Narrative:

I was the captain. I had been following the weather and its potential influence on the dispatch of this flight a full 24 hours prior to scheduled departure. I had called our dispatch and spoke to one of our equipment coordinators regarding the following day's flight schedule as it regarded plans for flight operations in the path of the weather. He stated so far there were no plans regarding the airports; but I could call him later that night to see if there were any developments affecting my flight. I called a second time; spoke to the equipment coordinator a second time; and he stated that [company] would be doing a briefing the following day. Keep in mind; the weather was forecast to landfall at approximately early that morning. I stated my concerns for the possibility of conditions that would at best be marginal; and then ended our conversation; saying I would just check back with dispatch the following day closer to departure time.I called that morning as I was leaving my layover hotel and was referred to the dispatcher who would be working my flight. We spoke briefly; and I mentioned at that time that the winds were gusting in excess of the limits set for landing in our aom (aircraft operations manual) part 1 regards to crosswinds relative to braking action. She said that I should call her when I got to ZZZ and for us to discuss it at that time. I expected her to gather information and current weather data in ZZZ1 prior to the call from ZZZ. That unfortunately; did not occur. When I called her again once I was at the gate in ZZZ and reviewed with her the current ATIS for ZZZ1 which had winds gusting to 28 knots; and once I did the math that translated to a 22 knot crosswind component. I stated to her then that the current winds exceeded the limits set for in our aom 1 for the EMB175 for those conditions; which were a runway braking action value of 3; which was for medium braking; and the stated limits were 15 knots of crosswinds. The ZZZ1 area was also under a tornado watch; and had earlier had a tornado warning near the ZZZ1 airport. Under these conditions; along with radar imagery; I felt it prudent to defer the flight until conditions improved; which seemed unlikely in the near term. She stated that this decision by me had to be discussed with upper management; and I requested to be included; along with my chief pilot; regarding the status of this flight.I was forwarded to several voicemails instead and finally I was able to reach my chief pilot and explained to him all of the above details. Chief pilot suggested taking more fuel to round trip back to ZZZ; which I responded to that I already had ZZZ as an alternate. I stated again that it was a safety of flight decision; and again brought up the limits set forth regarding cross winds on a runway reporting 3 or medium braking action. Chief pilot then stated that 'this is not punitive; but I am removing you from the flight; and having scheduling assign a reserve pilot to the flight.' if the second captain comes to the same conclusion as I did; then; he said; the flight would probably be cancelled. When I asked if I would be paid flight he said no; I would not. I mentioned to him that he should pay me for making good decisions; not penalize me. We ended the phone conversation at that time.I spoke to my crew regarding the events; and wished them well. I then received a second call from chief pilot where he stated that on second thought he felt I should be paid for the flight; but I was still removed. I walked outside to the gate; and within 5 minutes; the flight was cancelled. I informed the crew of the cancellation and was walking through the airport when chief pilot called me a third time; stating that upon further examination of the circumstances by himself; he agreed with my assessment and had informed the director of operations of his agreement with my decision; which resulted in the flight being cancelled.first of all; I feel that our operations should have been engaged in this weather early on; well before it happens; not on the day it occurred. The dispatcher should have asked for; and received help from her operations manager; rather than having no current and useful data for me when I called her again from ZZZ. Secondly; replacing a captain when he makes a safety of flight decision that the company disagrees with; by flight operations management; despite the limitations set forth in our AOM1 for the E175; was; in my opinion; contrary to the stated intent of the far regulations regarding the safe operation of an airliner; and the authority of the PIC.I feel the company was derelict in its preparations for this event from an operations standpoint; and once a captain decided to defer a flight; the initial action by chief pilot of removing me from the flight indicates a high disregard for an experienced pilot with over 22;000 hours judgment regarding the safety of this flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 Captain reported refusing a trip due to severe weather conditions.

Narrative: I was the Captain. I had been following the weather and its potential influence on the dispatch of this flight a full 24 hours prior to scheduled departure. I had called our dispatch and spoke to one of our equipment coordinators regarding the following day's flight schedule as it regarded plans for flight operations in the path of the weather. He stated so far there were no plans regarding the airports; but I could call him later that night to see if there were any developments affecting my flight. I called a second time; spoke to the Equipment Coordinator a second time; and he stated that [Company] would be doing a briefing the following day. Keep in mind; the weather was forecast to landfall at approximately early that morning. I stated my concerns for the possibility of conditions that would at best be marginal; and then ended our conversation; saying I would just check back with dispatch the following day closer to departure time.I called that morning as I was leaving my layover hotel and was referred to the dispatcher who would be working my flight. We spoke briefly; and I mentioned at that time that the winds were gusting in excess of the limits set for landing in our AOM (Aircraft Operations Manual) Part 1 regards to Crosswinds relative to braking action. She said that I should call her when I got to ZZZ and for us to discuss it at that time. I expected her to gather information and current weather data in ZZZ1 prior to the call from ZZZ. That unfortunately; did not occur. When I called her again once I was at the gate in ZZZ and reviewed with her the current ATIS for ZZZ1 which had winds gusting to 28 knots; and once I did the math that translated to a 22 knot crosswind component. I stated to her then that the current winds exceeded the limits set for in our AOM 1 for the EMB175 for those conditions; which were a runway braking action value of 3; which was for Medium Braking; and the stated limits were 15 knots of crosswinds. The ZZZ1 area was also under a Tornado watch; and had earlier had a tornado warning near the ZZZ1 Airport. Under these conditions; along with radar imagery; I felt it prudent to defer the flight until conditions improved; which seemed unlikely in the near term. She stated that this decision by me had to be discussed with upper management; and I requested to be included; along with my chief pilot; regarding the status of this flight.I was forwarded to several voicemails instead and finally I was able to reach my chief pilot and explained to him all of the above details. Chief Pilot suggested taking more fuel to round trip back to ZZZ; which I responded to that I already had ZZZ as an alternate. I stated again that it was a safety of flight decision; and again brought up the limits set forth regarding cross winds on a runway reporting 3 or Medium braking action. Chief Pilot then stated that 'This is not punitive; but I am removing you from the flight; and having scheduling assign a reserve pilot to the flight.' If the second Captain comes to the same conclusion as I did; then; he said; the flight would probably be cancelled. When I asked if I would be paid flight he said NO; I would not. I mentioned to him that he should pay me for making good decisions; not penalize me. We ended the phone conversation at that time.I spoke to my crew regarding the events; and wished them well. I then received a second call from Chief Pilot where he stated that on second thought he felt I should be paid for the flight; but I was still removed. I walked outside to the gate; and within 5 minutes; the flight was cancelled. I informed the crew of the cancellation and was walking through the airport when Chief Pilot called me a third time; stating that upon further examination of the circumstances by himself; he agreed with my assessment and had informed the Director of Operations of his agreement with my decision; which resulted in the flight being cancelled.First of all; I feel that our Operations should have been engaged in this weather early on; well before it happens; not on the day it occurred. The dispatcher should have asked for; and received help from her Operations manager; rather than having no current and useful data for me when I called her again from ZZZ. Secondly; replacing a Captain when he makes a safety of flight decision that the company disagrees with; by Flight Operations Management; despite the limitations set forth in our AOM1 for the E175; was; in my opinion; contrary to the stated intent of the FAR regulations regarding the safe operation of an airliner; and the authority of the PIC.I feel the company was derelict in its preparations for this event from an Operations standpoint; and once a Captain decided to defer a flight; the initial action by Chief Pilot of removing me from the flight indicates a high disregard for an experienced pilot with over 22;000 hours judgment regarding the safety of this flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.