Narrative:

Flight in question was for crq to smo. Flight began with IFR to VFR on top clearance. The significant clouds and WX sections for lax, close to smo, showed that I should expect 'after cax 15-25 scattered ocnl visibility 3-5 fh. After xcz clear' in the lax-smo area. After reaching VFR on top, I cancelled IFR and reset the transponder to 1200. At 6500' MSL and 10 northwest ocn VORTAC, contacted coast approach on 132.7 for flight following to smo. Advised them that I desired the shoreline transition route through the lax TCA into small aircraft. Request was acknowledged and flight following was provided. Several traffic advisories were relayed to me en route. In the vicinity of the sli 180 degree right, ATC instruction me to descend VFR to 4500' MSL. I was level at 4500' MSL going over lax harbor. In the area between the toa and el segundo refinery. ATC advised me that the shoreline route was unavailable due to traffic and suggested I use the sfra and instructed me to squawk 1200. I thought briefly about requesting IFR to smo. It was scattered VFR with 3-5 fh as expected where I was and I was only about 10 mi from smo. I had no reason to believe that conditions were any different closer to smo. The ATC system seemed already loaded up or I would have been given the shoreline route. It was denied 'for traffic,' not 'visibility or ceiling.' I felt that since it appeared to be VFR the rest of the way in, I needn't burden the system more unnecessarily. ATC suggested the sfra (twice). I am sure that this increased my confidence that conditions were acceptable up to smo. Since I was close to the TCA, I quickly switched to 122.75, squawked 1200, made sure I was T or below 140 KIAS, intercepted the smo 132 degree right and announced my intentions as required for the sfra. This did not afford a chance to get the smo ATIS. This may or may not have indicated a problem at that time. The fog and haze made it difficult to tell if the clouds were ahead were clouds or fog and haze. Just past lax however, conditions rapidly deteriorated. I had to climb several hundred ft to make sure I cleared what appeared to be a marginal cloud. I expected to be able to resume 4500' MSL immediately past it. As a precaution, I began to consider options of this tendency continued. I was at about 4800'[ MSL. The clouds had thickened and risen on both my right and left. I considered and rejected a # of courses of action: 1) a 180 degree turn to the right was out. The clouds on the right were more defined and thicker. 2) a 180 degree turn to the left seemed inadvisable since it would probably put me in those clouds. They looked to be scattered, but I couldn't tell for sure. 3) additionally, a 180 degree turn would also require a descent in probably marginal conditions to 3500' MSL. Any other sfra traffic, particularly southbound at 3500' MSL in this area, could have difficulty seeing me (and I them). 4) I briefly considered descending straight ahead, but opted not to for several reasons: it was thickening up under me and I didn't want to be descending in even worse conditions; if it were in fact 20-25 -overcast or overcast now below me, and I was nearing the north edge of the sfra, I didn't think it wise or safe to be descending unannounced supposedly VFR in IMC into the smo air traffic area; and I didn't feel it was safe to leave the 122.75 frequency until I was clear of the sfra. (The transmitter selector knob was broken and I could only transmit on the selected radio. I had a portable handheld aircraft band radio onboard for use if I experienced complete radio failure; however, in the the surprise of being in these conditions, trying to stay VFR, and considering alternatives, I didn't think to use it as an alternate for the other radio. The choices rapidly narrowed down to 2: descend back to 4500' MSL and enter IMC unannounced over the smo air traffic area, or stay VFR and climb above 5000' MSL (the floor of the TCA in that vicinity) and immediately contact lax approach and advise. It appeared that the safest action was stay VFR and get ATC assistance. I elected to initiate a climb to remain VFR and immediately call approach on 134l9 and advise them of my situation and action. At 5400' MSL they advised me that this wasn't a real safe place to be, and told me to immediately exit the TCA by descending to 4500' MSL and suggested I contact bur approach on 135.05. I began descend and contacted bur approach. Bur provided vectors for a VOR a approach into smo. Small aircraft ground control relayed a request from ATC for me to call the ATC lax supervisor after parking. I relayed to him, in a less detailed form, the information contained above. After that call, I filed for, received clearance for and flew the lax foxtrot 9 tower-tower IFR route back to crq and encountered no difficulty. What could/should I have done differently? 1) been aware that a # of IFR approachs for lax specify the smo VORTAC as an IAF with an initial heading and altitude form there of 068 degrees and 5000' MSL. I was aware that there was a routing over smo, but thought they were at a much higher altitude. 2) listened to smo ATIS well outside the area before things got busy. This may or may not have given an indication of the conditions in encountered. 3)requested an IFR approach to smo after ATC cancelled my shoreline route request. 4) used my portable handheld radio at the first sign of deteriorating conditions, advised lax approach, and requested IFR form there. This would have enabled me to continue to monitor and respond to any aircraft in the sfra while simultaneously communication with approach. 5) since earlier conditions in the area had been IFR, I could have assumed a likelihood they could continue, and filed for the san foxtrot 13 tower-tower IFR route in the first place.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA UNAUTH PENETRATION OF LAX TCA.

