Narrative:

Prior to descent to den; expected runway 35L due to construction and low arrival demand. We briefed the descent; approach; and windshear procedures; due to windshear advisories. On initial contact with approach control; told to expect 35L. On downwind; 210 knots assigned; just prior to bark; controller told us to expect 35R. Both pilots turn to the ipad to get 35R charts. I started an 'active briefing' for ILS 35R backup. As I was setting ILS freq we were assigned heading 260. Rolling out on base leg we were asked to report 'airport in sight.' we reported the field in sight and the controller assigned us 'heading 320; maintain 180 knots.' the first officer asked if I wanted him to extend the course to the final approach fix. I told him 'yes' and he extended the FAF. As I turned to the intercept heading; I cross-checked the nav display and saw the intercept heading was inside the FAF; but would put us in front of other traffic on final. The controller then told us to maintain 170 knots until 5 DME and cleared us for the visual runway 35R. At that point; I realized that we were going through the final course to 35R and that the FMC was still programmed for 35L. We made the turn to 35R without conflicting with traffic for 35L. Because we had been turning and descending from a 210 knot downwind; however; we were still at very high speed; and were barely within the stabilized approach criteria at 500 feet. This 'slam dunk' was not set up to give spacing to traffic landing behind us; but rather to close spacing with traffic ahead of us. That could have led to an approach to the wrong runway; conflict with traffic on a parallel approach; or an unstabilized approach. Given that windshear advisories were also in effect; I consider that type of pushing to get us in fast to be an invitation for disaster. Finally; I would like to add that the tower controller was making a lot of comments about what airplanes were doing and the pace that they were following his instructions. I'm sure that his comments were annoying to everyone who was on frequency; and outright distracting for a crew that just got slam dunked.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported that on approach to DEN while on downwind they were given a runway change and a short turn to final which resulted in an overshoot and an unstabilized approach.

Narrative: Prior to descent to DEN; expected Runway 35L due to construction and low arrival demand. We briefed the Descent; Approach; and Windshear Procedures; due to Windshear Advisories. On initial contact with Approach Control; told to expect 35L. On Downwind; 210 knots assigned; just prior to BARK; controller told us to expect 35R. Both pilots turn to the iPad to get 35R charts. I started an 'Active Briefing' for ILS 35R backup. As I was setting ILS freq we were assigned heading 260. Rolling out on Base Leg we were asked to report 'Airport in sight.' We reported the Field in sight and the controller assigned us 'Heading 320; Maintain 180 knots.' The First Officer asked if I wanted him to extend the Course to the Final Approach Fix. I told him 'yes' and he extended the FAF. As I turned to the intercept heading; I cross-checked the Nav Display and saw the intercept heading was inside the FAF; but would put us in front of other traffic on Final. The controller then told us to maintain 170 knots until 5 DME and cleared us for the Visual Runway 35R. At that point; I realized that we were going through the Final course to 35R and that the FMC was still programmed for 35L. We made the turn to 35R without conflicting with traffic for 35L. Because we had been turning and descending From a 210 knot downwind; however; we were still at very high speed; and were barely within the Stabilized Approach criteria at 500 feet. This 'Slam Dunk' was not set up to give spacing to traffic landing behind us; but rather to close spacing with traffic ahead of us. That could have led to an approach to the wrong runway; conflict with traffic on a parallel approach; or an unstabilized approach. Given that Windshear Advisories were also in effect; I consider that type of pushing to get us in fast to be an invitation for disaster. Finally; I would like to add that the Tower Controller was making a lot of comments about what airplanes were doing and the pace that they were following his instructions. I'm sure that his comments were annoying to everyone who was on frequency; and outright distracting for a crew that just got slam dunked.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.