Narrative:

I was working a flight of two [military fighters]. On check-in; aircraft X requested flight breakup for aircraft Y to proceed to landing and aircraft X to hold prior to approach. I generated a beacon code for aircraft Y and advised aircraft X to have aircraft Y squawk the code and come up on frequency. When I observed the aircraft Y radar track initiate I advised radar contact and when clear of flight maintain 3000 feet. This procedure is in accordance with 7110.65 2-1-13 which states that separation between aircraft in a formation rests on the pilots until approved separation has been attained.when aircraft Y was radar contacted; he became a separate flight with responsibility to maintain separation until standard separation was attained. My instruction was not a control instruction until he was 'clear of flight'. What led to the event doing flight breakups the same way every time and never having a problem. Instead of getting up in arms about a phrase in the 7110.65; why don't we ask the military pilots how they would prefer us to do it. How is relaying instructions through a lead aircraft safer than direct issuance to the aircraft that is splitting off and is in the back maintaining visual on the lead? The 'interpretation request' states that 'a controller may issue control instructions through the lead aircraft' which is substantially different [than] shall. Also; the questions that interpretation is answering are completely different than the situation that occurred this time. Clarify 7110.65 2-1-13 with a specific phraseology example for flight breakups.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PCT TRACON Controller reported assigning an operational error conducting a flight break up procedure even though they were in compliance with the 7110.65.

Narrative: I was working a flight of two [Military Fighters]. On check-in; Aircraft X requested flight breakup for Aircraft Y to proceed to landing and Aircraft X to hold prior to approach. I generated a beacon code for Aircraft Y and advised Aircraft X to have Aircraft Y squawk the code and come up on frequency. When I observed the Aircraft Y radar track initiate I advised radar contact and when clear of flight maintain 3000 feet. This procedure is in accordance with 7110.65 2-1-13 which states that separation between aircraft in a formation rests on the pilots until approved separation has been attained.When Aircraft Y was radar contacted; he became a separate flight with responsibility to maintain separation until standard separation was attained. My instruction was not a control instruction until he was 'clear of flight'. What led to the event doing flight breakups the same way every time and never having a problem. Instead of getting up in arms about a phrase in the 7110.65; why don't we ask the military pilots how they would prefer us to do it. How is relaying instructions through a lead aircraft safer than direct issuance to the aircraft that is splitting off and is in the back maintaining visual on the lead? The 'interpretation request' states that 'a controller MAY issue control instructions through the lead aircraft' which is substantially different [than] SHALL. Also; the questions that interpretation is answering are completely different than the situation that occurred this time. Clarify 7110.65 2-1-13 with a specific phraseology example for flight breakups.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.