Narrative: FLT IN QUESTION WAS FOR CRQ TO SMO. FLT BEGAN WITH IFR TO VFR ON TOP CLRNC. THE SIGNIFICANT CLOUDS AND WX SECTIONS FOR LAX, CLOSE TO SMO, SHOWED THAT I SHOULD EXPECT 'AFTER CAX 15-25 SCATTERED OCNL VISIBILITY 3-5 FH. AFTER XCZ CLR' IN THE LAX-SMO AREA. AFTER REACHING VFR ON TOP, I CANCELLED IFR AND RESET THE XPONDER TO 1200. AT 6500' MSL AND 10 NW OCN VORTAC, CONTACTED COAST APCH ON 132.7 FOR FLT FOLLOWING TO SMO. ADVISED THEM THAT I DESIRED THE SHORELINE TRANSITION RTE THROUGH THE LAX TCA INTO SMA. REQUEST WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AND FLT FOLLOWING WAS PROVIDED. SEVERAL TFC ADVISORIES WERE RELAYED TO ME ENRTE. IN THE VICINITY OF THE SLI 180 DEG R, ATC INSTRUCTION ME TO DSND VFR TO 4500' MSL. I WAS LEVEL AT 4500' MSL GOING OVER LAX HARBOR. IN THE AREA BTWN THE TOA AND EL SEGUNDO REFINERY. ATC ADVISED ME THAT THE SHORELINE RTE WAS UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TFC AND SUGGESTED I USE THE SFRA AND INSTRUCTED ME TO SQUAWK 1200. I THOUGHT BRIEFLY ABOUT REQUESTING IFR TO SMO. IT WAS SCATTERED VFR WITH 3-5 FH AS EXPECTED WHERE I WAS AND I WAS ONLY ABOUT 10 MI FROM SMO. I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT CONDITIONS WERE ANY DIFFERENT CLOSER TO SMO. THE ATC SYS SEEMED ALREADY LOADED UP OR I WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE SHORELINE RTE. IT WAS DENIED 'FOR TFC,' NOT 'VISIBILITY OR CEILING.' I FELT THAT SINCE IT APPEARED TO BE VFR THE REST OF THE WAY IN, I NEEDN'T BURDEN THE SYS MORE UNNECESSARILY. ATC SUGGESTED THE SFRA (TWICE). I AM SURE THAT THIS INCREASED MY CONFIDENCE THAT CONDITIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE UP TO SMO. SINCE I WAS CLOSE TO THE TCA, I QUICKLY SWITCHED TO 122.75, SQUAWKED 1200, MADE SURE I WAS T OR BELOW 140 KIAS, INTERCEPTED THE SMO 132 DEG R AND ANNOUNCED MY INTENTIONS AS REQUIRED FOR THE SFRA. THIS DID NOT AFFORD A CHANCE TO GET THE SMO ATIS. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE INDICATED A PROB AT THAT TIME. THE FOG AND HAZE MADE IT DIFFICULT TO TELL IF THE CLOUDS WERE AHEAD WERE CLOUDS OR FOG AND HAZE. JUST PAST LAX HOWEVER, CONDITIONS RAPIDLY DETERIORATED. I HAD TO CLB SEVERAL HUNDRED FT TO MAKE SURE I CLRED WHAT APPEARED TO BE A MARGINAL CLOUD. I EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO RESUME 4500' MSL IMMEDIATELY PAST IT. AS A PRECAUTION, I BEGAN TO CONSIDER OPTIONS OF THIS TENDENCY CONTINUED. I WAS AT ABOUT 4800'[ MSL. THE CLOUDS HAD THICKENED AND RISEN ON BOTH MY RIGHT AND LEFT. I CONSIDERED AND REJECTED A # OF COURSES OF ACTION: 1) A 180 DEG TURN TO THE RIGHT WAS OUT. THE CLOUDS ON THE RIGHT WERE MORE DEFINED AND THICKER. 2) A 180 DEG TURN TO THE LEFT SEEMED INADVISABLE SINCE IT WOULD PROBABLY PUT ME IN THOSE CLOUDS. THEY LOOKED TO BE SCATTERED, BUT I COULDN'T TELL FOR SURE. 3) ADDITIONALLY, A 180 DEG TURN WOULD ALSO REQUIRE A DSNT IN PROBABLY MARGINAL CONDITIONS TO 3500' MSL. ANY OTHER SFRA TFC, PARTICULARLY SBND AT 3500' MSL IN THIS AREA, COULD HAVE DIFFICULTY SEEING ME (AND I THEM). 