Narrative:

I was the captain/pilot flying on aircraft X. The incident occurred during cruise at FL330; approximately 80 NM south of the border; and in contact with center. Our first indication that something non-standard was occurring began when the first officer (first officer) and I heard a continuous loud knocking noise; which seemed to be coming from the flight deck door. The knocking continued for approximately 30 seconds as we tried to ascertain what was happening. I pressed the attend button to attempt contact with the a flight attendant to determine if we were experiencing a security event; if she knew the source of the noise; and to verify the intercom system had not failed.the B flight attendant answered the intercom from the rear galley. She stated there was an older male passenger standing near the flight deck door whom appeared confused as to where the lavatory was and that she would intervene. Approximately 30 seconds later; the B flight attendant called me back and stated the a flight attendant was down on the forward galley floor and unconscious.I immediately directed the first officer to inform center that we had a medical emergency on board and that we would be diverting. I knew this would at least get us headed north towards the border; and give us time to fine tune our plan with dispatch as to the best alternate. I transferred the aircraft to the first officer; and as we began our turn north I started coordinating with dispatch.dispatch copied the required information; stated [a different airport] was a closer alternate; and that they would run the numbers to make sure landing performance was acceptable due to our being in a fully loaded [aircraft]. Med-link was also patched through and I informed the B flight attendant. The B flight attendant told me the a was still unresponsive and being slightly combative as she lapsed in and out of consciousness. After some initial difficulties; the med-link connection was made; but later dropped offline and a continuous recording played. Simultaneously; the C and D flight attendants informed me they were dealing with a teenage passenger who was repeatedly vomiting around the aft galley and lavs. Normally this wouldn't be worth noting; but one of the aft lavs was MEL'd; and a line had already been forming when the sick passenger soiled one of the 2 remaining aft lavs. The D flight attendant had only been on-line for 2 weeks and dealt with trying to aid the sick passenger and restore use of the soiled lav while the C flight attendant began to prepare the cabin for arrival. About this time; we were handed off to [another] center who cleared us direct to zzzzz intersection on the arrival into [diversion airport].dispatch sent us acceptable landing data for ZZZ and informed me that we would be landing in excess of our structural limit weight. I began reviewing our arrival plan with the first officer; accomplished the required checklists; and verified that center was aware that we had [requested priority] due to an incapacitated cabin crew member. I checked back with the B flight attendant and directed her to put the a flight attendant on oxygen since she was now mostly conscious; and there was no further time to troubleshoot the med-link connection. Center then cleared us direct to the FAF and handed us off to approach.as we neared the airport; I assumed control of the aircraft for the impending overweight landing; and realized we were now high on the approach due to flying fast; our heavy weight; and all the subsequent direct clearances ATC had been providing. I began some s-turns and requested a 360 turn which was denied due to multiple traffic targets. Realizing landing would not be feasible without aggressive maneuvering on the approach; I elected to go around at approximately 1500ft; and requested a vector for the visual approach to runway. The landing and taxi to the gate was uneventful and emergency medical personnel were waiting for us at the gate.to say this was an incredible amount of information to processin a limited time is an understatement. These events; and more; took place over approximately 20 minutes. A pilot reference card would have been invaluable regarding an emergency inflight diversion to ensure all of our bases were covered. I probably asked the first officer twenty times if he could think of anything we'd forgotten to address. A checklist type format would have provided a very reassuring reference.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported an enroute diversion due to several on board medical situations. A successful overweight landing was accomplished.

Narrative: I was the Captain/Pilot Flying on Aircraft X. The incident occurred during cruise at FL330; approximately 80 NM south of the border; and in contact with Center. Our first indication that something non-standard was occurring began when the First Officer (FO) and I heard a continuous loud knocking noise; which seemed to be coming from the flight deck door. The knocking continued for approximately 30 seconds as we tried to ascertain what was happening. I pressed the ATTEND button to attempt contact with the A Flight Attendant to determine if we were experiencing a security event; if she knew the source of the noise; and to verify the intercom system had not failed.The B flight attendant answered the intercom from the rear galley. She stated there was an older male passenger standing near the flight deck door whom appeared confused as to where the lavatory was and that she would intervene. Approximately 30 seconds later; the B Flight Attendant called me back and stated the A Flight Attendant was down on the forward galley floor and unconscious.I immediately directed the FO to inform Center that we had a medical emergency on board and that we would be diverting. I knew this would at least get us headed north towards the border; and give us time to fine tune our plan with dispatch as to the best alternate. I transferred the aircraft to the FO; and as we began our turn north I started coordinating with dispatch.Dispatch copied the required information; stated [a different airport] was a closer alternate; and that they would run the numbers to make sure landing performance was acceptable due to our being in a fully loaded [aircraft]. Med-Link was also patched through and I informed the B Flight Attendant. The B Flight Attendant told me the A was still unresponsive and being slightly combative as she lapsed in and out of consciousness. After some initial difficulties; the Med-Link connection was made; but later dropped offline and a continuous recording played. Simultaneously; the C and D Flight Attendants informed me they were dealing with a teenage passenger who was repeatedly vomiting around the aft galley and lavs. Normally this wouldn't be worth noting; but one of the aft lavs was MEL'd; and a line had already been forming when the sick passenger soiled one of the 2 remaining aft lavs. The D Flight Attendant had only been on-line for 2 weeks and dealt with trying to aid the sick passenger and restore use of the soiled lav while the C FA began to prepare the cabin for arrival. About this time; we were handed off to [another] Center who cleared us direct to ZZZZZ Intersection on the arrival into [diversion airport].Dispatch sent us acceptable landing data for ZZZ and informed me that we would be landing in excess of our structural limit weight. I began reviewing our arrival plan with the FO; accomplished the required checklists; and verified that Center was aware that we had [requested priority] due to an incapacitated cabin crew member. I checked back with the B Flight Attendant and directed her to put the A Flight Attendant on oxygen since she was now mostly conscious; and there was no further time to troubleshoot the Med-Link connection. Center then cleared us direct to the FAF and handed us off to Approach.As we neared the airport; I assumed control of the aircraft for the impending overweight landing; and realized we were now high on the approach due to flying fast; our heavy weight; and all the subsequent direct clearances ATC had been providing. I began some S-turns and requested a 360 turn which was denied due to multiple traffic targets. Realizing landing would not be feasible without aggressive maneuvering on the approach; I elected to go around at approximately 1500ft; and requested a vector for the visual approach to runway. The landing and taxi to the gate was uneventful and emergency medical personnel were waiting for us at the gate.To say this was an incredible amount of information to processin a limited time is an understatement. These events; and more; took place over approximately 20 minutes. A Pilot Reference Card would have been invaluable regarding an emergency inflight diversion to ensure all of our bases were covered. I probably asked the FO twenty times if he could think of anything we'd forgotten to address. A checklist type format would have provided a very reassuring reference.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.