Narrative:

Whilst approaching the gate in miami; at the culmination of the flight; the area appeared to be clear. I called clear on the left and the first officer responded clear on the right. I saw from the automatic guidance that L2 was displayed; so I asked the first officer to advise the purser that L2 was being used. On the left side of the gate approach area there was an air conditioning cart parked in the safe area; close to but outside the line. I noticed that the air conditioning ducting did not appear to be secured on the cart so as a precaution against it possibly being blown into the left engine by jet wash; I instructed the first officer to shut down the left engine and we continued the last few yards to the gate on the right engine. As I followed the automatic guidance; we failed to notice that the tug and tow bar were positioned incorrectly and as we were coming to a stop; the tow bar contacted the left nose gear tire causing a cut in the tire. We called maintenance and requested a nose gear inspection and made an entry in the aml. I then notified dispatch. A tire change was completed and the aircraft departed as scheduled.this event was a direct result of poor ramp management in miami. Two traps were set for the incoming aircraft at this gate. The cart with the unsecured AC ducting in close proximity to the safety zone and the tug/tow bar protruding into the safety zone. The automatic parking guidance system was turned on without anyone first checking that the safety zone was safe. The threat of the cart with the unsecured air conditioning hose parked in close proximity diverted our full attention causing us to miss the threat that the tug/tow bar was protruding into the safety zone; something that we should easily have caught if that had been the only issue. We had a [early morning] wake up that morning and though we both felt we were adequately rested; some level of fatigue may have affected our alertness. A misguided level of confidence in the automatic parking guidance system. In the past it has given a stop command when a significant obstacle is detected in the safety zone. Not having someone standing in front of the aircraft actively monitoring our progress with the ability to signal a stop if a safety issue is observed ramp control/ operations has camera views of the gate area. There was only one other aircraft movement at the time of our arrival and they were holding for us. Could an alert ramp controller have been another layer of safety in preventing this incident? The agent on the jet bridge said she saw the tow bar was an issue but had no way to alert us in time. Is there a communication channel input to the parking guidance system that would facilitate a stop input to the guidance display from the jet bridge and ramp? Maybe hand held VHF communication set to the ramp frequency for urgent safety communication only. I accept full responsibility for the safety of my aircraft; crew and passengers but my job is made much more difficult by poor ramp training and control which set the trap for this incident. I often feel that the pilots are the sole safety layer in the miami ramp area instead of being the final layer.[suggest] having a person actively monitoring an aircraft being guided in by the automatic guidance system; positioned where a stop signal can easily be seen by the captain. If there is even the slightest distraction during the parking process; stopping until the issue is resolved or stop and get towed to the gate. Over 25 years of flying; I have never once had to stop to have someone clear an obstacle in the safety zone. Arriving in miami on the other hand; it is a regular occurrence. We regularly have had to stop and gesticulate to ramp personnel about an obvious object in the safety zone. It points to a lack of training; management and accountability for safe ramp operations. Having ramp personnel not park; stop or place any equipment in the safety zone except when servicing an aircraft at the gate. Before the aircraft is pushed back; the safety area should once again be cleared until the arrival of the next aircraft. A zero tolerance policy should be adopted. Whoever turns the automatic gate parking guidance system on should be responsible for the safety zone being clear before turning the system on and a log should be placed next to the switch where a name; employee number; time and initial has to be entered; accepting responsibility for the area being safe for an aircraft to enter the gate area before turning the automatic guidance system on. I also believe that better ramp control of the alley between concourses could improve safety and on time performance. On numerous occasions; I have had to hold while an aircraft is pushed back and disconnected in front of my gate when more proactive controlling could have had them instruct the crews to push further back or pull forward to a clear area before disconnecting to avoid unnecessary delays. This causes frustration for the crews with the associated negative impact on safety. The agent at the jet bridge waiting for an aircraft arrival could be another safety layer; inspecting the safety area from the jet bridge and alerting someone if a safety issue is noticed. An accountability program being put in place. Inbound aircraft noticing a safety issue could for example say 'snapshot gate #' on ramp control and the event is documented and an immediate call is made to the crew chief or implicated party requesting a reason for the safety issue. It could be tracked by a simple program.a program of the gate camera system being used to scan the safety area prior to each aircraft arrival and immediate notification to a crew chief or a mobile safety monitor to resolve an issue before the aircraft even enters the ramp area. Random safety audits by a ramp supervisor of gate areas prior to aircraft arrival. Too much burden is being placed on cockpit crews dealing with these unnecessary safety distractions. The crews have often had long and often stressful days due to weather; terrain; passenger; technical challenges and they should never be placed in jeopardy situations by completely avoidable situations caused by poor ramp control and management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 Captain reported contacting a tow bar attached to a tug as he parked using an automated parking system in MIA.