4) I BRIEFLY CONSIDERED DSNDING STRAIGHT AHEAD, BUT OPTED NOT TO FOR SEVERAL REASONS: IT WAS THICKENING UP UNDER ME AND I DIDN'T WANT TO BE DSNDING IN EVEN WORSE CONDITIONS; IF IT WERE IN FACT 20-25 -OVCST OR OVCST NOW BELOW ME, AND I WAS NEARING THE N EDGE OF THE SFRA, I DIDN'T THINK IT WISE OR SAFE TO BE DSNDING UNANNOUNCED SUPPOSEDLY VFR IN IMC INTO THE SMO ATA; AND I DIDN'T FEEL IT WAS SAFE TO LEAVE THE 122.75 FREQ UNTIL I WAS CLR OF THE SFRA. (THE XMITTER SELECTOR KNOB WAS BROKEN AND I COULD ONLY XMIT ON THE SELECTED RADIO. I HAD A PORTABLE HANDHELD ACFT BAND RADIO ONBOARD FOR USE IF I EXPERIENCED COMPLETE RADIO FAILURE; HOWEVER, IN THE THE SURPRISE OF BEING IN THESE CONDITIONS, TRYING TO STAY VFR, AND CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES, I DIDN'T THINK TO USE IT AS AN ALTERNATE FOR THE OTHER RADIO. THE CHOICES RAPIDLY NARROWED DOWN TO 2: DSND BACK TO 4500' MSL AND ENTER IMC UNANNOUNCED OVER THE SMO ATA, OR STAY VFR AND CLB ABOVE 5000' MSL (THE FLOOR OF THE TCA IN THAT VICINITY) AND IMMEDIATELY CONTACT LAX APCH AND ADVISE. IT APPEARED THAT THE SAFEST ACTION WAS STAY VFR AND GET ATC ASSISTANCE. I ELECTED TO INITIATE A CLB TO REMAIN VFR AND IMMEDIATELY CALL APCH ON 134L9 AND ADVISE THEM OF MY SITUATION AND ACTION. AT 5400' MSL THEY ADVISED ME THAT THIS WASN'T A REAL SAFE PLACE TO BE, AND TOLD ME TO IMMEDIATELY EXIT THE TCA BY DSNDING TO 4500' MSL AND SUGGESTED I CONTACT BUR APCH ON 135.05. I BEGAN DSND AND CONTACTED BUR APCH. BUR PROVIDED VECTORS FOR A VOR A APCH INTO SMO. SMA GND CTL RELAYED A REQUEST FROM ATC FOR ME TO CALL THE ATC LAX SUPVR AFTER PARKING. I RELAYED TO HIM, IN A LESS DETAILED FORM, THE INFO CONTAINED ABOVE. AFTER THAT CALL, I FILED FOR, RECEIVED CLRNC FOR AND FLEW THE LAX FOXTROT 9 TWR-TWR IFR RTE BACK TO CRQ AND ENCOUNTERED NO DIFFICULTY. WHAT COULD/SHOULD I HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY? 1) BEEN AWARE THAT A # OF IFR APCHS FOR LAX SPECIFY THE SMO VORTAC AS AN IAF WITH AN INITIAL HDG AND ALT FORM THERE OF 068 DEGS AND 5000' MSL. I WAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS A RTING OVER SMO, BUT THOUGHT THEY WERE AT A MUCH HIGHER ALT. 2) LISTENED TO SMO ATIS WELL OUTSIDE THE AREA BEFORE THINGS GOT BUSY. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE GIVEN AN INDICATION OF THE CONDITIONS IN ENCOUNTERED. 3)REQUESTED AN IFR APCH TO SMO AFTER ATC CANCELLED MY SHORELINE RTE REQUEST. 4) USED MY PORTABLE HANDHELD RADIO AT THE FIRST SIGN OF DETERIORATING CONDITIONS, ADVISED LAX APCH, AND REQUESTED IFR FORM THERE. THIS WOULD HAVE ENABLED ME TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO ANY ACFT IN THE SFRA WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY COM WITH APCH. 5) SINCE EARLIER CONDITIONS IN THE AREA HAD BEEN IFR, I COULD HAVE ASSUMED A LIKELIHOOD THEY COULD CONTINUE, AND FILED FOR THE SAN FOXTROT 13 TWR-TWR IFR RTE IN THE FIRST PLACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.