Narrative:

Taxiing out of the FBO the flight crew were advised by ATC of an amendment to our IFR departure clearance. A new SID was issued and I observed while the first officer selected the hayez five as the current departure loaded to our aircraft's FMS flight plan. This procedure was selected to replace the harys one departure which we had manually loaded together a few minutes earlier. On taxi out I scanned the aircrafts efb ipad to confirm the fixes automatically loaded in the FMS matched the SID plate and as part of the takeoff briefing read aloud the name of each fix we would cross on the SID; the most immediate turns and the speed/altitude restrictions appropriate at each fix.takeoff clearance was received from vny tower and as we lifted off I relied on the first officer to help monitor our progress with the garmin 750 visual display set in map mode to help ensure the course in the departure procedure was accurately flown during this IFR departure. Very soon after takeoff between conds and traff we were switched to socal departure and the first officer's hand came up covering the map screen as he changed frequencies on the garmin 750's integral communication radio. I expected his hand to go down quickly so I could resume reference to the screen and also receive his inputs verifying our position relative to each of the closely spaced fixes. Instead; his hand remained covering the display so I assumed he was taking a little delay as he sometimes does inputting frequencies on this device. While I focused on flying the aircraft the first officer had taken it upon himself to switch the GNS 750 display from map into flight plan mode and was reprogramming the SID by manually deleting 2 immediately upcoming fixes necessary to navigate the departure! When his hand came down the display was now out of map mode and I had to reorient myself to the fixes in map mode. This was distracting as I now had to reset the screen mode; re-evaluate our position and search for fixes on the departure procedure that I had no idea had been deliberately removed. At that moment the socal controller jumped in very annoyed we had missed the important first turn and while discussion ensued between himself and the [first officer]; I attempted to regain enough situational awareness to re intercept the proper course. The controller chastised us rather bluntly and finally issued vectors to the proper course. The weather was VMC and no traffic conflict occurred to my knowledge.later; while debriefing; [the first officer] claimed he didn't have enough time on the ground to verify the loaded departure and was concerned to delete possible duplicate fixes between the new departure and one previously loaded. I replied that the garmin appeared to accurately display the loaded procedure from its database and if he thought otherwise he should have stated so. Further; by acknowledging the takeoff briefing and accepting the takeoff clearance this implied to me that he was ready to provide his full support and participation in executing the departure as briefed. [He] acknowledged this and apologized for interfering with my ability to utilize the FMS for navigation but could offer no rational explanation as to why he would reprogram it without mutual consent as well as his failure to monitor the departure in progress as is normal procedure. I consider my part in this breakdown of communications was to not fully recognize this first officer was overwhelmed at the speed at which things were happening. Vny was very busy and we were in fact hustling as the departure procedure change caught us out of the gate. I believe [he] did his best to catch up to his own satisfaction but it's inexplicable if he could not realize those actions he took with the FMS were out of step as well as inaccurate and therefor distracting and contrary to the pilot flying performing his duties. In retrospect; I should have advised the controller at the first sign of a failure in the FMS/GPS programming and solicited his help in navigation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Corporate jet Captain reported a deviation on the HAYEZ FIVE departure from VNY due to the First Officer reprogramming the SID and manually deleting two fixes necessary for the departure.

Narrative: Taxiing out of the FBO the flight crew were advised by ATC of an amendment to our IFR departure clearance. A new SID was issued and I observed while the first officer selected the HAYEZ FIVE as the current departure loaded to our aircraft's FMS flight plan. This procedure was selected to replace the HARYS ONE departure which we had manually loaded together a few minutes earlier. On taxi out I scanned the aircrafts EFB iPad to confirm the fixes automatically loaded in the FMS matched the SID plate and as part of the takeoff briefing read aloud the name of each fix we would cross on the SID; the most immediate turns and the speed/altitude restrictions appropriate at each fix.Takeoff clearance was received from VNY Tower and as we lifted off I relied on the first officer to help monitor our progress with the Garmin 750 visual display set in map mode to help ensure the course in the Departure Procedure was accurately flown during this IFR departure. Very soon after takeoff between CONDS and TRAFF we were switched to SoCal Departure and the first officer's hand came up covering the map screen as he changed frequencies on the Garmin 750's integral communication radio. I expected his hand to go down quickly so I could resume reference to the screen and also receive his inputs verifying our position relative to each of the closely spaced fixes. Instead; his hand remained covering the display so I assumed he was taking a little delay as he sometimes does inputting frequencies on this device. While I focused on flying the aircraft the first officer had taken it upon himself to switch the GNS 750 display from Map into Flight Plan mode and was reprogramming the SID by manually deleting 2 immediately upcoming fixes necessary to navigate the departure! When his hand came down the display was now out of map mode and I had to reorient myself to the fixes in map mode. This was distracting as I now had to reset the screen mode; re-evaluate our position and search for fixes on the Departure Procedure that I had no idea had been deliberately removed. At that moment the SoCal controller jumped in very annoyed we had missed the important first turn and while discussion ensued between himself and the [first officer]; I attempted to regain enough situational awareness to re intercept the proper course. The controller chastised us rather bluntly and finally issued vectors to the proper course. The weather was VMC and no traffic conflict occurred to my knowledge.Later; while debriefing; [the first officer] claimed he didn't have enough time on the ground to verify the loaded departure and was concerned to delete possible duplicate fixes between the new departure and one previously loaded. I replied that the Garmin appeared to accurately display the loaded procedure from its database and if he thought otherwise he should have stated so. Further; by acknowledging the takeoff briefing and accepting the takeoff clearance this implied to me that he was ready to provide his full support and participation in executing the departure as briefed. [He] acknowledged this and apologized for interfering with my ability to utilize the FMS for navigation but could offer no rational explanation as to why he would reprogram it without mutual consent as well as his failure to monitor the departure in progress as is normal procedure. I consider my part in this breakdown of communications was to not fully recognize this first officer was overwhelmed at the speed at which things were happening. VNY was very busy and we were in fact hustling as the Departure Procedure change caught us out of the gate. I believe [he] did his best to catch up to his own satisfaction but it's inexplicable if he could not realize those actions he took with the FMS were out of step as well as inaccurate and therefor distracting and contrary to the pilot flying performing his duties. In retrospect; I should have advised the controller at the first sign of a failure in the FMS/GPS programming and solicited his help in navigation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.