Narrative:

On approach into lax landing on 24R. We were configuring for landing. We were instructed to hold 180 knots to the final approach fix. We were on speed and had lowered the gear prior to the FAF. At the FAF; the first officer (first officer) called for flaps 30. I selected flaps 30 and the high-speed clacker went off as we were a few knots fast; and I did not catch the speed difference before selecting flaps 30. We slowed below 170 knots and he then called for flaps 45 and before landing check. I then checked the spoilers and selected flaps to 45. As I looked up to set the final reference speed; I noticed we were below reference and decelerating quickly. I immediately called 'speed' three times quickly. The first officer responded by adding power but just a small amount. I was reaching for the controls when we received a stick shaker. I took the controls and turned off the autopilot. I quickly performed the stall recovery procedure. I added power and we were already descending. We recovered our speed quickly and were stable before 1000 feet. I estimate the event happened at about 1700 feet AGL. I landed the plane with no further incident. The time from when I looked at the speed to set flaps 45 to the time we received the stick shaker was approximately ten to fifteen seconds. We were in visual conditions.cause: we were conducting new hire initial operating experience; so the training environment definitely contributed. In the de-brief; I learned that the student upon hearing the momentary clacker only thought over speed and reduced the throttle to idle or close to [it]. I did not notice such a drastic throttle reduction as I was setting flaps. The throttle position with the addition of flaps 45 lead to a drastic deceleration. We were working on our call outs as well during this time so that added to the workload and confusion.suggestions: I felt prepared for the approach and we were acting on our briefed plan of action. Yet my student's inexperience and my momentary distraction led to an undesired aircraft state. In the future; I will continue to brief the plan of action; but I will check on the aircraft flight path more often. I will also try to be more aware of what normally would happen; does not always apply; especially while training. I will also try to sharpen my senses to other cues such as engine noise.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 flight crew reported a stick shaker occurred when landing flaps were extended with thrust levers at or near idle.

Narrative: On approach into LAX landing on 24R. We were configuring for landing. We were instructed to hold 180 knots to the final approach fix. We were on speed and had lowered the gear prior to the FAF. At the FAF; the First Officer (FO) called for flaps 30. I selected flaps 30 and the high-speed clacker went off as we were a few knots fast; and I did not catch the speed difference before selecting flaps 30. We slowed below 170 knots and he then called for flaps 45 and before landing check. I then checked the spoilers and selected flaps to 45. As I looked up to set the final reference speed; I noticed we were below reference and decelerating quickly. I immediately called 'Speed' three times quickly. The FO responded by adding power but just a small amount. I was reaching for the controls when we received a stick shaker. I took the controls and turned off the autopilot. I quickly performed the stall recovery procedure. I added power and we were already descending. We recovered our speed quickly and were stable before 1000 feet. I estimate the event happened at about 1700 feet AGL. I landed the plane with no further incident. The time from when I looked at the speed to set flaps 45 to the time we received the stick shaker was approximately ten to fifteen seconds. We were in visual conditions.Cause: We were conducting new hire Initial Operating Experience; so the training environment definitely contributed. In the de-brief; I learned that the student upon hearing the momentary clacker only thought over speed and reduced the throttle to idle or close to [it]. I did not notice such a drastic throttle reduction as I was setting flaps. The throttle position with the addition of flaps 45 lead to a drastic deceleration. We were working on our call outs as well during this time so that added to the workload and confusion.Suggestions: I felt prepared for the approach and we were acting on our briefed plan of action. Yet my student's inexperience and my momentary distraction led to an undesired aircraft state. In the future; I will continue to brief the plan of action; but I will check on the aircraft flight path more often. I will also try to be more aware of what normally would happen; does not always apply; especially while training. I will also try to sharpen my senses to other cues such as engine noise.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.