Narrative:

This report is filed as a result of refusing an aircraft (B-737) reviewing the logbook I discovered several recent events that were related involving the flap/slat flight control system. More detailed information is provided below.I was the captain. I wound up refusing aircraft for multiple flight control issues during several previous flights with no leading edge; and or no trailing edge flaps resulting in emergency landings in each instance at very high approach speeds (reported as 170 up to 185 knots at touchdown) and also several high energy braking write-ups following the touchdown with high heat-cooling required. I would like to request for a [test flight]; and my disappointment in the fact that it was signed off by maintenance and then again returned to revenue service yesterday. In that release signed by maintenance yesterday; it indicated the jet had flown 5 flights without an issue following the replacement of the fseu (flap slat electronics unit); which was not true from my review of the logbook. It had flown two legs before my flight since the last flight control problem. Further; in my review of the logbook; there were multiple flights with no problems in-between these recurring flap/slat flight control issues; each time followed by another attempt by maintenance to troubleshoot and resolve this problem. I could not with confidence see taking this aircraft with its total recent history; and multiple fix attempts and still strongly believe for this issue that an test flight would have been the correct thing to do before returning it to service.when talking with the ramp tower/chief pilot; he had a discussion with the maintenance manager about my concern. The maintenance manager told him that the jet had flown twice and told the chief 'there is your [test flight]'. My problem with that statement is it wasn't a [test flight] but a flight with passengers and crew. A [test flight] would allow for multiple attempts to verify the fix and minimize the risk associated with putting a repeating flight control issue with multiple in-flight emergencies back into service almost without a thought to the history. There actually was a writeup in the logbook stating that a [test flight] was required that was later voided out. In conversation with mechanics that I spoke with regarding this jet; recent changes took away the routine or mandatory requirement for flight control (and apparently all) [test flights] to verify the work; and changed the requirement for a [test flight] to maintenance control management discretion. Whether this is accurate or not; I'm not certain. Common sense though tells me as a 38 year professional aviator; that it would have been the correct thing to do in this circumstance.if you reference a few of these write-ups; I hope it will help explain my concern and that you will be motivated to follow up not only with this jet; but with the procedures in place; especially as it pertains to [test flights]; maintenance control and sign-offs of aircraft with a long history of issues such as this aircraft.in the course of this issue; I spoke with the my first officer; the duty chief pilot; B737 tech desk; 3 mechanics that came to the aircraft; the chief pilot on duty; and an aircraft maintenance supervisor that came to the gate. Aside from the comments by the ramp tower maintenance supervisor; and the maintenance manager that came to the gate; everyone else saw the issue from a similar perspective as mine. The maintenance techs were all in agreement that this would have been best flown as an [test flight]; but obviously not their call. In the end; with consultation with my first officer we agreed that it was the right thing to do. Though no one wants to inconvenience our passengers; my call was to weigh all the factors; and to respectfully make the safe; and right decision for them; as well as my crew; and our flight operations.I believe that a functional check flight to ensure the reliability ofthis aircraft should be done before putting it back into revenue service. (In light of the multiple reoccurrences of this flight control issue resulting in extremely high speed landings with subsequent overheating of the brakes as a result.) this type of issue with a primary flight control; in my opinion should receive the utmost scrutiny and follow up through an [test flight] program. I'm concerned as an aviator; if what I heard about the [test flight] process is true (re: leaving it up to a single maintenance control manager to decide if he thinks it requires a [test flight]. It might be more plausible to have flight operations and maintenance control involved in those rare occasions that a [test flight] is in question or should be done). There needs be a transparent; and cost/neutral approach to how our aircraft are cleared back into service; especially following critical flight component malfunctions. Unfortunately; reality can lead some to avoid such thorough follow up based on costs; time; and equipment out of service issues. This should never trump the safety of the flight environment. I want to trust that the jet I am operating meets the high standards that you would expect as well if you were on that flight with me. I professionally could not accept this aircraft at this time; based on its repeat history without the increased confidence that an [test flight] would have provided to ensure the system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 Captain reported refusing an aircraft that had several flap/slat write ups and requested a test flight before a return to revenue service.

