Narrative:

We taxied from the ramp for a departure. The weather was VMC. Clear skies; 10 miles visibility; winds 280/03 with an altimeter setting of 30.34. Takeoff weight was 328;400. Fuel onboard was 54;600. All these above conditions are being listed to indicate that this was a very standard and normal takeoff. All went well until about 100 ft AGL; then we developed compressor stalls on the right engine. There were loud popping sounds; vibrations; and a slight yaw to the right. Between 500 and 700 ft AGL the tower reported there were flames visible from our right engine. Passing approximately 1000 ft AGL; I asked for an immediate return to land. Simultaneously I reached for the quick reference checklist. One or more conditions indicated that we had a compressor stall. The at (autothrottle) arm switch was turned off; thrust lever (right side) was retarded to idle. But as I review the events of this flight; I don't remember completing the third step in the checklist for the 767 'engine limit or surge or compressor stall'. That step called for the engine start selector (affected side) to be placed in the flight position. This omission may have occurred due to the fact that I; as pilot monitoring; was coordinating with tower to get set up for a return to land. The landing runway and ILS was set up as backup reference. We flew the pattern at outer marker altitude. Landing checklist was completed; and the landing occurred with the rescue vehicles staged alongside the runway. Total time airborne was 7 minutes. One or more of the rescue vehicles followed our aircraft to the ramp. During taxi in; the left brakes heated up to the point that I warned ground crew to avoid them until cleared by maintenance. It was my decision that getting the aircraft safely back on the ground immediately was my highest priority. I didn't feel that I should've requested a longer pattern to allow me to do a more thorough job of troubleshooting. In hindsight; I think I've learned more clearly that time management and checklist review could have caught the missing step in the checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300 Captain reported a compressor stall shortly after takeoff.

Narrative: We taxied from the ramp for a departure. The weather was VMC. Clear skies; 10 miles visibility; winds 280/03 with an altimeter setting of 30.34. Takeoff weight was 328;400. Fuel onboard was 54;600. All these above conditions are being listed to indicate that this was a very standard and normal takeoff. All went well until about 100 ft AGL; then we developed compressor stalls on the right engine. There were loud popping sounds; vibrations; and a slight yaw to the right. Between 500 and 700 ft AGL the Tower reported there were flames visible from our right engine. Passing approximately 1000 ft AGL; I asked for an immediate return to land. Simultaneously I reached for the Quick Reference Checklist. One or more conditions indicated that we had a compressor stall. The AT (AutoThrottle) Arm Switch was turned off; thrust lever (right side) was retarded to idle. But as I review the events of this flight; I don't remember completing the third step in the checklist for the 767 'Engine Limit or Surge or Compressor Stall'. That step called for the Engine Start Selector (Affected side) to be placed in the FLT position. This omission may have occurred due to the fact that I; as pilot monitoring; was coordinating with Tower to get set up for a return to land. The landing runway and ILS was set up as backup reference. We flew the pattern at outer marker altitude. Landing checklist was completed; and the landing occurred with the rescue vehicles staged alongside the runway. Total time airborne was 7 minutes. One or more of the rescue vehicles followed our aircraft to the ramp. During taxi in; the left brakes heated up to the point that I warned ground crew to avoid them until cleared by maintenance. It was my decision that getting the aircraft safely back on the ground immediately was my highest priority. I didn't feel that I should've requested a longer pattern to allow me to do a more thorough job of troubleshooting. In hindsight; I think I've learned more clearly that time management and checklist review could have caught the missing step in the checklist.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.