Narrative:

Descending into gso we were being given vectors for the visual 23L. We were given a 360 heading and a descent to 3000 ft. This put us on a fairly direct course to brant (FAF for 23L). ATC asked us if we had the field. We were approximately 8 miles east of the field when I called the field in sight. ATC cleared us for the visual approach and told us to keep our turn inside brant. This would put us at about a 5 mile final so we accepted. The first officer was configuring the aircraft in an appropriate time frame but was a little late initiating a descent. This was then compounded when instead of squaring the turn to final; he cut the corner a bit. These things combined with a delayed decision to disconnect the autopilot put us behind in the final configuring and descent to the runway. As he descended to get back on glide path; I mentioned we needed to be stable by just above 1;900 ft. He began to transition the descent rate to 1;000 FPM. I got busy with bugging the reference speed and completing the before landing checklist. At roughly the 1;000 foot AGL call; we got a low altitude alert warning from tower combined with a 'glide slope' call from the GPWS. Apparently; his transition to the proper descent rate did not happen as quickly as I had expected it would. As best I remember we were about a dot to dot and a half below glide slope but on speed. He promptly corrected back and we continued the approach to an uneventful landing as the safety and outcome of the flight were never in doubt. With the quick succession of events; I was uncertain at the time whether we were truly in a fully stable approach but decided it was close enough to continue. However; after landing and further evaluation I determined the correct decision should have been to go around and do it again. This was a combination of an ATC alert as well as a GPWS alert.I believe that the cause of this was due to a couple factors. The set up to the approach became hurried with the ATC instruction to keep it in a little tight. This combined with a degree of breakdown in crew coordination resulted in the altitude alert (i.e. I should have been more vocal earlier when I saw the potential for us to get behind). Additionally; the decision to continue with an unstable approach was a poor judgement call on my part due in part to my indecision in the moment as well as my desire to complete the flight due to starting to feel tired. A positive pitch correction was initiated immediately and the aircraft was returned to the proper glide path.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain on approach to GSO Runway 23L reported a low altitude alert from Tower and GPWS alert at 1;000 AGL; but continued to land.

Narrative: Descending into GSO we were being given vectors for the Visual 23L. We were given a 360 heading and a descent to 3000 ft. This put us on a fairly direct course to BRANT (FAF for 23L). ATC asked us if we had the field. We were approximately 8 miles east of the field when I called the field in sight. ATC cleared us for the visual approach and told us to keep our turn inside BRANT. This would put us at about a 5 mile final so we accepted. The FO was configuring the aircraft in an appropriate time frame but was a little late initiating a descent. This was then compounded when instead of squaring the turn to final; he cut the corner a bit. These things combined with a delayed decision to disconnect the autopilot put us behind in the final configuring and descent to the runway. As he descended to get back on glide path; I mentioned we needed to be stable by just above 1;900 ft. He began to transition the descent rate to 1;000 FPM. I got busy with bugging the reference speed and completing the Before Landing Checklist. At roughly the 1;000 foot AGL call; we got a low altitude alert warning from tower combined with a 'glide slope' call from the GPWS. Apparently; his transition to the proper descent rate did not happen as quickly as I had expected it would. As best I remember we were about a dot to dot and a half below glide slope but on speed. He promptly corrected back and we continued the approach to an uneventful landing as the safety and outcome of the flight were never in doubt. With the quick succession of events; I was uncertain at the time whether we were truly in a fully stable approach but decided it was close enough to continue. However; after landing and further evaluation I determined the correct decision should have been to go around and do it again. This was a combination of an ATC alert as well as a GPWS alert.I believe that the cause of this was due to a couple factors. The set up to the approach became hurried with the ATC instruction to keep it in a little tight. This combined with a degree of breakdown in crew coordination resulted in the altitude alert (i.e. I should have been more vocal earlier when I saw the potential for us to get behind). Additionally; the decision to continue with an unstable approach was a poor judgement call on my part due in part to my indecision in the moment as well as my desire to complete the flight due to starting to feel tired. A positive pitch correction was initiated immediately and the aircraft was returned to the proper glide path.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.