Narrative:

It seemed like a long day; but by simply looking at it; nothing would indicate the issues/challenges we had faced. Lots of little things during the day such as a reposition in ZZZ; a 10 passenger leg with lots of luggage; non-towered operations; having to do a last minute MEL on the database and jeppesen charts; a delayed receipt of flight release out of ZZZ1; early passengers with a last minute passenger count change resulting in another release to be generated (I called dispatch 5 times in ZZZ1 alone). No item was out of the normal or unusual alone but the combination of all factors had the entire crew a little worn out even before the ZZZ1-ase leg started. The flight to ase was uneventful; the weather was good and winds were calm at ase enroute. I was the pm in the left seat and the sic was flying from the right seat. We briefed the roaring fork visual and at the sic's request we loaded the localizer DME-east in the box although I mentioned that it would be of minimal value as we would not be on the lateral or vertical portion of the approach. The sic indicated that he had not been to ase in some time. I; on the other hand; was familiar and comfortable going in there especially under the conditions of the given day. The ase ATIS was calling the sky clear but there were surrounding high clouds that we descended through on the arrival. We were direct dbl; when we exited the clouds at around FL180 descending to 17;000 ft approximately 15 miles southeast of the VOR and I saw the airport (we were on a 9;000 ft AGL high downwind leg). We were handed over to aspen approach; I called the airport insight and was planning for the roaring fork visual. We were then cleared to 15;000 ft and were informed that the winds had shifted and now exceeded the 10 knot limitation for landing (the winds were out of the north gusting to 18). We requested a hold and were given a hold on dbl 343 radial with 7 mile legs and instructed to climb back to 16;000 feet. Suddenly; things were getting busy as I entered the hold in the FMS only miles from the VOR. The airspeed at this point was approximately 200 knots planning for the hold. My mind was also going through our options and preparing for what was going to happen next. How long to hold before diverting? Where would the passengers want to go? How much fuel did we have? Will the winds die down as the sun sets? When is sunset? Etc. As we approached the hold; the controller asked if we could accept 'instantaneous winds.' I responded in the affirmative; but based on my past experiences I remained a little weary of this sudden change when winds became 330 at 9 knots. Based on this new information; the controller gave us a base turn and descent to 14;000 ft. He again queried if we still had the field and cleared us for the visual to runway 15. The sic could not see the airport from the right seat as it was behind us and off the left wing. I was talking him through the turn and instructed him that we were high and fast and needed to get down both in terms of altitude and airspeed and configuration (we were still doing around 200 knots at 15;000 ft).in the base turn we contacted the tower and were given the winds again and cleared to land (the airport was not busy and the frequency was quiet). As we continued the base turn toward the airport; the sic instructed me to 'clean up the box' as the holding pattern and localizer-east were still displaying on the mfd/pfd. I was hesitant to do so and was more concerned about him getting the airport in sight and flying the visual. There was some confusion initially as to if/when he had the field in sight. Finally; he called the airport in sight and again implored me to 'clean up the FMS'. Again; to me; this was of no value as it provided no additional situational awareness nor vertical guidance. At some point I did tell him 'we are high; keep coming down.' I assumed he had the airport in sight and would adjust accordingly. The tower continued to keep us updated on the 'instantaneous winds' as we continued to descend; configure and slow. It had suddenly become very busy. My attention was also drawn to our 9 knot tailwind and I became focused on attempting to update the FMS and obtain a new a landing distance; as well preforming a landing performance assessment. I was heads down programming the FMS and trying to 'clean up the box' when I heard 'caution terrain.' when I looked up we were now low. I told him to level off; which he was in the process of doing when the first of several 'terrain pull-up' calls started. Despite being familiar with both the fom (flight operations manual) and aom (aircraft operations manual); rather than call for a go-around and initiating an escape procedure; I told the sic to 'climb' and was focused on getting back on a normal glide path in an attempt to 'salvage' the approach. It may seem odd to those reading this in hindsight; but I was actually surprised we got the warning; as the airplane didn't seem that close to the hills. The air was smooth; the visibility good; and to me the flight path was stable. We were over the highway; in the valley. If I had to guess; we were approximately 9;100 ft