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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1507977 |
Time | |
Date | 201712 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
After an otherwise very quiet flight; I briefed our arrival and approach plan prior to reaching top of descent. The descent was stable per my briefing. I was very focused on my instruments; so when the captain threw his right arm out with the checklist in his hand; I was incredibly startled since I could only see it out the corner of my eye. My initial thought was that he was going to hit me; until I realized that he was in fact only holding the checklist. I closed my eyes for a moment; took a deep breath and composed myself. The following is the ensuing dialog:first officer: 'what can I do for you?'ca: 'here...you want the arrival checklist so bad; you can run the damn checklist'fo: 'captain; please run the arrival checklist'ca: 'no; if you want the ****ing checklist; you can run the damn checklist!'I took a deep breath and evaluated the captain's emotions. I could not comprehend why he might behave in this manner since nothing was previously brought to my attention; and trying to figure it out only threatened the stability of the arrival and compounded the threats. To hopefully avoid a total CRM meltdown; I tried to help him see the issue from another angle.first officer: 'captain; are you sure you don't want to just run the checklist? It's our SOP; and if god-forbid anything happens to this airplane and the FAA has to pull our tapes; they're going to view this as willful non-compliance and both of our certificates are at risk and we could both face disciplinary action. Is that really worth it to you? Can we please just run the checklist?'I said this as I looked at the captain to try to get a read on him; and he only appeared more angry. His breathing seemed to be getting heavier; and I determined that the situation was not going to improve. The captain broke his glare at me; looked through the front windscreen and placed the checklist back between the window and glare-shield without saying a word. At that point my goal was to avoid further escalation; and remain calm. To hopefully deescalate the situation; I elected to read the arrival checklist verbally myself to ensure compliance and avoid an in-flight altercation.we were originally assigned runway xyr; but were then switched to xyl and given vectors for the approach. I made the appropriate change in the FMS and verified the proper ILS frequencies were selected. We were then advised of a medical emergency inbound; and we were assigned [another runway]. Again; I made the changes in the FMS and verified the proper ILS frequencies and missed approach procedures. After I called for the final configuration change for landing and the landing checklist; the captain recited the checklist from memory; rather than reading from the physical checklist. He used old; non-standard terminology ie: 'landing gear down; 3 green.....flaps set 45' as opposed to the current checklist. I verified with the physical checklist that he had at least checked the appropriate items; albeit with improper nomenclature and continued the approach. I had no faith that any form of correction at that point would have led to a favorable outcome.after landing and transferring controls back to the captain we taxied uneventfully to the gate; where he called for the parking checklist. We ran the parking checklist although he did not look at any of the items. I went through each item silently after the fact and visually verified that everything was in its correct position prior to exiting the aircraft.threats: crew member who has not learned or reviewed current SOP; willful/conscientious non-compliance; captain's hazardous attitudeerrors: choosing not to learn and willfully not comply with current SOP uas: I don't believe we ended up in a uas (undesired aircraft state); though we were certainly headed for one based on the captain's actions. I did everything I thought I could to ensure compliance with SOP while mitigating threats to a manageable level. I do wish to know if we did in fact reach a uas; and would very much like to learn from this experience.based on my training and experience; I believe that I handled this as calmly; professionally; and tactfully as possible.I'm not sure how this captain has gotten away with running checklists (or in this case; not). I was hopeful that painting a clearer picture of the repercussions of will-full non-compliance would be enough to convince him to run the checklists per SOP; but it only served to anger him. I was so uncomfortable being near someone so unprofessional and angry that I feared my personal safety might be at risk if I attempted to debrief him after parking. If the emotional side was not an issue; I would have politely asked for any kind of clarification or justification for his decisions not to run the checklists per SOP. Having to deal with this type of situation is inherently uncomfortable; extraordinarily stressful; and can be downright scary. However; I believe that the integrity of the operation for both legal and safety reasons should; and can never be sacrificed so I elected to speak up to the captain. We often talk about situations like this in training; but I feel like many pilots don't fully embrace the possibility of it happening to them. I know that it took me a few seconds to fully accept that this was actually happening; and that the situation doesn't only happen in hypothetical CRM training scenarios.I'm not certain how best to proceed; but I do wish to somehow share my experience with the pilot group to demonstrate that this (very unfortunately) can happen. I feel that I handled the situation to the best of my abilities; but I can always improve and learn how to better handle future endeavors.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ERJ-145 First Officer reported breakdown of CRM and Captain's professionalism.