Narrative: This report is filed as a result of refusing an aircraft (B-737) reviewing the logbook I discovered several recent events that were related involving the Flap/Slat Flight Control System. More detailed information is provided below.I was the Captain. I wound up refusing aircraft for multiple Flight Control issues during several previous flights with no leading edge; and or no trailing edge flaps resulting in emergency landings in each instance at very high approach speeds (reported as 170 up to 185 knots at touchdown) and also several high energy braking write-ups following the touchdown with high heat-cooling required. I would like to request for a [Test Flight]; and my disappointment in the fact that it was signed off by Maintenance and then again returned to Revenue Service yesterday. In that release signed by Maintenance yesterday; it indicated the jet had flown 5 flights without an issue following the replacement of the FSEU (Flap Slat Electronics Unit); which was not true from my review of the logbook. It had flown two legs before my flight since the last Flight Control problem. Further; in my review of the logbook; there were multiple flights with no problems in-between these recurring FLAP/SLAT Flight Control issues; each time followed by another attempt by Maintenance to troubleshoot and resolve this problem. I could not with confidence see taking this aircraft with its total recent history; and multiple fix attempts and still strongly believe for this issue that an Test Flight would have been the correct thing to do before returning it to service.When talking with the Ramp Tower/Chief Pilot; he had a discussion with the Maintenance Manager about my concern. The Maintenance Manager told him that the jet had flown twice and told the Chief 'there is your [Test Flight]'. My problem with that statement is it wasn't a [Test Flight] but a flight with Passengers and Crew. A [Test Flight] would allow for multiple attempts to verify the fix and minimize the RISK associated with putting a repeating Flight Control Issue with multiple In-Flight Emergencies back into service almost without a thought to the history. There actually was a writeup in the logbook stating that a [Test Flight] was required that was later voided out. In conversation with Mechanics that I spoke with regarding this jet; recent changes took away the routine or mandatory requirement for Flight Control (and apparently all) [Test Flights] to verify the work; and changed the requirement for a [Test Flight] to Maintenance Control Management discretion. Whether this is accurate or not; I'm not certain. Common sense though tells me as a 38 Year Professional Aviator; that it would have been the correct thing to do in this circumstance.If you reference a few of these write-ups; I hope it will help explain my concern and that you will be motivated to follow up not only with this jet; but with the procedures in place; especially as it pertains to [Test Flights]; Maintenance Control and sign-offs of aircraft with a long history of issues such as this aircraft.In the course of this issue; I spoke with the my First Officer; the Duty Chief Pilot; B737 Tech Desk; 3 Mechanics that came to the aircraft; the Chief Pilot on duty; and an Aircraft Maintenance Supervisor that came to the gate. Aside from the comments by the Ramp Tower Maintenance Supervisor; and the Maintenance Manager that came to the gate; everyone else saw the issue from a similar perspective as mine. The Maintenance techs were all in agreement that this would have been best flown as an [Test Flight]; but obviously not their call. In the end; with consultation with my First Officer we agreed that it was the right thing to do. Though no one wants to inconvenience our passengers; My Call was to weigh all the factors; and to respectfully make the Safe; and right decision for them; as well as my Crew; and our Flight Operations.I believe that a Functional Check Flight to ensure the reliability ofthis aircraft should be done before putting it back into revenue service. (In light of the multiple reoccurrences of this flight control issue resulting in extremely high speed landings with subsequent overheating of the brakes as a result.) This type of issue with a primary flight control; in my opinion should receive the utmost scrutiny and follow up through an [Test Flight] program. I'm concerned as an Aviator; if what I heard about the [Test Flight] process is true (re: leaving it up to a single Maintenance Control Manager to decide if he thinks it requires a [Test Flight]. It might be more plausible to have Flight Operations and Maintenance Control involved in those rare occasions that a [Test Flight] is in question or should be done). There needs be a transparent; and cost/neutral approach to how our Aircraft are cleared back into service; especially following critical flight component malfunctions. Unfortunately; reality can lead some to avoid such thorough follow up based on costs; time; and equipment out of service issues. This should never trump the safety of the Flight environment. I want to trust that the jet I am operating meets the high standards that you would expect as well if you were on that flight with me. I professionally could not accept this aircraft at this time; based on its repeat history without the increased confidence that an [Test Flight] would have provided to ensure the system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.