN. IN THIS INSTANCE, HOWEVER, TWR TOLD ACR X PLT ABOUT THE INBND TFC, TOLD HIM TO TURN ASAP, AND TOLD HIM TO CHANGE TO DEP. THE ACR X PLT DID NOT COMPLY WITH EITHER THE SID OR THE TWR CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS. AS A RESULT, THE 2 ACFT PASSED, I ESTIMATE, WITHIN 500', AND HALF A MI OF EACH OTHER. I WAS WORKING THE CLRNC DELIVERY POSITION AND HEARD THE SUPVR TELL LCL THAT ACR X HAD NOT TURNED. I LOOKED AT THE RADAR AND SAW THE NEAR MISS. AS FAR AS I KNOW NO SAFETY ALERT WAS GIVEN TO EITHER PLT, BY THE TRACON OR TWR. I DON'T THINK EITHER PLT SAW THE OTHER BECAUSE OF THE WX. I ALSO DO NOT REMEMBER THE CONFLICT ALERT GOING OFF. NO FOLLOW UP ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE TRACON OR ATCT, OTHER THAN THE ACR X PLT BEING ASKED TO CALL THE TWR. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NEAR MIDAIR WERE THE ACR X PLT AND THE LCL CTLR'S INATTENTION TO DUTY. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THIS UNSAFE SITUATION IS THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION REQUIREMENTS AT ONT. TWR ONLY HAS 14 MI OF RADAR COVERAGE TO THE E, AND WITH ATX Y COMING IN AT 250 KTS (WHICH IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR THEM OR OTHER AIR CARRIERS) THERE IS LITTLE TIME TO GET A DEP OFF WITHIN THE SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS. ONTARIO APCH IS NOT REQUIRED TO CALL THE INCOMING TFC, SINCE ONT ATCT IS A LIMITED RADAR TWR WHICH HAS ARTS III. THESE TYPES OF SITUATIONS CAN BE AVOIDED BY THE LOS ANGELES DEPT OF ARPT (WHICH RUNS OIA), ADOPTING A LESS STRINGENT NOISE ABATEMENT POLICY. AS OIA HAS GOTTEN BUSIER OVER THE YEARS, THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION SITUATION HAS GOTTEN WORSE, WITH MORE AND MORE FLTS IN AND OUT DURING CONTRA FLOW TIMES. IF THE ARPT WOULD ALLOW W DEPS AFTER XF AM INSTEAD OF XG AM THE SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE. ANOTHER POSSIBLE REMEDY WOULD BE TO HAVE ONT APCH BE REQUIRED TO CALL INCOMING TFC WHEN THERE IS CONTRA FLOW. SPEED RESTRICTIONS SHOULD ALSO BE USED FOR THE ARRS DURING THIS TIME. I'VE SEEN ACFT INDICATING 280 KTS ON FINAL, WHICH WITH NO FOREWARNING BY APCH. WITH ONLY 14 MI OF COVERAGE, THIS LEAVES PRECIOUS LITTLE TIME TO MAKE THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION SEPARATION WORK. I'VE HAD TO CANCEL THE TKOF CLRNCS OF HEAVY JETS BECAUSE OF THIS. WITH THE NEW CONSTRUCTION OF THE CARGO RAMP FORTHCOMING THE PROBLEM WILL ONLY GET WORSE. THEY WILL HAVE 22 JETS HERE COMPARED WITH HALF THAT NUMBER NOW, AND THEY DO MOST OF THEIR FLYING DURING CONTRA HOURS. CONSTRUCTION ON A NEW TERMINAL AT OIA IS EMINENT. THIS WILL ADD ANOTHER 36 GATES. THE CTLRS HANDBOOK NEEDS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF OPPOSITE DIRECTION IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: WAKE TURBULENCE, RADAR SEPARATION AND VISUAL SEPARATION. ANOTHER SAFETY PROBLEM IS THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE CTLR ON DUTY AT ONT ATCT BETWEEN XK PM AND XE AM. THE CTLR (WHO IS WORKING 4 POSITIONS COMBINED), CAN BE EASILY DISTRACTED FROM THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION SITUATION WITH OTHER DUTIES. AS I HAVE INDICATED, OIA HAS A VERY SERIOUS SAFETY PROBLEM. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THIS SITUATION FURTHER WITH YOU. THANK YOU.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.