Narrative:

During our descent into sbrj; my colleague; a highly experienced captain; listened to the ATIS and advised the approach in use was the RNAV (gnss) Y 02R. ATC issued us instructions to fly the ugrad 1A RNAV arrival to the RNAV (gnss) Y 02R; and to descend on the arrival. We had anticipated both of these procedures; and I conducted a thorough briefing. We descended on the arrival when instructed to do so; and were subsequently cleared for the approach. At some point during our initial descent; my colleague mentioned that there was a new ATIS but that all remained essentially as we'd briefed. He did note; however; that we now had a slight tailwind (4 kts) on 02R; which is only 4341 ft in length. We both agreed that this would not present any operational difficulty for our aircraft; but it should have been our first clue that the runway in use might be subject to change. The controller re-cleared us for the RNAV (gnss) Y; and we both 'heard' rwy 02R. In retrospect; the controller had stated 20L; which my colleague read back. We failed to notice that the runway had changed; and we continued flying the approach to 02R. At fix RJ031 (4000 ft mandatory for 02R vs at or above 3500 ft for 20L); the RNAV (gnss) Y 02R and 20L diverge. The 02R procedure continues along a 114 degree course to cross RJ032 at 2800 ft; and the 20L procedure continues along a 083 course to cross 2.2 nm prior to RJ107 at 2500 ft. As we continued the approach to 02R; the controller advised that the runway in use was 20L. Believing that the runway and approach had been changed at the last moment; we requested a vector. The controller instructed us to fly heading 075; and shortly thereafter I visually acquired the airport. I told my colleague to 'call the field in sight'; and the controller cleared us for a visual approach to 20L. No conflict with other traffic occurred at any point during our approach in VMC; and we landed without incident. After shutting down engines; I contacted ground control to inquire about the 'last minute runway change'; and to ensure that we had not missed something. The controller said that we had made a 'small mistake' regarding the runway in use; but that it was 'no problem.' in reflecting upon our error; there were numerous contributing factors; from which I have learned several lessons:1. Although both of us are highly experienced; and had flown to this airport several times in the past; we treat this challenging airport with respect. Nevertheless; we were comforted to be flying together; and complacent in not challenging one another when some of the cues 'didn't add up'.2. The accented english spoken by ATC made it difficult for us to perceive the change in runway from 02R to 20L. Both runways contain a '2' and a '0'.3. The approach to both runways is an RNAV (gnss) Y; which made it more difficult for us to perceive the runway change.4. We'd briefed the RNAV (gnss) Y 02R; and our expectations overrode the instructions. In short; our heads were 'up and locked'.although all ultimately went well; these lessons will heighten my situational awareness in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Corporate jet Captain reported missing a change to the approach clearance by ATC into SBRJ due to expectation bias; changing weather conditions and the Controller's foreign accent.

Narrative: During our descent into SBRJ; my colleague; a highly experienced Captain; listened to the ATIS and advised the approach in use was the RNAV (GNSS) Y 02R. ATC issued us instructions to fly the UGRAD 1A RNAV arrival to the RNAV (GNSS) Y 02R; and to descend on the arrival. We had anticipated both of these procedures; and I conducted a thorough briefing. We descended on the arrival when instructed to do so; and were subsequently cleared for the approach. At some point during our initial descent; my colleague mentioned that there was a new ATIS but that all remained essentially as we'd briefed. He did note; however; that we now had a slight tailwind (4 kts) on 02R; which is only 4341 ft in length. We both agreed that this would not present any operational difficulty for our aircraft; but it should have been our first clue that the runway in use might be subject to change. The controller re-cleared us for the RNAV (GNSS) Y; and we both 'heard' Rwy 02R. In retrospect; the controller had stated 20L; which my colleague read back. We failed to notice that the runway had changed; and we continued flying the approach to 02R. At fix RJ031 (4000 ft mandatory for 02R vs at or above 3500 ft for 20L); the RNAV (GNSS) Y 02R and 20L diverge. The 02R procedure continues along a 114 degree course to cross RJ032 at 2800 ft; and the 20L procedure continues along a 083 course to cross 2.2 nm prior to RJ107 at 2500 ft. As we continued the approach to 02R; the controller advised that the runway in use was 20L. Believing that the runway and approach had been changed at the last moment; we requested a vector. The controller instructed us to fly heading 075; and shortly thereafter I visually acquired the airport. I told my colleague to 'call the field in sight'; and the controller cleared us for a visual approach to 20L. No conflict with other traffic occurred at any point during our approach in VMC; and we landed without incident. After shutting down engines; I contacted ground control to inquire about the 'last minute runway change'; and to ensure that we had not missed something. The controller said that we had made a 'small mistake' regarding the runway in use; but that it was 'no problem.' In reflecting upon our error; there were numerous contributing factors; from which I have learned several lessons:1. Although both of us are highly experienced; and had flown to this airport several times in the past; we treat this challenging airport with respect. Nevertheless; we were comforted to be flying together; and complacent in not challenging one another when some of the cues 'didn't add up'.2. The accented English spoken by ATC made it difficult for us to perceive the change in Runway from 02R to 20L. Both runways contain a '2' and a '0'.3. The approach to both runways is an RNAV (GNSS) Y; which made it more difficult for us to perceive the runway change.4. We'd briefed the RNAV (GNSS) Y 02R; and our expectations overrode the instructions. In short; our heads were 'up and locked'.Although all ultimately went well; these lessons will heighten my situational awareness in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.