and were 4-5 miles from the runway. I was never nervous; and never felt that the safety of the flight was in jeopardy. If anything; I was frustrated and bewildered that on a visual approach the airplane was allowed to descend to such a low altitude. We continued down the valley and joined the final of runway 15; intercepted the PAPI and continued to configure and ran the before landing checklist. To add to the excitement; the auto-throttles either quit or got turned off; so we endured the continuous 'auto-throttle' call for the remaining 3 miles. The sic was focused on flying and never cancelled the warning (the cancel button is on top of the thrust levers and I could not cancel them with his hands now covering them). The approach at this point was normal. At one time the airspeed dipped slightly below reference; but was corrected in a timely matter. As we approached short final; the 'auto-throttle' call was replaced by a 'not a runway' call; as somehow the new revision 5 software determined that we were not aligned with the runway. Per the revision 5 guidance material; we determined that we were and landed uneventfully but it was quite a hectic few minutes.in the time that has passed since this event I have been reflecting a great deal on how I allowed this to happen and how to prevent similar situations going forward. As I painfully replay the events described above; several things come to mind. The most striking one is [the] obvious response (or lack thereof) to the terrain warning. I know what the answer is; however; on this given day; I as the PIC elected to continue the approach because the power of getting the 'mission accomplished' and 'making it work' overrode the sops and aom. There were threats; the threats were real; the mountains were rock...but the crew at the time didn't perceive the threats as such and 'made it work.' however bad that decision was; the reality is I should have never have let the situation get to that point. At the first sign of confusion or ambiguity as to the location of the airport by the sic; I should have bailed on the approach while at altitude. Also in hindsight; because I had a much better view and was more familiar; I should have taken the controls at least until a point where a normal landing could be made. In the end; I let my familiarity and confidence with the roaring forks visual into ase turn into a sense of complacency which led the airplane; crew and passengers into an undesired aircraft state.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Corporate jet Captain reported a Terrain Warning on visual approach to Runway 15 at ASE; but continued the approach to a landing.

Narrative: It seemed like a long day; but by simply looking at it; nothing would indicate the issues/challenges we had faced. Lots of little things during the day such as a reposition in ZZZ; a 10 passenger leg with lots of luggage; non-towered operations; having to do a last minute MEL on the database and Jeppesen charts; a delayed receipt of Flight Release out of ZZZ1; early passengers with a last minute passenger count change resulting in another release to be generated (I called dispatch 5 times in ZZZ1 alone). No item was out of the normal or unusual alone but the combination of all factors had the entire crew a little worn out even before the ZZZ1-ASE leg started. The flight to ASE was uneventful; the weather was good and winds were calm at ASE enroute. I was the PM in the left seat and the SIC was flying from the right seat. We briefed the Roaring Fork Visual and at the SIC's request we loaded the LOC DME-E in the box although I mentioned that it would be of minimal value as we would not be on the lateral or vertical portion of the approach. The SIC indicated that he had not been to ASE in some time. I; on the other hand; was familiar and comfortable going in there especially under the conditions of the given day. The ASE ATIS was calling the sky clear but there were surrounding high clouds that we descended through on the arrival. We were direct DBL; when we exited the clouds at around FL180 descending to 17;000 ft approximately 15 miles southeast of the VOR and I saw the airport (we were on a 9;000 ft AGL high downwind leg). We were handed over to Aspen Approach; I called the airport insight and was planning for the Roaring Fork Visual. We were then cleared to 15;000 ft and were informed that the winds had shifted and now exceeded the 10 knot limitation for landing (the winds were out of the north gusting to 18). We requested a hold and were given a hold on DBL 343 radial with 7 mile legs and instructed to climb back to 16;000 feet. Suddenly; things were getting busy as I entered the hold in the FMS only miles from the VOR. The airspeed at this point was approximately 200 knots planning for the hold. My mind was also going through our options and preparing for what was going to happen next. How long to hold before diverting? Where would the passengers want to go? How much fuel did we have? Will the winds die down as the sun sets? When is sunset? Etc. As we approached the hold; the controller asked if we could accept 'instantaneous winds.' I responded in the affirmative; but