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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1487954 |
Time | |
Date | 201710 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Baron 55/Cochise |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | None |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Elevator Trim System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Single Pilot |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27 Flight Crew Total 962 Flight Crew Type 99 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft |
Narrative:
Aircraft had its autopilot roll servo replaced. This was the maintenance flight to verify operation. Avionics tech that did the work was along to verify operation. What I felt to be a thorough preflight was conducted by myself as pilot in command; verifying all switches; knobs; etc. Were in the correct location. Verified operation of the autopilot and electric trim on the ground. Verified controls free and correct. Did not manually roll trim to stops. Run-up and systems checks were all fine. Verified all items against the aircraft checklist. Aircraft is [equipped] with the trim indication window below the dual control cross bar. It is very visible in flight; but not as much on the ground. I recall looking at the trim indication and believing I saw the correct value in the window. As noted before; I did not roll the trim to the stops and also did not manually roll it each direction to verify the proper reading. I believe this was complacency brought about as a result of being the only one who flies the aircraft; and setting the proper trim value as part of my clear of runway and stopped; post-flight clean-up. Contributing is the fact that the 'proper' takeoff (and landing flare) trim indication for this aircraft is a relative reading of 12 to 15 up (was this way when purchased). I believe the actual indication may have been set closer to -0- based on what I noted shortly after takeoff.takeoff power application; engine indications; aircraft control were normal on the takeoff roll. After liftoff; breaking ground effect and picking up speed; forward control force increased. Added trim via electric on the yoke but response was not immediate. Wasn't sure if the electric trim was not responding or just slow. Took right hand from the throttles and reached down to roll in manual trim. Glanced down at the indication window at the time and noted an incorrect trim indication. Gear was retracted within this short time frame as well. I do not recall reaching for or moving the gear handle; but clearly did in the sequence of events. Between the gear retracting and my attention moving inside the cockpit (toward the floor) the aircraft settled; resulting in the propeller tips of both engines contacting the runway. This was not readily apparent; and was believed at the time to be the gear touching down and then becoming airborne again. Once airborne; aircraft control and engine indications were normal. Noted a gear in transit light still illuminated. Verified aircraft control; airspeed; and engine indications (full digital engine monitor equipped). Cycled the gear back to the 'down' position. Three green illuminated. Elected to continue around the pattern for landing. Aircraft control was normal; with only a slight vibration noted on short final with power reduction. Landing and roll-out were normal; with full aft control maintained through roll-out to keep pressure off the nose gear (had suspected a front gear hit resulting in the bounce and failure for in-transit light to extinguish earlier). Upon shut-down; bent propeller tips were noted; as well as damage to the inner main gear doors. As noted previously; the first error was complacency. While I checked; re-checked; and verified all other systems; I believe I 'saw' what I expected to in the trim indication window. I believe the complacency was furthered on my part by having the tech with me for the initial flight. I also feel that had I been alone; I would have likely run through the checklist another time; as I have done before on post-maintenance flights. Either out of 'respect' for his time or whatever it was; I did not do another full verification. I believe if I had been at a longer field; I may have elected to pull the power when the forward pressure was noted. This may have resulted in a hard landing or runway over-run had I elected that option. That was not a consideration at the time; though. I was close to or just beyond the accelerate / stop point and airborne by the timethe forward pressure was noted. I also knew from the preflight checks that the controls were free and electric trim was operational. The out-of-trim condition was visually noted very quickly. However; I believe the combination of moving my focus inside the aircraft and towards the floor; as well as repositioning of my right hand to the trim knob resulted in a slight relaxation of the back pressure on the yoke. I still do not recall either reaching for or moving the gear knob (on the right side in this vintage) to the 'up' position. As best as I can figure; that was muscle memory in play - albeit at a much lower altitude than normal - take right hand off throttles; reach down and move the gear handle; return to the throttles. If I had that segment to do again; I would have placed my right hand on the yoke to assist the left and continued to roll in 'up' trim with the thumb control. However; that would not have been necessary had I manually rolled the trim to both stops and fully verified the trim indication and physically verified the position during the preflight inspection.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: BE55 pilot reported damage to the propeller blades and landing gear door due to runway contact after takeoff due to an unexpected nose down trim condition.
