Narrative:

Pushback occurred at (time). On the pushback I was instructed to start the number 2 engine. I started the number 2 engine and verified a normal start. All engine indications were operating within normal parameters. Next; I was instructed to start the number 1 engine. Again; a normal engine start was observed. After completion of the before taxi checklist; I obtained clearance to taxi the aircraft to runway xx. Just prior to turning onto taxiway D the number 2 engine rolled back. I let ATC know that we had an issue and would like to stop our taxi and asses our situation. The parking brake was set and we both started to apply risk and resource management to this situation. We communicated that it would be a good idea to get our support people involved. The captain handed control of the aircraft over to me while he contacted maintenance and dispatch. After several minutes of consultation with maintenance and dispatch and also consulting the QRH; we were instructed to restart the number 2 engine.the engine was started and operated within normal parameters. After the start; the captain; in coordination with maintenance and dispatch; performed an operational check of the engine. The engine again appeared to be normal. After several throttle advances and several minutes running at idle; the captain and I; as well as dispatch and maintenance; to my knowledge; agreed it was safe and acceptable to continue the flight. After the captain was through speaking to dispatch and maintenance; the captain conveyed that maintenance showed no prior history on the number 2 engine. All of the information I was receiving at the time was third hand. At this point the captain and I worked together on the 'shared mental model.' this would define our expectations and plans going forward. We both formed a solid contingency plan by communicating risk and intentions with thorough briefings as we do on every flight of every day. The plan was to return immediately to XXX should anything happen after takeoff. We were cleared for takeoff on runway xx. It was my leg to [destination airport]. I applied takeoff thrust and scanned the engine instruments briefly and preformed a normal takeoff.the flight operated normally through most of the flight. It was during our descent that we both noticed an audible thump noise in 3 quick successions; coming from the number 2 engine. This was followed by another audible noise. Almost immediately; we both recognized what appeared to be a compressor stall. My pilot monitoring quickly referenced the QRH and performed the procedure. The determination was made through the QRH that the engine should remain operational and not shut down; (per the procedure). We decided to land in [destination airport] at this point in time; given that we were closest to that location. We discussed and communicated a thorough arrival plan. The captain; after a discussion with me decided to become the pilot flying. I became the pilot monitoring for the rest of the flight. We continued to [destination airport] with a short visual approach in VMC conditions with no further abnormal indications. The approach was made successfully and a normal landing was performed.had we not been involved with company personnel during this situation; the captain and I would have returned to the gate without question. It is my belief that this scenario would have still played out the same regardless of a gate return. My personal litmus test for continuing on any flight I operate is this: can I put my three children and wife into this aircraft and takeoff knowing it is safe to do so? I did not have any feeling; not one goose bump that what we were doing was egregious in any way. In my mind; we were assessing a potential risk with subject experts involved on multiple levels. Without a doubt; we as pilots and mechanics need more clear guidance on engine malfunctions while on the ground. I felt frustrated due to the lack of information on engine assessment for oursituation; i.e. Cold-soaked; first flight; windy conditions; and possibly go-no-go guidance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew and dispatch reported that during taxi the number 2 engine failed; but after restart all indications were normal until descent when the engine surged/stalled several times.

Narrative: Pushback occurred at (time). On the pushback I was instructed to start the number 2 engine. I started the number 2 engine and verified a normal start. All engine indications were operating within normal parameters. Next; I was instructed to start the number 1 engine. Again; a normal engine start was observed. After completion of the Before Taxi Checklist; I obtained clearance to taxi the aircraft to Runway XX. Just prior to turning onto Taxiway D the number 2 engine rolled back. I let ATC know that we had an issue and would like to stop our taxi and asses our situation. The parking brake was set and we both started to apply Risk and Resource Management to this situation. We communicated that it would be a good idea to get our Support People involved. The Captain handed control of the aircraft over to me while he contacted Maintenance and Dispatch. After several minutes of consultation with Maintenance and Dispatch and also consulting the QRH; we were instructed to restart the number 2 engine.The engine was started and operated within normal parameters. After the start; the Captain; in coordination with Maintenance and Dispatch; performed an operational check of the engine. The engine again appeared to be normal. After several throttle advances and several minutes running at idle; the Captain and I; as well as Dispatch and Maintenance; to my knowledge; agreed it was safe and acceptable to continue the flight. After the Captain was through speaking to Dispatch and Maintenance; the Captain conveyed that Maintenance showed no prior history on the number 2 engine. All of the information I was receiving at the time was third hand. At this point the Captain and I worked together on the 'shared mental model.' This would define our expectations and plans going forward. We both formed a solid contingency plan by communicating risk and intentions with thorough briefings as we do on every flight of every day. The plan was to return immediately to XXX should anything happen after takeoff. We were cleared for takeoff on Runway XX. It was my leg to [destination airport]. I applied takeoff thrust and scanned the engine instruments briefly and preformed a normal takeoff.The flight operated normally through most of the flight. It was during our descent that we both noticed an audible thump noise in 3 quick successions; coming from the number 2 engine. This was followed by another audible noise. Almost immediately; we both recognized what appeared to be a compressor stall. My Pilot Monitoring quickly referenced the QRH and performed the procedure. The determination was made through the QRH that the engine should remain operational and not shut down; (per the procedure). We decided to land in [destination airport] at this point in time; given that we were closest to that location. We discussed and communicated a thorough arrival plan. The Captain; after a discussion with me decided to become the Pilot Flying. I became the Pilot Monitoring for the rest of the flight. We continued to [destination airport] with a short visual approach in VMC conditions with no further abnormal indications. The approach was made successfully and a normal landing was performed.Had we not been involved with Company Personnel during this situation; the Captain and I would have returned to the gate without question. It is my belief that this scenario would have still played out the same regardless of a gate return. My personal litmus test for continuing on any flight I operate is this: Can I put my three children and wife into this aircraft and takeoff knowing it is safe to do so? I did not have any feeling; not one goose bump that what we were doing was egregious in any way. In my mind; we were assessing a potential risk with subject experts involved on multiple levels. Without a doubt; we as Pilots and Mechanics need more clear guidance on engine malfunctions while on the ground. I felt frustrated due to the lack of information on engine assessment for oursituation; i.e. cold-soaked; first flight; windy conditions; and possibly go-no-go guidance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.