based on my past experiences I remained a little weary of this sudden change when winds became 330 at 9 knots. Based on this new information; the controller gave us a base turn and descent to 14;000 ft. He again queried if we still had the field and cleared us for the visual to Runway 15. The SIC could not see the airport from the right seat as it was behind us and off the left wing. I was talking him through the turn and instructed him that we were high and fast and needed to get down both in terms of altitude and airspeed and configuration (we were still doing around 200 knots at 15;000 ft).In the base turn we contacted the tower and were given the winds again and cleared to land (the airport was not busy and the frequency was quiet). As we continued the base turn toward the airport; the SIC instructed me to 'clean up the box' as the holding pattern and LOC-E were still displaying on the MFD/PFD. I was hesitant to do so and was more concerned about him getting the airport in sight and flying the visual. There was some confusion initially as to if/when he had the field in sight. Finally; he called the airport in sight and again implored me to 'clean up the FMS'. Again; to me; this was of no value as it provided no additional situational awareness nor vertical guidance. At some point I did tell him 'we are high; keep coming down.' I assumed he had the airport in sight and would adjust accordingly. The tower continued to keep us updated on the 'instantaneous winds' as we continued to descend; configure and slow. It had suddenly become very busy. My attention was also drawn to our 9 knot tailwind and I became focused on attempting to update the FMS and obtain a new a landing distance; as well preforming a Landing Performance Assessment. I was heads down programming the FMS and trying to 'clean up the box' when I heard 'Caution Terrain.' When I looked up we were now low. I told him to level off; which he was in the process of doing when the first of several 'Terrain Pull-Up' calls started. Despite being familiar with both the FOM (Flight Operations Manual) and AOM (Aircraft Operations Manual); rather than call for a go-around and initiating an escape procedure; I told the SIC to 'climb' and was focused on getting back on a normal glide path in an attempt to 'salvage' the approach. It may seem odd to those reading this in hindsight; but I was actually surprised we got the warning; as the airplane didn't seem that close to the hills. The air was smooth; the visibility good; and to me the flight path was stable. We were over the highway; in the valley. If I had to guess; we were approximately 9;100 ft and were 4-5 miles from the runway. I was never nervous; and never felt that the safety of the flight was in jeopardy. If anything; I was frustrated and bewildered that on a visual approach the airplane was allowed to descend to such a low altitude. We continued down the valley and joined the final of Runway 15; intercepted the PAPI and continued to configure and ran the Before Landing checklist. To add to the excitement; the auto-throttles either quit or got turned off; so we endured the continuous 'auto-throttle' call for the remaining 3 miles. The SIC was focused on flying and never cancelled the warning (the cancel button is on top of the thrust levers and I could not cancel them with his hands now covering them). The approach at this point was normal. At one time the airspeed dipped slightly below reference; but was corrected in a timely matter. As we approached short final; the 'auto-throttle' call was replaced by a 'Not a Runway' call; as somehow the new Revision 5 software determined that we were not aligned with the runway. Per the Revision 5 guidance material; we determined that we were and landed uneventfully but it was quite a hectic few minutes.In the time that has passed since this event I have been reflecting a great deal on how I allowed this to happen and how to prevent similar situations going forward. As I painfully replay the events described above; several things come to mind. The most striking one is [the] obvious response (or lack thereof) to the terrain warning. I know what the answer is; however; on this given day; I as the PIC elected to continue the approach because the power of getting the 'mission accomplished' and 'making it work' overrode the SOPs and AOM. There were threats; the threats were real; the mountains were rock...but the crew at the time didn't perceive the threats as such and 'made it work.' However bad that decision was; the reality is I should have never have let the situation get to that point. At the first sign of confusion or ambiguity as to the location of the airport by the SIC; I should have bailed on the approach while at altitude. Also in hindsight; because I had a much better view and was more familiar; I should have taken the controls at least until a point where a normal landing could be made. In the end; I let my familiarity and confidence with the Roaring Forks Visual into ASE turn into a sense of complacency which led the airplane; crew and passengers into an undesired aircraft state.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.