Narrative: After an otherwise very quiet flight; I briefed our arrival and approach plan prior to reaching top of descent. The descent was stable per my briefing. I was very focused on my instruments; so when the captain threw his right arm out with the checklist in his hand; I was incredibly startled since I could only see it out the corner of my eye. My initial thought was that he was going to hit me; until I realized that he was in fact only holding the checklist. I closed my eyes for a moment; took a deep breath and composed myself. The following is the ensuing dialog:FO: 'What can I do for you?'CA: 'Here...you want the arrival checklist so bad; YOU can run the damn checklist'FO: 'Captain; please run the arrival checklist'CA: 'No; if you want the ****ing checklist; YOU can run the damn checklist!'I took a deep breath and evaluated the captain's emotions. I could not comprehend why he might behave in this manner since nothing was previously brought to my attention; and trying to figure it out only threatened the stability of the arrival and compounded the threats. To hopefully avoid a total CRM meltdown; I tried to help him see the issue from another angle.FO: 'Captain; are you SURE you don't want to just run the checklist? It's our SOP; and if God-forbid anything happens to this airplane and the FAA has to pull our tapes; they're going to view this as willful non-compliance and BOTH of our certificates are at risk and we could BOTH face disciplinary action. Is that really worth it to you? Can we please just run the checklist?'I said this as I looked at the captain to try to get a read on him; and he only appeared more angry. His breathing seemed to be getting heavier; and I determined that the situation was not going to improve. The captain broke his glare at me; looked through the front windscreen and placed the checklist back between the window and glare-shield without saying a word. At that point my goal was to avoid further escalation; and remain calm. To hopefully deescalate the situation; I elected to read the arrival checklist verbally myself to ensure compliance and avoid an in-flight altercation.We were originally assigned runway XYR; but were then switched to XYL and given vectors for the approach. I made the appropriate change in the FMS and verified the proper ILS frequencies were selected. We were then advised of a medical emergency inbound; and we were assigned [another runway]. Again; I made the changes in the FMS and verified the proper ILS frequencies and missed approach procedures. After I called for the final configuration change for landing and the landing checklist; the captain recited the checklist from memory; rather than reading from the physical checklist. He used old; non-standard terminology ie: 'landing gear down; 3 green.....flaps set 45' as opposed to the current checklist. I verified with the physical checklist that he had at least checked the appropriate items; albeit with improper nomenclature and continued the approach. I had no faith that any form of correction at that point would have led to a favorable outcome.After landing and transferring controls back to the captain we taxied uneventfully to the gate; where he called for the parking checklist. We ran the parking checklist although he did not look at any of the items. I went through each item silently after the fact and visually verified that everything was in its correct position prior to exiting the aircraft.Threats: crew member who has not learned or reviewed current SOP; willful/conscientious non-compliance; captain's hazardous attitudeErrors: choosing not to learn and willfully not comply with current SOP UAS: I don't believe we ended up in a UAS (Undesired Aircraft State); though we were certainly headed for one based on the captain's actions. I did everything I thought I could to ensure compliance with SOP while mitigating threats to a manageable level. I do wish to know if we DID in fact reach a UAS; and would very much like to learn from this experience.Based on my training and experience; I believe that I handled this as calmly; professionally; and tactfully as possible.I'm not sure how this captain has gotten away with running checklists (or in this case; not). I was hopeful that painting a clearer picture of the repercussions of will-full non-compliance would be enough to convince him to run the checklists per SOP; but it only served to anger him. I was so uncomfortable being near someone so unprofessional and angry that I feared my personal safety might be at risk if I attempted to debrief him after parking. If the emotional side was not an issue; I would have politely asked for any kind of clarification or justification for his decisions not to run the checklists per SOP. Having to deal with this type of situation is inherently uncomfortable; extraordinarily stressful; and can be downright scary. However; I believe that the integrity of the operation for both legal and safety reasons should; and can never be sacrificed so I elected to speak up to the captain. We often talk about situations like this in training; but I feel like many pilots don't fully embrace the possibility of it happening to them. I know that it took me a few seconds to fully accept that this was actually happening; and that the situation doesn't only happen in hypothetical CRM training scenarios.I'm not certain how best to proceed; but I do wish to somehow share my experience with the pilot group to demonstrate that this (very unfortunately) CAN happen. I feel that I handled the situation to the best of my abilities; but I can always improve and learn how to better handle future endeavors.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.