Narrative:

Aircraft X; departed for ZZZ. We departed under ops spec A012 which did not require an alternate in belize due to good weather. We were planned to arrive with about 8500 pounds of fuel. Neither I nor my first officer had been to [this airport] prior.as we entered the local area on the arrival; we were placed into holding about 40 miles from the field as heavy rain moved through the area. The weather was at minimums for the approach. This was unforecast. We coordinated with dispatch to find us a suitable alternate. I requested [an alternate airport] since it seemed like the closest alternate with support facilities for our passengers; and it had regularly scheduled jet airline traffic. The fuel burn to [an alternate] would have had us landing below 4000 pounds of fuel. Fortunately; we were quickly cleared the approach and landed with around 7000 pounds of fuel.I know that we operate underthe time into [foreign airports] and other locations. It allows flexibility to our operations and better ATOG accommodations. It is logical; but it is also based on numerous assumptions that may not be accurate the farther south of [the] border that you fly. I have about two decades of flying experience in 38 different countries. When I did this for the [military] we always required an alternate at all overseas locations. This was due to inconsistent weather reporting and facilities reliability. I also could carry 332;500 pounds of fuel.. So I know our limitations with the 737.that being said; I think that our sod and international operations folks need to take a better look at our policy of not requiring an alternate the farther south that we fly. A better approach on mission planning should be; if you are operating south; to require the alternate from the beginning and then use a decision guide to see if you can opt to not use one. Start the decision process with the requirement... And then when facts; forecasts; and pilot reports show better conditions; removing the alternate could be an option.[the airport] is a version of a small regional airport with minimal support facilities that meet ICAO; but not us standards. Weather reporting is sporadic. Weather radar coverage did not seem to be available via wsi because it showed nothing in the area; and we had a good satellite link. Approach control seemed to have no idea the extent and direction of the storm system that had moved in. This is fairly standard for central and south american flying and only gets worse in the developing world. This is a fact of operational life down south. The question is how we; as a company; deal with these operational realities.as we discussed these issues on our moonlit ride back to houston; my first officer and I discussed the operational realities of what a night diversion to somewhere would have entailed. Considering that we had no spanish speaking crew members; no satcom; no HF communication; and cell phones that might have worked; we acknowledged that we may have dodged a bullet. Then my first officer relayed a story of a crew who; after a overnight; opened up the logbook to find the inbound fuel of 3.2; and a writeup saying that fuel levels in the main tanks had gotten below the 1675 pounds required for hydraulic cooling in our aom limitations. We need to understand; as a company; that there needs to be a heightened awareness of international operations in our planning and execution phase. That heightened awareness was not evident on my flight. From planning; communication; contingencies; and offline divert; these flights need more considerations the farther south we go. This includes the policy of allowing us to fly south without satcom or HF; or an automatic alternate. Like that crew that landed with 3.2....we may be operating on luck.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported the flight plan they were on did not require an alternate due to good weather; when they arrived the weather was at minimums with no alternate.

Narrative: Aircraft X; departed for ZZZ. We departed under Ops Spec A012 which did not require an alternate in Belize due to good weather. We were planned to arrive with about 8500 pounds of fuel. Neither I nor my First Officer had been to [this airport] prior.As we entered the local area on the arrival; we were placed into holding about 40 miles from the field as heavy rain moved through the area. The weather was at minimums for the approach. This was unforecast. We coordinated with Dispatch to find us a suitable alternate. I requested [an alternate airport] since it seemed like the closest alternate with support facilities for our Passengers; and it had regularly scheduled jet airline traffic. The fuel burn to [an alternate] would have had us landing below 4000 pounds of fuel. Fortunately; we were quickly cleared the approach and landed with around 7000 pounds of fuel.I know that we operate underthe time into [foreign airports] and other locations. It allows flexibility to our operations and better ATOG accommodations. It is logical; but it is also based on numerous assumptions that may not be accurate the farther south of [the] border that you fly. I have about two decades of flying experience in 38 different countries. When I did this for the [military] we always required an alternate at all overseas locations. This was due to inconsistent weather reporting and facilities reliability. I also could carry 332;500 pounds of fuel.. so I know our limitations with the 737.That being said; I think that our SOD and International Operations folks need to take a better look at our policy of not requiring an alternate the farther south that we fly. A better approach on mission planning should be; if you are operating south; to require the alternate from the beginning and then use a decision guide to see if you can opt to not use one. Start the decision process with the requirement... and then when facts; forecasts; and Pilot reports show better conditions; removing the alternate could be an option.[The airport] is a version of a small regional airport with minimal support facilities that meet ICAO; but not US standards. Weather reporting is sporadic. Weather radar coverage did not seem to be available via WSI because it showed nothing in the area; and we had a good satellite link. Approach Control seemed to have no idea the extent and direction of the storm system that had moved in. This is fairly standard for Central and South American flying and only gets worse in the developing world. This is a fact of operational life down south. The question is how we; as a Company; deal with these operational realities.As we discussed these issues on our moonlit ride back to Houston; my First Officer and I discussed the operational realities of what a night diversion to somewhere would have entailed. Considering that we had no Spanish speaking Crew Members; no SATCOM; no HF communication; and cell phones that might have worked; we acknowledged that we may have dodged a bullet. Then my First Officer relayed a story of a Crew who; after a overnight; opened up the logbook to find the inbound fuel of 3.2; and a writeup saying that fuel levels in the main tanks had gotten below the 1675 pounds required for hydraulic cooling in our AOM limitations. We need to understand; as a Company; that there needs to be a heightened awareness of international operations in our planning and execution phase. That heightened awareness was not evident on my flight. From planning; communication; contingencies; and offline divert; these flights need more considerations the farther south we go. This includes the policy of allowing us to fly south without SATCOM or HF; or an automatic alternate. Like that Crew that landed with 3.2....we may be operating on luck.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.