Narrative: Whilst approaching the gate in Miami; at the culmination of the flight; the area appeared to be clear. I called clear on the left and the first officer responded clear on the right. I saw from the automatic guidance that L2 was displayed; so I asked the first officer to advise the purser that L2 was being used. On the left side of the gate approach area there was an air conditioning cart parked in the safe area; close to but outside the line. I noticed that the air conditioning ducting did not appear to be secured on the cart so as a precaution against it possibly being blown into the left engine by jet wash; I instructed the first officer to shut down the left engine and we continued the last few yards to the gate on the right engine. As I followed the automatic guidance; we failed to notice that the tug and tow bar were positioned incorrectly and as we were coming to a stop; the tow bar contacted the left nose gear tire causing a cut in the tire. We called maintenance and requested a nose gear inspection and made an entry in the AML. I then notified dispatch. A tire change was completed and the aircraft departed as scheduled.This event was a direct result of poor ramp management in Miami. Two traps were set for the incoming aircraft at this gate. The cart with the unsecured AC ducting in close proximity to the safety zone and the tug/tow bar protruding into the safety zone. The automatic parking guidance system was turned on without anyone first checking that the safety zone was safe. The threat of the cart with the unsecured air conditioning hose parked in close proximity diverted our full attention causing us to miss the threat that the tug/tow bar was protruding into the safety zone; something that we should easily have caught if that had been the only issue. We had a [early morning] wake up that morning and though we both felt we were adequately rested; some level of fatigue may have affected our alertness. A misguided level of confidence in the automatic parking guidance system. In the past it has given a stop command when a significant obstacle is detected in the safety zone. Not having someone standing in front of the aircraft actively monitoring our progress with the ability to signal a stop if a safety issue is observed Ramp control/ operations has camera views of the gate area. There was only one other aircraft movement at the time of our arrival and they were holding for us. Could an alert ramp controller have been another layer of safety in preventing this incident? The agent on the jet bridge said she saw the tow bar was an issue but had no way to alert us in time. Is there a communication channel input to the parking guidance system that would facilitate a STOP input to the guidance display from the jet bridge and ramp? Maybe hand held VHF communication set to the ramp frequency for urgent safety communication only. I accept full responsibility for the safety of my aircraft; crew and passengers but my job is made much more difficult by poor ramp training and Control which set the trap for this incident. I often feel that the pilots are the sole safety layer in the Miami ramp area instead of being the final layer.[Suggest] having a person actively monitoring an aircraft being guided in by the automatic guidance system; positioned where a stop signal can easily be seen by the captain. If there is even the slightest distraction during the parking process; stopping until the issue is resolved or stop and get towed to the gate. Over 25 years of flying; I have never once had to stop to have someone clear an obstacle in the safety zone. Arriving in Miami on the other hand; it is a regular occurrence. We regularly have had to stop and gesticulate to ramp personnel about an obvious object in the safety zone. It points to a lack of training; management and accountability for safe ramp operations. Having ramp personnel not park; stop or place any equipment in the safety zone except when servicing an aircraft at the gate. Before the aircraft is pushed back; the safety area should once again be cleared until the arrival of the next aircraft. A zero tolerance policy should be adopted. Whoever turns the automatic gate parking guidance system on should be responsible for the safety zone being clear before turning the system on and a log should be placed next to the switch where a name; employee number; time and initial has to be entered; accepting responsibility for the area being safe for an aircraft to enter the gate area before turning the automatic guidance system on. I also believe that better ramp control of the alley between concourses could improve safety and on time performance. On numerous occasions; I have had to hold while an aircraft is pushed back and disconnected in front of my gate when more proactive controlling could have had them instruct the crews to push further back or pull forward to a clear area before disconnecting to avoid unnecessary delays. This causes frustration for the crews with the associated negative impact on safety. The agent at the jet bridge waiting for an aircraft arrival could be another safety layer; inspecting the safety area from the jet bridge and alerting someone if a safety issue is noticed. An accountability program being put in place. Inbound aircraft noticing a safety issue could for example say 'snapshot gate #' on ramp control and the event is documented and an immediate call is made to the crew chief or implicated party requesting a reason for the safety issue. It could be tracked by a simple program.A program of the gate camera system being used to scan the safety area prior to each aircraft arrival and immediate notification to a crew chief or a mobile safety monitor to resolve an issue before the aircraft even enters the ramp area. Random safety audits by a ramp supervisor of gate areas prior to aircraft arrival. Too much burden is being placed on cockpit crews dealing with these unnecessary safety distractions. The crews have often had long and often stressful days due to weather; terrain; passenger; technical challenges and they should never be placed in jeopardy situations by completely avoidable situations caused by poor ramp control and management.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.