Narrative:

I was working R46/47 with significant extreme thunderstorm activity across an arc just north of all four mia/fll departure transition areas (dtas); requiring all four dtas to funnel through a single ~5 NM gap between thunderstorms. I had previously made my front line manager (flm) aware of the impending situation; as the radar history display in the control room clearly showed that the gap was closing up; and aircraft were beginning to require more extreme deviations. Despite asking for it repeatedly; at no point do I feel I was given adequate in-trail from mia approach to have time to properly call weather to departure aircraft in accordance with FAA order 7110.65. No traffic management unit (tmu) initiatives were posted until after management was made aware of the loss of standard separation (loss) I am describing in this report.the four dtas were stratified; which per local standard procedure means that instead of climbing to the top of mia approach airspace (16;000 MSL;) fll/fxe/lauderdale satellite departures climb to 11;000 MSL; with our control for climb. Aircraft Y was almost due westbound; along the northern mia approach boundary; with thunderstorm activity ~10 NM north of him; climbing to 11;000; filed for 16;000 off fll. Aircraft X was southwest of him; northbound; also climbing to 11;000; filed for FL210; off of fxe. I had accepted automated radar hand offs on both aircraft; assuming that mia approach would keep them separated until transferring control.just as I realized that the aircraft were essentially on right-angle converging courses; and conflict alert began to go off for the two aircraft; aircraft Y checked on level at 11;000. My d-side had been attempting to coordinate with mia approach; but there was a great deal of confusion between them; as they had been trying to get higher on one of the two incident aircraft; to top a third aircraft that I do not have information on. As soon as I had aircraft Y on my frequency; and having no turns available due to thunderstorms; I issued him an expedited climb to 13;000; with best rate of climb through 12;000; and called the traffic. He passed through 12;000 in the climb with approximately 4.1 NM lateral separation from aircraft X. Aircraft X did not check on my frequency until the situation was resolved; and at no time did I detect a turn or change in altitude by aircraft X from a possible mia approach clearance.tmu routinely dismisses our requests for in-trail; or adjustments to traffic flow for weather; and only ever reacts to situations after they have already occurred. At no point was any traffic management initiatives (tmi) or in-trail requirement issued to route aircraft away from extreme thunderstorms; or to ensure that controllers in question have enough frequency-time to issue weather; and provide adequate deviations. Only after aircraft have started to refuse routing through gaps; and are deviating into other traffic flows; such as departures deviating head-on into arrival streams; will tmu begin to issue tmis; which are by that time already too late.south florida is both one of the most convective active pieces of airspace in the world; and is rapidly growing into one of the busiest; most congested areas in the country. Our local tmu needs to be far more proactive in the management of traffic as significant weather begins to impact the operation on a nearly daily basis; so that controllers aren't struggling to separate completely unpredictable traffic flows.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZMA ARTCC Controller reported that two aircraft lost separation due to weather and the lack of a traffic management initiative to help relive the volume.

Narrative: I was working R46/47 with significant extreme thunderstorm activity across an arc just north of all four MIA/FLL Departure Transition Areas (DTAs); requiring all four DTAs to funnel through a single ~5 NM gap between thunderstorms. I had previously made my Front Line Manager (FLM) aware of the impending situation; as the radar history display in the control room clearly showed that the gap was closing up; and aircraft were beginning to require more extreme deviations. Despite asking for it repeatedly; at no point do I feel I was given adequate in-trail from MIA approach to have time to properly call weather to departure aircraft in accordance with FAA order 7110.65. No Traffic Management Unit (TMU) initiatives were posted until after management was made aware of the Loss of Standard Separation (LoSS) I am describing in this report.The four DTAs were stratified; which per local standard procedure means that instead of climbing to the top of MIA Approach airspace (16;000 MSL;) FLL/FXE/Lauderdale satellite departures climb to 11;000 MSL; with our control for climb. Aircraft Y was almost due westbound; along the northern MIA Approach boundary; with thunderstorm activity ~10 NM north of him; climbing to 11;000; filed for 16;000 off FLL. Aircraft X was southwest of him; northbound; also climbing to 11;000; filed for FL210; off of FXE. I had accepted automated radar hand offs on both aircraft; assuming that MIA Approach would keep them separated until transferring control.Just as I realized that the aircraft were essentially on right-angle converging courses; and conflict alert began to go off for the two aircraft; Aircraft Y checked on level at 11;000. My D-side had been attempting to coordinate with MIA Approach; but there was a great deal of confusion between them; as they had been trying to get higher on one of the two incident aircraft; to top a third aircraft that I do not have information on. As soon as I had Aircraft Y on my frequency; and having no turns available due to thunderstorms; I issued him an expedited climb to 13;000; with best rate of climb through 12;000; and called the traffic. He passed through 12;000 in the climb with approximately 4.1 NM lateral separation from Aircraft X. Aircraft X did not check on my frequency until the situation was resolved; and at no time did I detect a turn or change in altitude by Aircraft X from a possible MIA Approach clearance.TMU routinely dismisses our requests for in-trail; or adjustments to traffic flow for weather; and only ever reacts to situations after they have already occurred. At no point was any Traffic Management Initiatives (TMI) or in-trail requirement issued to route aircraft away from extreme thunderstorms; or to ensure that controllers in question have enough frequency-time to issue weather; and provide adequate deviations. Only after aircraft have started to refuse routing through gaps; and are deviating into other traffic flows; such as departures deviating head-on into arrival streams; will TMU begin to issue TMIs; which are by that time already too late.South Florida is both one of the most convective active pieces of airspace in the world; and is rapidly growing into one of the busiest; most congested areas in the country. Our local TMU needs to be far more proactive in the management of traffic as significant weather begins to impact the operation on a nearly daily basis; so that controllers aren't struggling to separate completely unpredictable traffic flows.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.