Narrative: Aircraft had its autopilot roll servo replaced. This was the maintenance flight to verify operation. Avionics tech that did the work was along to verify operation. What I felt to be a thorough preflight was conducted by myself as Pilot In Command; verifying all switches; knobs; etc. were in the correct location. Verified operation of the autopilot and electric trim on the ground. Verified controls free and correct. DID NOT MANUALLY ROLL TRIM TO STOPS. Run-up and systems checks were all fine. Verified all items against the aircraft checklist. Aircraft is [equipped] with the trim indication window below the dual control cross bar. It is very visible in flight; but not as much on the ground. I recall looking at the trim indication and believing I saw the correct value in the window. As noted before; I did not roll the trim to the stops and also did not manually roll it each direction to verify the proper reading. I believe this was complacency brought about as a result of being the only one who flies the aircraft; and setting the proper trim value as part of my clear of runway and stopped; post-flight clean-up. Contributing is the fact that the 'proper' takeoff (and landing flare) trim indication for this aircraft is a relative reading of 12 to 15 up (was this way when purchased). I believe the actual indication may have been set closer to -0- based on what I noted shortly after takeoff.Takeoff power application; engine indications; aircraft control were normal on the takeoff roll. After liftoff; breaking ground effect and picking up speed; forward control force increased. Added trim via electric on the yoke but response was not immediate. Wasn't sure if the electric trim was not responding or just slow. Took right hand from the throttles and reached down to roll in manual trim. Glanced down at the indication window at the time and noted an incorrect trim indication. Gear was retracted within this short time frame as well. I do not recall reaching for or moving the gear handle; but clearly did in the sequence of events. Between the gear retracting and my attention moving inside the cockpit (toward the floor) the aircraft settled; resulting in the propeller tips of both engines contacting the runway. This was not readily apparent; and was believed at the time to be the gear touching down and then becoming airborne again. Once airborne; aircraft control and engine indications were normal. Noted a gear in transit light still illuminated. Verified aircraft control; airspeed; and engine indications (full digital engine monitor equipped). Cycled the gear back to the 'down' position. Three green illuminated. Elected to continue around the pattern for landing. Aircraft control was normal; with only a slight vibration noted on short final with power reduction. Landing and roll-out were normal; with full aft control maintained through roll-out to keep pressure off the nose gear (had suspected a front gear hit resulting in the bounce and failure for in-transit light to extinguish earlier). Upon shut-down; bent propeller tips were noted; as well as damage to the inner main gear doors. As noted previously; the first error was complacency. While I checked; re-checked; and verified all other systems; I believe I 'saw' what I expected to in the trim indication window. I believe the complacency was furthered on my part by having the tech with me for the initial flight. I also feel that had I been alone; I would have likely run through the checklist another time; as I have done before on post-maintenance flights. Either out of 'respect' for his time or whatever it was; I did not do another full verification. I believe if I had been at a longer field; I may have elected to pull the power when the forward pressure was noted. This may have resulted in a hard landing or runway over-run had I elected that option. That was not a consideration at the time; though. I was close to or just beyond the accelerate / stop point and airborne by the timethe forward pressure was noted. I also knew from the preflight checks that the controls were free and electric trim was operational. The out-of-trim condition was visually noted very quickly. However; I believe the combination of moving my focus inside the aircraft and towards the floor; as well as repositioning of my right hand to the trim knob resulted in a slight relaxation of the back pressure on the yoke. I still do not recall either reaching for or moving the gear knob (on the right side in this vintage) to the 'up' position. As best as I can figure; that was muscle memory in play - albeit at a much lower altitude than normal - take right hand off throttles; reach down and move the gear handle; return to the throttles. If I had that segment to do again; I would have placed my right hand on the yoke to assist the left and continued to roll in 'up' trim with the thumb control. However; that would not have been necessary had I manually rolled the trim to both stops and fully verified the trim indication and physically verified the position during the preflight inspection.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.