Narrative:

Upon landing gear extension; we received an ECAM 'brakes automatic brk fault' message. No auto brakes had been selected. We also noted that the three gear down-lock indicators (green triangles) were not illuminated. The gear unlk lights on the panel were also not illuminated. With flaps full selected; I confirmed that the landing memo was green; which includes the gear down lock notation. We both felt that the gear was in fact down and locked; but I was contemplating a go-around to give us some time to look at the QRH in order to gain some more knowledge of what might have occurred. (I had yet to check the wheel page for green gear confirmation.) prior to 500 feet AGL; the ECAM message cleared itself; and the three gear down-lock indicators illuminated green. We both agreed that it was safe to continue the approach and landing. My thoughts were that this might just be an airbus anomaly. After a normal landing on runway xyl; I selected full reverse thrust. At 80 knots; I came out of reverse; and then applied the brakes to exit at [the] taxiway. The brakes felt very soft and abnormal (mushy at best). I could tell that something was definitely wrong. I applied additional pressure to the brakes and realized that I would not make the high-speed taxiway; and focused on making the next turn-off. Once again the brake effectiveness was not going to slow adequately for that exit. I was communicating all of the braking issues with my first officer. Noting that the normal brakes were not working properly; I reached over and turned the a/skid; nose wheel steering switch off to revert to alternate brakes. I applied several applications; remembering that I was supposed to limit the pressure to 1000 psi to prevent wheel lock-up. This was not working like the simulator; and the braking effectiveness was nearly nil. I applied considerably more pressure to the brakes in a normal reaction to try to stop the airplane. Realizing that the end of the runway was getting closer; I reverted to using full reverse thrust. My thoughts were to get as slow as I could; and then resort to my final option of using the parking brake to stop the airplane. My first officer then stated; 'what about the parking brake?' I asked him to go ahead and cycle it. He applied several applications; and the airplane came to a complete stop; slightly off the runway center line but still completely on the runway. We were several hundred feet short of the end of the runway. My first officer instinctively instructed the passengers to 'remain seated'. We told the tower of our condition; and they instructed us to hold our position on the runway; and then they began coordinating our tow to the gate. The tower controller asked if we needed emergency equipment do to the potential of hot brakes; but the hottest indication peaked at 240 degrees (a normal green indication). Obviously on a 90 degree day with the amount of braking that had been applied; these were very abnormal brake temperatures. All hydraulic system indications were normal. I discussed the situation with the purser and made several announcements to our passengers to ensure that we were safely parked on the runway; and that we would be towed to our gate. Maintenance arrived and towed us to our gate; where I briefed them on the event. I submitted several reports to provide maintenance with a history of what we encountered.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported receiving an ECAM 'BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT' message. Normal brakes did not funtion properly and alternate brakes were also ineffective. The Captain was able to stop the aircraft using applications of the parking brake.

Narrative: Upon landing gear extension; we received an ECAM 'BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT' message. No auto brakes had been selected. We also noted that the three gear down-lock indicators (green triangles) were not illuminated. The gear UNLK lights on the panel were also not illuminated. With flaps full selected; I confirmed that the Landing Memo was green; which includes the gear down lock notation. We both felt that the gear was in fact down and locked; but I was contemplating a go-around to give us some time to look at the QRH in order to gain some more knowledge of what might have occurred. (I had yet to check the WHEEL page for green gear confirmation.) Prior to 500 feet AGL; the ECAM message cleared itself; and the three gear down-lock indicators illuminated green. We both agreed that it was safe to continue the approach and landing. My thoughts were that this might just be an Airbus anomaly. After a normal landing on runway XYL; I selected full reverse thrust. At 80 knots; I came out of reverse; and then applied the brakes to exit at [the] taxiway. The brakes felt very soft and abnormal (mushy at best). I could tell that something was definitely wrong. I applied additional pressure to the brakes and realized that I would not make the high-speed taxiway; and focused on making the next turn-off. Once again the brake effectiveness was not going to slow adequately for that exit. I was communicating all of the braking issues with my First Officer. Noting that the normal brakes were not working properly; I reached over and turned the A/SKID; Nose Wheel steering switch off to revert to alternate brakes. I applied several applications; remembering that I was supposed to limit the pressure to 1000 PSI to prevent wheel lock-up. This was not working like the simulator; and the braking effectiveness was nearly nil. I applied considerably more pressure to the brakes in a normal reaction to try to stop the airplane. Realizing that the end of the runway was getting closer; I reverted to using full reverse thrust. My thoughts were to get as slow as I could; and then resort to my final option of using the parking brake to stop the airplane. My First Officer then stated; 'What about the parking brake?' I asked him to go ahead and cycle it. He applied several applications; and the airplane came to a complete stop; slightly off the runway center line but still completely on the runway. We were several hundred feet short of the end of the runway. My First Officer instinctively instructed the passengers to 'remain seated'. We told the Tower of our condition; and they instructed us to hold our position on the runway; and then they began coordinating our tow to the gate. The tower controller asked if we needed emergency equipment do to the potential of hot brakes; but the hottest indication peaked at 240 degrees (a normal green indication). Obviously on a 90 degree day with the amount of braking that had been applied; these were very abnormal brake temperatures. All hydraulic system indications were normal. I discussed the situation with the Purser and made several announcements to our passengers to ensure that we were safely parked on the runway; and that we would be towed to our gate. Maintenance arrived and towed us to our gate; where I briefed them on the event. I submitted several reports to provide Maintenance with a history of what we encountered.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.