Narrative:

On july, 1990, I flew (as captain) from st louis to kansas city, mci airport. Passenger load was full, 12 in first class, 134 in coach. Takeoff, climb, cruise, descent and landing were normal and routine. About 2 mi out on final approach, tower advised a light rain shower had drifted over the field, reducing ceiling and visibility to about 800' and 2-3 mi...not a problem. Windshield wipers were required and turned on in low. Landing was very smooth at approximately 1800 from the threshold of runway 27 (mci) at near maximum structural landing weight (149100 pounds), on centerline, on speed, 135 KTS. Landing in normal deceleration. The runway is approximately 9500' long; abeam the C-7 high speed turn off I elected to allow the aircraft to roll to the end of the runway, another 2400' to C-8 turn off, rather than use heavy braking to exit C-7, the high speed, which was possible to make. I released brakes abeam C-7 and allowed the aircraft to roll to the end of the runway. Flaps, spoilers, reverse idle thrust all remained in landing and stopping confign, respectively. Approaching the end of the runway, C-8 turn off, a 90 degree turn off, I used a small amount of additional braking and began turning off at what I felt was a safe taxi speed. A proper taxi speed. In the turn, the nose wheel lost traction on the wet concrete of C-8 taxiway. I immediately applied heavy braking, aligned the nose wheel, momentarily in the direction of the nose wheel skid and returned to the right turn. The nose wheel failed to respond to the right turn and tracked taxiway lights onto the asphalt hard surface from the concrete hard surface, then back onto the concrete hard surface. I immediately reported to the tower (first officer called) that we had run down one or two taxi lights. Continuing to the gate, I requested a full inspection of all landing gear by maintenance. Later, the tower reported that no damage had been done to the landing lights (a ground inspection veh was dispatched to C-8) and maintenance reported no damage to nose wheel ies, truck or main gear which remained on the taxiway. I flew the aircraft back to st louis after being given approval by my chief pilot in st louis. Factors which contributed to this extremely hazardous, potentially dangerous incident was wet runway, extremely slippery pavement on that specific runway end, high gross weight and excessive speed for the existing conditions even though I felt sure the speed was properly slow as did first officer and F/east. The rain on windshield and wipers may have contributed to my failure to perceive how slippery it was. This runway should be grooved! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. The runway is grooved but is slick in this area. Conditions suggested rubber deposit build up could be a contributing factor. No FAA action has been taken to date. Also said several other aircraft had problems taxiing in this area and the company has been apprised of the incident.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT TXWY EXCURSION TURNING OFF A WET SLIPPERY RWY AFTER LNDG.

Narrative: ON JULY, 1990, I FLEW (AS CAPT) FROM ST LOUIS TO KANSAS CITY, MCI ARPT. PAX LOAD WAS FULL, 12 IN FIRST CLASS, 134 IN COACH. TKOF, CLB, CRUISE, DSNT AND LNDG WERE NORMAL AND ROUTINE. ABOUT 2 MI OUT ON FINAL APCH, TWR ADVISED A LIGHT RAIN SHOWER HAD DRIFTED OVER THE FIELD, REDUCING CEILING AND VISIBILITY TO ABOUT 800' AND 2-3 MI...NOT A PROB. WINDSHIELD WIPERS WERE REQUIRED AND TURNED ON IN LOW. LNDG WAS VERY SMOOTH AT APPROX 1800 FROM THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 27 (MCI) AT NEAR MAX STRUCTURAL LNDG WT (149100 LBS), ON CTRLINE, ON SPD, 135 KTS. LNDG IN NORMAL DECELERATION. THE RWY IS APPROX 9500' LONG; ABEAM THE C-7 HIGH SPD TURN OFF I ELECTED TO ALLOW THE ACFT TO ROLL TO THE END OF THE RWY, ANOTHER 2400' TO C-8 TURN OFF, RATHER THAN USE HVY BRAKING TO EXIT C-7, THE HIGH SPD, WHICH WAS POSSIBLE TO MAKE. I RELEASED BRAKES ABEAM C-7 AND ALLOWED THE ACFT TO ROLL TO THE END OF THE RWY. FLAPS, SPOILERS, REVERSE IDLE THRUST ALL REMAINED IN LNDG AND STOPPING CONFIGN, RESPECTIVELY. APCHING THE END OF THE RWY, C-8 TURN OFF, A 90 DEG TURN OFF, I USED A SMALL AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL BRAKING AND BEGAN TURNING OFF AT WHAT I FELT WAS A SAFE TAXI SPD. A PROPER TAXI SPD. IN THE TURN, THE NOSE WHEEL LOST TRACTION ON THE WET CONCRETE OF C-8 TXWY. I IMMEDIATELY APPLIED HVY BRAKING, ALIGNED THE NOSE WHEEL, MOMENTARILY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NOSE WHEEL SKID AND RETURNED TO THE R TURN. THE NOSE WHEEL FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE R TURN AND TRACKED TXWY LIGHTS ONTO THE ASPHALT HARD SURFACE FROM THE CONCRETE HARD SURFACE, THEN BACK ONTO THE CONCRETE HARD SURFACE. I IMMEDIATELY RPTED TO THE TWR (F/O CALLED) THAT WE HAD RUN DOWN ONE OR TWO TAXI LIGHTS. CONTINUING TO THE GATE, I REQUESTED A FULL INSPECTION OF ALL LNDG GEAR BY MAINT. LATER, THE TWR RPTED THAT NO DAMAGE HAD BEEN DONE TO THE LNDG LIGHTS (A GND INSPECTION VEH WAS DISPATCHED TO C-8) AND MAINT RPTED NO DAMAGE TO NOSE WHEEL IES, TRUCK OR MAIN GEAR WHICH REMAINED ON THE TXWY. I FLEW THE ACFT BACK TO ST LOUIS AFTER BEING GIVEN APPROVAL BY MY CHIEF PLT IN ST LOUIS. FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS, POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS INCIDENT WAS WET RWY, EXTREMELY SLIPPERY PAVEMENT ON THAT SPECIFIC RWY END, HIGH GROSS WT AND EXCESSIVE SPD FOR THE EXISTING CONDITIONS EVEN THOUGH I FELT SURE THE SPD WAS PROPERLY SLOW AS DID F/O AND F/E. THE RAIN ON WINDSHIELD AND WIPERS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO MY FAILURE TO PERCEIVE HOW SLIPPERY IT WAS. THIS RWY SHOULD BE GROOVED! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. THE RWY IS GROOVED BUT IS SLICK IN THIS AREA. CONDITIONS SUGGESTED RUBBER DEPOSIT BUILD UP COULD BE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. NO FAA ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO DATE. ALSO SAID SEVERAL OTHER ACFT HAD PROBS TAXIING IN THIS AREA AND THE COMPANY HAS BEEN APPRISED OF THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.