Narrative:

Event: rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff) due to configuration warning.flight crew duties: ca: pm; first officer: PF.event description: upon lining up on runway 28R at taxiway november 5; first officer advanced throttles for takeoff. Nearly instantly; crew received a configuration warning due to improper flap position. First officer maintained aircraft control; retarded the throttles and applied the brakes to perform the rejected takeoff. Ca advised ATC; took control of the aircraft and exited the runway; per ATC instructions. No other warnings or cautions were observed. All brake indicators were at 2 or below. Crew was resequenced for takeoff and performed the rest of the trip without incident. Background: prior to this incident; crew executed two legs aboard another aircraft. On each of these legs the aircraft APU was deferred. Each of the legs were notably delayed due to issues on the ground. Upon arrival back at ord; the crew swapped airplanes and rushed to the new gate to board the incident aircraft. The crew expeditiously prepared the new aircraft for pushback and taxi in an attempt to get back on schedule. During pushback; the first officer's before taxi flow was interrupted briefly and flaps were not lowered to the proper position; even though all other flow items were accomplished correctly. The taxi checklist was performed. Crew received clearance and taxied to runway 28R/N5 and while in the number 4 position for takeoff the crew performed the; before takeoff checklist; to the line. Crew was cleared into position and read the; before takeoff checklist; below the line and shortly thereafter; the incident occurred.while the aircraft system logic provided the most immediate and direct solution to preventing a departure with an improper flap setting; both the ca and the first officer remarked to each other how neither had ever attempted a takeoff with an improper flap setting before this incident and; during a crew debrief; identified their being dehydrated; rushed; undernourished and tired as possible contributing factors that while apparent afterward; were not necessarily apparent in the time leading up to the incident.in arriving at his particular thought; the crew considered the following:1) both of the previous legs were notably delayed due to issues on the ground at ord. Ground crew's slow acquisition of 'start-cart' for ground air start. 2) ramp congestion resulting in 10-15 minute sit at the gate.3) taxi to out-of-the-way area; away from gate (at ord) to perform cross-bleed start.4) as the delay time increased; so did the temperature on the flight deck due to the inoperative APU.5) by the time the crew departed the flight deck was exceedingly hot and the crew noted the possibility of heat related impairment as a threat during the takeoff brief and while on the approach to next airport.6) ground ops at next airport were rushed and the crew turned the aircraft as fast as conditions would allow.7) the temperature in the cockpit was still exceedingly hot and the crew; again; mentioned heat related impairment as a possible and very real threat as they prepared to depart.8) as stated above; upon arrival at ord; the crew swapped airplanes and rushed to the new gate to board and prep the incident aircraft.9) the crew expeditiously prepared the new aircraft for pushback and taxi in an attempt to get back on schedule however; as the crew later realized; they were now dehydrated; rushing and starting to feel the effects of a lack of nourishment.10) additionally; prior to the incident; the first officer had flown 16 legs over the past 3 and a half days and the ca was a commuter. Both had remarked how they were feeling the effects of a tough schedule.11) in realizing all of this the crew concluded; even though they performed the appropriate checklists; they; 'saw what they wanted to see;' when they looked to confirm the flap setting and noted their physical condition as a definite contributing factor.recommendation: if a crew finds that it must; for whatever reason; fly an aircraft with a non-functioning APU; the crew must ensure each member is thoroughly hydrated and nourished. In so doing; the crew can not only mitigate the brutal effects of an inoperative APU during a hot summer day but also mitigate the effects of being slightly tired while operating at a heightened operational tempo.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reported a rejected takeoff due to improper flap position.

Narrative: EVENT: Rejected Takeoff (RTO) due to configuration warning.FLIGHT CREW DUTIES: CA: PM; FO: PF.EVENT DESCRIPTION: Upon lining up on runway 28R at taxiway November 5; FO advanced throttles for takeoff. Nearly instantly; crew received a configuration warning due to improper flap position. FO maintained aircraft control; retarded the throttles and applied the brakes to perform the RTO. CA advised ATC; took control of the aircraft and exited the runway; per ATC instructions. No other warnings or cautions were observed. All brake indicators were at 2 or below. Crew was resequenced for takeoff and performed the rest of the trip without incident. BACKGROUND: Prior to this incident; crew executed two legs aboard another aircraft. On each of these legs the aircraft APU was deferred. Each of the legs were notably delayed due to issues on the ground. Upon arrival back at ORD; the crew swapped airplanes and rushed to the new gate to board the incident aircraft. The crew expeditiously prepared the new aircraft for pushback and taxi in an attempt to get back on schedule. During pushback; the FO's before taxi flow was interrupted briefly and flaps were not lowered to the proper position; even though all other flow items were accomplished correctly. The taxi checklist was performed. Crew received clearance and taxied to runway 28R/N5 and while in the number 4 position for takeoff the crew performed the; Before Takeoff Checklist; to the line. Crew was cleared into position and read the; Before Takeoff Checklist; below the line and shortly thereafter; the incident occurred.While the aircraft system logic provided the most immediate and direct solution to preventing a departure with an improper flap setting; both the CA and the FO remarked to each other how neither had ever attempted a takeoff with an improper flap setting before this incident and; during a crew debrief; identified their being dehydrated; rushed; undernourished and tired as possible contributing factors that while apparent afterward; were not necessarily apparent in the time leading up to the incident.In arriving at his particular thought; the crew considered the following:1) Both of the previous legs were notably delayed due to issues on the ground at ORD. Ground crew's slow acquisition of 'start-cart' for ground air start. 2) Ramp congestion resulting in 10-15 minute sit at the gate.3) Taxi to out-of-the-way area; away from gate (at ORD) to perform cross-bleed start.4) As the delay time increased; so did the temperature on the flight deck due to the inoperative APU.5) By the time the crew departed the flight deck was exceedingly hot and the crew noted the possibility of heat related impairment as a threat during the takeoff brief and while on the approach to next airport.6) Ground ops at next airport were rushed and the crew turned the aircraft as fast as conditions would allow.7) The temperature in the cockpit was still exceedingly hot and the crew; again; mentioned heat related impairment as a possible and very real threat as they prepared to depart.8) As stated above; upon arrival at ORD; the crew swapped airplanes and rushed to the new gate to board and prep the incident aircraft.9) The crew expeditiously prepared the new aircraft for pushback and taxi in an attempt to get back on schedule however; as the crew later realized; they were now dehydrated; rushing and starting to feel the effects of a lack of nourishment.10) Additionally; prior to the incident; the FO had flown 16 legs over the past 3 and a half days and the CA was a commuter. Both had remarked how they were feeling the effects of a tough schedule.11) In realizing all of this the crew concluded; even though they performed the appropriate checklists; they; 'saw what they wanted to see;' when they looked to confirm the flap setting and noted their physical condition as a definite contributing factor.RECOMMENDATION: If a crew finds that it must; for whatever reason; fly an aircraft with a non-functioning APU; the crew MUST ensure each member is THOROUGHLY hydrated and nourished. In so doing; the crew can not only mitigate the brutal effects of an inoperative APU during a hot summer day but also mitigate the effects of being slightly tired while operating at a heightened operational tempo.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.