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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1505027 |
Time | |
Date | 201712 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | None |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Emergency Exit |
Person 1 | |
Function | Lead Technician Technician |
Person 2 | |
Function | Technician |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
There were two other amt's and a qa inspector on or at the aircraft. I took the task of being the monitor amt and the other two amt's were the task amt's. We were assigned the task of putting the left over wing exit hatch back into a serviceable condition. This included re-arming the emergency escape system. Initially [the] steps were confusing to me. I had to re-read them several times; eventually I became frustrated with what I interpreted them to be. Having said that I now know that I made a mistake by not continuing to be the monitor of the task. At the time of the incident I felt that I had interpreted the point the paperwork was trying to convey to me. I then let my mechanical experience take over and proceeded to do what I felt should have been done to complete the task within the intent of our assigned referenced task.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 Maintenance crew reported that they installed an over-wing slide and it deployed when they connected the electrical connector.
Narrative: There were two other AMT's and a QA Inspector on or at the aircraft. I took the task of being the monitor AMT and the other two AMT's were the task AMT's. We were assigned the task of putting the left over wing exit hatch back into a serviceable condition. This included re-arming the emergency escape system. Initially [the] steps were confusing to me. I had to re-read them several times; eventually I became frustrated with what I interpreted them to be. Having said that I now know that I made a mistake by not continuing to be the monitor of the task. At the time of the incident I felt that I had interpreted the point the paperwork was trying to convey to me. I then let my mechanical experience take over and proceeded to do what I felt should have been done to complete the task within the intent of our assigned referenced task.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.