Narrative:

Training was in progress at local 1. Aircraft X was given to us from the TRACON 1/2 mile behind aircraft Y with an overtake. Aircraft X was tagged for the overhead runway 34L; and aircraft Y had been cleared to land runway 34R. Given the wake turbulence separation of an F not being allowed to be passed by a D; this was not an appropriate landing sequence and there was little time to correct the situation. The tower controller advised aircraft Y of the C130 traffic behind and to his left landing the parallel runway; and the pilot of aircraft Y stated that he had the traffic in sight. Aircraft Y's next transmission was that he had responded to an RA; but was now clear. Aircraft X ended up passing aircraft Y while conducting his overhead approach; and was 600 feet above aircraft Y at the time of passing him.the nct controller clearly wasn't thinking about wake turbulence separation for aircraft on approach landing runways separated by 700 feet. In this situation; an F cannot be passed by a D. Giving the tower 1/2 mile to respond to the situation is poor technique. All conflicts should be resolved before handing the aircraft over to tower; and they were not. Aircraft X should have been broken off approach or altitude restricted by the tower; but given that training was in progress; and the minimal time available to react because of nct's sequence; it did not. Had there been better communication and coordination by the nct controller; I think this situation could have been avoided. There was no reason to jam aircraft X in so close directly behind aircraft Y.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RNO Tower Controller reported receiving successive arrivals to parallel runways from NCT TRACON with less than required wake turbulence separation.

Narrative: Training was in progress at Local 1. Aircraft X was given to us from the TRACON 1/2 mile behind Aircraft Y with an overtake. Aircraft X was tagged for the overhead Runway 34L; and Aircraft Y had been cleared to land Runway 34R. Given the wake turbulence separation of an F not being allowed to be passed by a D; this was not an appropriate landing sequence and there was little time to correct the situation. The Tower Controller advised Aircraft Y of the C130 traffic behind and to his left landing the parallel runway; and the pilot of Aircraft Y stated that he had the traffic in sight. Aircraft Y's next transmission was that he had responded to an RA; but was now clear. Aircraft X ended up passing Aircraft Y while conducting his overhead approach; and was 600 feet above Aircraft Y at the time of passing him.The NCT controller clearly wasn't thinking about wake turbulence separation for aircraft on approach landing runways separated by 700 feet. In this situation; an F cannot be passed by a D. Giving the tower 1/2 mile to respond to the situation is poor technique. All conflicts SHOULD be resolved before handing the aircraft over to tower; and they were not. Aircraft X should have been broken off approach or altitude restricted by the tower; but given that training was in progress; and the minimal time available to react because of NCT's sequence; it did not. Had there been better communication and coordination by the NCT controller; I think this situation could have been avoided. There was no reason to jam Aircraft X in so close directly behind Aircraft Y.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.