Narrative:

Immediately after takeoff; received the following ECAM messages:F/control left ail faultf/control right ail faultf/control atn lawupon completion of after takeoff checklist; ATC was advised. Requested to level off at 12;000 feet to comply with sector MEA; ensure terrain clearance; and complete ECAM actions and communication procedures. Due to the nature of the ecams; the decision was made to return to the departure airport. In an overabundance of caution; the decision was made to hold within 40NM northeast of the airport and burn fuel until reaching a landing weight below 150;000 lbs. Dispatch; maintenance; operations; cabin crew and ATC were all involved in decision-making communications. In addition; dead heading captain occupied the jumpseat and served as an additional crew member. Passengers were briefed of situation and plan to return to the departure airport after decisions and planning/coordination were complete. Once the desired landing weight was ensured; the overweight landing communication procedure was applied and a visual approach; backed up by the ILS; was conducted to [the] runway. Emergency equipment was requested and standing by.a normal landing was conducted. Once the aircraft was stopped on the runway; emergency personnel verified that brake temperatures were normal; ensured no other external anomalies were present; and cleared the aircraft for taxi to the gate.after parking checklist was completed; all discrepancies were entered in the aircraft maintenance log (aml).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 pilot reported an ECAM alerted to multiple failures immediately after takeoff.

Narrative: Immediately after takeoff; received the following ECAM messages:F/CTL L AIL FAULTF/CTL R AIL FAULTF/CTL ATN LAWUpon completion of AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST; ATC was advised. Requested to level off at 12;000 feet to comply with sector MEA; ensure terrain clearance; and complete ECAM actions and COM procedures. Due to the nature of the ECAMs; the decision was made to return to the departure airport. In an overabundance of caution; the decision was made to hold within 40NM northeast of the airport and burn fuel until reaching a landing weight below 150;000 lbs. Dispatch; Maintenance; Operations; Cabin Crew and ATC were all involved in decision-making communications. In addition; dead heading Captain occupied the jumpseat and served as an additional crew member. Passengers were briefed of situation and plan to return to the departure airport after decisions and planning/coordination were complete. Once the desired landing weight was ensured; the overweight landing COM procedure was applied and a visual approach; backed up by the ILS; was conducted to [the] Runway. Emergency equipment was requested and standing by.A normal landing was conducted. Once the aircraft was stopped on the runway; emergency personnel verified that brake temperatures were normal; ensured no other external anomalies were present; and cleared the aircraft for taxi to the gate.After PARKING CHECKLIST was completed; all discrepancies were entered in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.